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ABSTRACT
Since the late 1970s, irregular employment arrangements
(short-term, temporary and part-time) have been growing in
firms with a history of well-developed internal labor
markets. The continued presence of these arrangements
alongside jobs in internal labor markets has raised
questions among researchers and policy makers about the
future role of irregular employment in firms' strategies for
workforce use. It has also raised concerns about the coming
shape of "enterprise internal labor markets."
During the 1980s, scholarship drew an analogy between
irregular and secondary employment and asked whether we have
witnessed the conversion of primary sector jobs into
"secondary-like" jobs through irregular employment. Using
this analogy has led researchers to see the growth of
irregular employment as indicative of the future "steady
state" of employment systems; the latter will be organized
on a core-ring basis, itself the result of employers
following a "low-wage" strategy. Researchers' use of the
primary/secondary employment model also has led them to
interpret irregular employment as a response to greater flux
and uncertainty, just as original definitions of secondary
employment would indicate.
My research on the French Banking and Insurance sectors
during the 1980s brings out a different use of irregular
employment than expected. French banks and insurance
companies used irregular employment to effect a
transformation of their employment system to a different
structure, while working with an existing workforce
composition and rules for personnel administration. In this
case, irregular employment is both a manifestation and a key
tool of that transition. The uses of irregular employment
documented in this study do not easily fit descriptions of
secondary employment, nor expectations of the growing core-
ring organization of the workforce in these sectors.
I identify two polar cases for understanding uses of
irregular employment in the 1980s. The first polar case,
the "low-wage, or core-ring strategy fits one aspect of
reality well. The second polar case, which I term the
"restructuring" or "transition" strategy, is exemplified by
the cases in this study.
In conlusion, I discuss the implications of these polar
cases for our understanding of irregular employment and of
secondary employment. I also present an assessment of the
aspects of these cases that are likely to be found in other
national contexts and those that are colored by the French
socio-institutional context.
Evidence for this study comes from interviews with
personnel, recruiting and training officials from major
banks and insurance companies and with representatives from
industry associations and union organizations. Interview
data were complemented with national, industry-level and
firm-level employment statistics.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
ORIGINS AND IMPLICATIONS OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
Since the late 1970s, irregular employment arrangements
(temporary, limited-duration and part-time) have grown in
firms with a history of well-developed internal labor
markets. 1 These arrangements are not new per se, but their
continued presence alongside jobs on internal labor markets
has raised questions among researchers and policy makers
about the future role of irregular employment in firms'
strategies for workforce use. It has also raised concerns
about the coming shape of "enterprise internal labor
markets."
Current forms of irregular employment are not explained
by models for traditionally casual employment which takes
place in very different economic circumstances of small,
ephemeral, or nonexistent firms. Additionally, because it
has grown in firms traditionally associated with the primary
sector, irregular employment cannot be easily assigned to
the secondary labor market.2
The analytical lens through which researchers
traditionally have looked at irregular employment has been
the model of the dual/segmented labor market. Roughly
1 See later on in the chapter for national trends on
France.
2 The latter was first defined as "a mixture of
internal labor markets and jobs not belonging to internal
labor markets" (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: 168).
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speaking, firms with internal labor markets provide primary
employment and firms without provide secondary employment.
Broad segments of existing scholarship on irregular
employment have subsumed its characteristics under secondary
employment and equated it with the latter. Thus, the
sustained presence of irregular employment within primary
sector firms violates the spirit of the dual, or segmented,
labor market models.
The original formulation of the distinction between
primary and secondary employment (Doeringer and Piore,
1971), and subsequent reformulations, did make room for
secondary jobs to be found "attached" to internal labor
markets, in other words, for the presence of secondary jobs
in primary sector firms. These secondary jobs, however,
consisted of tasks that were peripheral to production, or
seasonal. In a few cases, the only reason jobs with
secondary characteristics had become attached to internal
labor markets was because firms had found it
administratively easier to have consistent personnel rules
and not because of "compelling economic or social
reasons."3 Current forms of irregular employment, however,
do not fit this characterization.
During the 1980s, reliance on the analogy between
irregular and secondary employment led researchers to ask
3 Secondary jobs were "occasionally found attached to
internal labor markets in which the remainder of the jobs
are primary" (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: 167).
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whether we have witnessed the conversion of primary sector
jobs into "secondary-like" jobs through irregular
employment 4. Their main question was how many of the
characteristics of secondary employment fit irregular
arrangements.5 Using the primary/secondary employment
dichotomy has led researchers to interpret the growth of
irregular employment as pointing to the future "steady
state" of employment systems with a much larger share of
secondary jobs. They have argued that future employment
systems will be organized on a core-periphery basis,
resulting from the shrinkage of the core, and primary
employment, due to employers' following a low-wage strategy.
Researchers' use of the primary/secondary employment
model has also led them to interpret irregular employment as
a response to greater flux and uncertainty, which Piore
(1980) put forward as the "demand side" origin of secondary
employment historically. Secondary employment took place in
periphery firms which satisfied the unstable and uncertain
portions of demand while core firms catered to stable demand
and provided primary employment. The typologies developed
4 See among others, Appelbaum, 1987, 1992;
Christopherson, 1988; duRivage, ed, 1992; Noyelle, 1987;
Osterman, 1989.
5 The possibility also existed during the 1960s:
"..primary employers, through devices like subcontracting
and temporary employment, can convert primary employment
into secondary employment. (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: 166).
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by Osterman (1989) accommodated the presence of heterogenous
employment subsystems within firms; they are accompanied by
the notion that firms combine employment subsystems in
different ways over time. This perspective, however, also
assumed that secondary subsystems bear all the
characteristics of secondary employment (low skill, low
wage, high turnover) as first defined in the dual labor
market model and that they are designed to absorb some of
the uncertainty in firm activities.
Neo-classical analyses would also expect "secondary-
like" employment to be found in sectors experiencing flux
and uncertainty in economic activity because these are
sectors where it is too costly for firms to sustain
attachments to workers.
My case studies of the French Banking and Insurance
sectors during the 1980s, indicate, however, that the
expended use of irregular employment is not always
associated with great flux and uncertainty and may not
always prefigure the expansion of secondary employment in
some future steady-state employment structure and labor
market. French banks and insurance companies used irregular
employment to take their overall system of employment, and
existing workforce, through a major transition to a
different structure.6 Thus, irregular employment is both a
6 The forms of irregular employment they used are CDDs
(limited duration employment contracts, Contrat a Dur6e
Determinde), temporary help service contracts and part-time.
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way of accelerating, and a manifestation of, a transition
from a past to a future system of employment. As a
manifestation, irregular employment is expected to shrink
again in these sectors once the transition to a new
workforce composition and employment system has been made.
Analytically, irregular employment in this case does not
match closely with secondary employment.
This case --which I call the "restructuring" or
"transition" strategy-- stands in contrast, a polar
opposite, to the starkest prediction of the growth of
irregular employment as a result of firms' pursuing "core-
periphery/low-wage" strategies as short cuts out of the
pressures created by the economic environment of the 1980s.
As one of its implications, it adds further analysis to
existing evidence of heterogenous irregular employment as
documented by Noyelle (1987) or Bertrand and Noyelle (1989)
for service sector firms. These studies had noted
heterogeneity in skill level and institutional arrangement
(whether a job was precarious or not) .7
By delineating this second case and setting it in
opposition to existing accounts, I make an argument which is
akin, but not fully parallel, to distinctions that are well
developed in: a/ the literature of technology use -whether
new technologies are used as a cost saving device or to
7 Noyelle (1987) had concluded that the skill contents
of jobs, and not in what firm type a job was located,
determined whether a job was primary or secondary.
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create broadly skilled jobs; and b/ the research on
subcontracting patterns -whether relationships between prime
manufacturers and subcontractors are exploitative or
collaborative. These two bodies of research have explored
the opposite firm strategies triggered by "two-edged"
technological and market changes. This "restructuring"
case, similarly draws a distinction between patterns of
labor use and particularly how they manifest themselves in
uses of irregular employment. "Core-periphery" strategies
are ways for firms to go through the least amount of
internal employment reorganization, while "restructuring"
strategies entail significant changes to primary employment.
This case permits a bifurcation of demand side patterns
of labor use, and their interactions with labor supply. By
drawing a sharp distinction among the demand-side accounts
of uses of irregular employment, this study also differs
from other approaches which would draw sharp distinctions by
posing the question of whether the phenomenon is driven by
labor supply or labor demand. (see chpt. 6 for a discussion
of supply-side factors)
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In light of the above, research needs an analytical
construct, an "archetype" of sorts, that is sufficiently
distinct from secondary employment to account for uses of
irregular employment associated with the "restructuring"
cases of the type documented in this study. The archetypes
for primary and secondary employment --the building blocks
for segmented labor market models-- built a clear
relationship between job characteristics (e.g low wage,
peripheral to production) and institutional arrangement
(loose and precarious). That relationship has been
stretched when irregular employment, a "catch-all" category
for a set of institutional arrangements, has come to be used
in widely different ways and cannot be associated with one
type of firm strategy or one type of market. The approaches
that have identified the "core-periphery" strategy have
subsumed irregular arrangements into secondary employment;
in doing so, they capture one portion of firm practices but
not necessarily their full range.
A "new archetype", or an amended formulation of the
primary/secondary distinction, will need to account for the
two polar strategies alluded to above (and developed below)
and the range of intermediate cases. While this study does
not build a comprehensive archetype, it does bring out some
of the critical elements of the "restructuring" polar case
and thus contributes pieces towards an amended archetype.
The new "archetype" for irregular employment should be
built using elements of the secondary and primary employment
constructs. It only need be sufficiently unique to account
for cases of irregular employment that do not match with
secondary employment. A new archetype will need to specify:
a stylized empirical description, a market characterization,
a pattern of workforce behavior8 and an institutional
context. These elements originally went into the definition
of the dual labor markets model. Further, just as that
model analytically tied primary and secondary employment, so
the new archetype will need to tie irregular employment to
regular employment.
CENTRAL ARGUMENT
The contribution made by this study of irregular
employment in French insurance and banking is in the
building of the "restructuring" polar case. The study
spells out the characteristics of the case, and compares
them to the characteristics of the "core-periphery" polar
case. In keeping with the requirements for an archetype
described above, I focus on the empirical characterization
of irregular employment, and on the market and institutional
contexts for it. Except indirectly, by providing
demographic characteristics, the study does not address
exhaustively the behavioral component of irregular
employment (workers were not interviewed in the case
studies.)
Before moving on, I outline the essentials of the two
polar cases. The first polar case, the "low-wage, or core-
periphery" strategy fits one aspect of reality well. Firms
reassign large and growing portions of work to a low-wage
8 Workforce behavior which, in secondary employment,
fits neatly with, and is reproduced by, the organization of
tasks.
workforce covered by irregular employment arrangements. In
doing so, they are enabled by advances in micro-processor
based computer and communication technologies. Although
there are other ways to use new technologies to redesign
tasks, firms which fit this characterization use new
technologies to facilitate their use of a low-wage,
marginalized, workforce. Irregular arrangements are the
manifestation of this practice. Most research accounts of
this case draw the analogy between irregular and secondary
employment.
This first polar case also entails an interpretation of
the use of irregular employment in the 1980s as the blue-
print for the future organization of employment systems.
The upcoming "steady state" employment system will result
from the quantitative move away from primary employment and
toward secondary employment, the latter being equated with
irregular employment. Thus the economy will have large and
growing numbers of secondary jobs.
Another key element of this argument, not always
present, is that firms have implemented this strategy
because they can enforce it with greater ease in the 1980s
than in the previous two decades. Secondary/periphery
arrangements have grown because the workforce in both
primary and secondary employment is a/ either uninterested,
or too politically unorganized, to resist (arguments about
secondary workforces in industrialism) ; b/ too divided by
the division of labor and of markets to fight back; and/or
c/ weakened by the decline of union power.
The second polar case, which I term the "restructuring"
or "transition" strategy, is exemplified by the cases in
this thesis. This second strategy, is opposite to the
previous one because it does not fit irregular employment
closely to the secondary employment archetype, nor does it
make a clear prediction of a growing periphery of secondary
jobs in these sectors. The firms in French insurance and
banking have used irregular employment to accelerate a
transformation of their employment system while working with
constraints imposed by an existing workforce composition,
commitments to that workforce and existing rules of
personnel administration (internal labor market). Banks and
insurance companies have relied significantly on irregular
employment for some job categories to alter the distribution
of the workforce across job categories, drastically upgrade
recruiting requirements, to renew an existing workforce that
has low turnover, and to reconsider the career paths of some
occupation groups, all this without massive layoffs. Their
numerical use of irregular employment is modest but
nonetheless key to the transition in employment systems. It
is very specific and may not result in a lasting "core-
periphery" organization of the workforce. Additionally,
this case cannot be subsumed into the externalization of
secondary (peripheral) jobs which, previously, had been
"attached" to primary jobs through the extension of the
internal labor market rules for reasons of administrative
coherence. These peripheral jobs have indeed been handed
over to outside janitorial, courier or other service
contractors. There remains, however, a significant presence
of irregular employment (short-term, temporary and part-
time) in the two sectors for tasks which are not peripheral
to production activities.
In this second polar case, irregular employment
indicates transition to a different "steady state" of
employment systems which is not fully apparent in the
transition period. In firms which fit this case, employment
systems undergo a qualitative transformation with
consequences for regular employment as well. Thus the
process witnessed differs from the conversion of primary
jobs into secondary jobs.
FACTORS WHICH MAKE THE RESTRUCTURING CASE LIKELY
In order to make sure that this case is not an
"outlier" in some sense, some of its essential elements need
to be spelled out. In this way, we can identify: a/ the
circumstances in which the use of irregular employment for
"restructuring" strategies is more likely than for "core
periphery" strategies, and b/ how firms can be steered away
from the latter.
First, the French banking and insurance sectors have so
far stayed away from a "core periphery" strategy because,
for the two decades prior to the 1980s, they experienced
rapid and easy market expansion, which has provided them
with significant cash resources for personnel
administration. They experienced worries about their
operating accounts for the first time during the 1980s; they
were forecasting labor costs given their existing workforce
and rules of seniority-based promotion and pay increases.
It is in anticipation of their need to reduce workforce
costs that they accelerated the process of transformation of
employment systems and used irregular employment to that
effect.
Second, French banks and insurance companies had not
already developed during the 1970s what Osterman (1989)
would call "secondary arrangements" (part time shifts, high
turnover workforces) as many major U.S. service firms had.
Their clerical workers in low skill, routinized jobs were
part of the internal labor market because firms had needed
to retain them, either because the market was tight or
because they wanted to generate their own pool for promotion
into the middle levels. In the 1980s, personnel management
was not in the habit to cut personnel budgets yet. In
contrast, firms which adopted core-periphery strategies in
the 1980s, likely started as early as in the 1970s to weaken
the connection of their low skill clerical workers to their
primary internal labor market. Again, these other firms may
have had market strategies and organizational
characteristics which have historically been geared to
practices generating core-periphery structures.
Third, and to reinforce the previous point, the banks
and insurance companies I studied did not have employment
structures in place, nor the traditions, to further push
clerical workers to the periphery of the firm. Neither did
they seem to have a strong incentive to implement
technologies in those ways. Peripheral operations, such as
check processing centers, were slated for progressive job
reductions, not for further growth.
Concurrently, a set of generalized institutional
characteristics helped foster the use of irregular
employment for restructuring rather than core-periphery
strategies. While these institutional characteristics do
not determine firm strategies, they foster certain practices
and in some instances make them possible. I discuss each
one in turn.
All the banks and insurance companies in the study are
compelled to avoid mass layoffs (see below), thus they must
undertake their employment transformation progressively
rather than by getting rid of numerous workers and hiring
others in much smaller numbers. The commitment to avoid
layoffs cut off one course of action which would be to
layoff and rehire new workers. It also made it less
appealing to redesign work and assign it to periphery
workers in anticipation of future and frequent layoffs.
Layoffs are not a familiar tool to these sectors, as
they are in manufacturing; historically, large firms in the
two sectors have grown too fast, and needed to retain
workers too much, to resort to layoffs. In order to have
significant layoffs, banks and insurance companies would
have to live with the consequences of a drastically altered
image. Stability (in workforce practices and otherwise)
affects their product reputation and their employment
relations.
These firms also have been under pressure to avoid
layoffs from the national government. The largest banks and
insurance companies are nationalized, meaning that the
national government is a majority share holder. 9 Over the
years, they have retained significant management autonomy
but are implicitly expected to do their best to avoid
contributing to unemployment. Major (Paris-based) insurance
companies signed a no-layoff clause to their collective
bargaining agreements in 1973. Major banks must apply a
strict seniority principle which makes layoff unappealing
given their desire to reduce the numbers of high seniority
workers. In comments about French labor markets, much has
9 The national government is a significant economic
actor in the two sectors. This characterization holds true
prior to the programs of nationalization extension of 1982
and following the privatization programs post 1986.
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been made of the administrative oversight of layoffs first
instituted in 1973, reinforced in 1975 and removed in 1986,
but these administrative regulations never affected the two
sectors, particularly because several of the major firms had
already committed themselves to avoiding layoffs.
The national context of high unemployment also factored
into the reluctance of major firms to use layoffs to
drastically alter their workforce composition. The French
economy of the 1980s experienced stagnant and even declining
aggregate employment so that all major employers were under
pressure to avoid layoffs unless they were involved in
governments-sponsored large scale workforce reduction
programs as was the steel industry. The trade off for
avoiding layoffs, however, was government subsidized early
retirement and subsidies for new hires (see chapter 4
below).
Features of the industrial relations system also
steered banks and insurance companies away from core-
periphery strategies. They cannot single-handedly exclude
workers from coverage by the collective bargaining agreement
by setting up separate operations centers. Coverage from
the national or regional agreement has been extended across
all establishments by government administrative action (see
chpt. 3.) Geographic decentralization still makes it
possible to have access to less militant workforces, less
22
present unions, and possibly higher turnover, but it does
not provide a full segregation of workforce segments.
The fact that the social protection function, as Jacoby
(1987) calls it, is for the most part socialized, rather
than performed by employers, has also had an impact. Major
benefits are funded through compulsory payroll and other
taxes; for instance, excluding a worker from regular
employment does not automatically preclude contributions to
the nationalized health insurance tax.10 Thus the
differentials in total compensation between regular and
irregular workers are not as great as they would be in a
system in which the social protection function is provided
by the employer.
Restrictive aspects of the institutional context, such
as restrictions on limited duration contracts (CDDs) and
temporary help service contracts, have altered the terms
along which firms trade off their uses of irregular
arrangement. First, legal restrictions, and then a
10 Under the employment related program of the
nationalized health insurance system, workers must work an
average of 200 hours per trimester and not drop out of the
labor force for more than a year to receive full insurance
benefits. (There are separate regimes for family members,
retirees, disabled, and so on). Numerous exemptions to
these requirements have been made as marginal and
intermittent work situations and government sponsored
training programs proliferated in the 1980s. Unevenness of
treatment occurs in the level of worker contribution
required of each worker category. The nationalized health
insurance system even extends coverage for a year for those
workers who have exhausted all unemployment insurance
benefits and workers who have dropped out of labor force
activity. (Strohl, 1988.)
collective bargaining agreement for the temp industry",
have made "temping" a more expensive and specialized
alternative than it would otherwise be. This collective
bargaining agreement was in effect compelled by the
government's threat of further regulation of the industry.
The government policies to encourage part-time have
combined with workforce needs to enable banks and insurance
companies to selectively use the conversion of full-time
workers to part-time schedules for purposes of restructuring
employment. It is fair to say, however, that part-time has
also figured extensively in core-periphery strategies by
large employers in some low wage service sectors.
Collective agreements in banking and insurance, however,
only allow conversion of existing workers to part-time and
not hiring for short-hours schedules.
KEY METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
First, the French banking and insurance case studies
provide a useful counterpoint to a literature and a U.S.
debate that has its origins in studies of manufacturing.
Some studies of service sector firms have addressed this
issue directly (see chpt. 2) and there are similarities
between manufacturing and service internal labor markets.
The main theoretical tools, however, and the relation first
11 Between temp help industry representatives and major
unions.
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drawn between a/ flux and uncertainty and b/ secondary
employment, first, and, later on, between the former two and
irregular employment, were developed in manufacturing
contexts.
Second, this study focuses on the demand-side aspect of
irregular employment because my primary concern is the
evolution of employment systems, that is, of both regular
and irregular employment. The literature that addresses
these concerns has focused on changes in firm demand for
labor -as they interact with labor supply (Piore, 1980;
Appelbaum, 1987; Noyelle, 1987; Abraham, 1988a; Osterman,
1989.) Furthermore, and particularly in France, evidence
has been slim in support of the notion that labor supply
characteristics, if defined as worker preference for
irregular employment, drive the growth of irregular
arrangements. Evidence of worker availability (i.e. lack of
better options) has been more widespread but this kind of
availability effect is best captured in a framework which
starts with firm demand and then examines "how" workforces
are found." (see chapter 6)
Additionally, the U.S. policy debate has been polarized
between arguments that irregular arrangements are forced
upon a disorganized workforce, on one hand, or driven by
worker preferences, on the other. In contrast, the French
research and policy debate has had for starting point that
25
12 Piore, 1980.
irregular employment is a phenomenon primarily driven by
firm labor demand. It has thus open the way for questions
about the various ways in which patterns of labor demand
give rise to a range of irregular arrangements.
Third, that irregular employment should exist at all in
insurance and banking, two sectors not synonymous with great
flux and uncertainty in economic activity, runs counter to
expectations derived from the secondary employment model and
thus poses another counterpoint to existing explanations.
Banks and insurance companies want to effect a change in
employment system (prompted by their choice of response to
altered market conditions), a transformation which virtually
all economic sectors have had to undertake in the 1980s.
The new competitive conditions for banking and insurance,
however, cannot be reduced to flux and uncertainty, neither
can the activity of the two sectors be characterized by
these two factors. Large firms in the two sectors have
experienced market saturation, threats to their market share
and product changes but these do not compare to the flux and
uncertainty experienced in some manufacturing markets. The
deregulation of their markets further added to the need to
change but the latter consisted more of adaptations than of
the rapid entry of numerous new firms into the two sectors
(Petit et Vernieres, 1990.)
Fourth, because France has a particularly clear set of
institutional features for regular and irregular
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arrangements, it has proved easier to track how these
contribute to steer firm practices and vice-versa. Societal
norms for what constitutes regular employment changed
significantly during the 1980s and the regulatory context
for irregular employment evolved along with it thus
providing a clear picture for the observer.
HOW THIS POLAR CASE CONTRIBUTES TO A NEW
ARCHETYPE FOR IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
In keeping with the way the primary and secondary
employment archetypes were built by institutionalist
economics, this study provides an empirical description of
the "restructuring" use of irregular employment, ties it to
the evolution of internal labor markets in the two sectors,
to a market characterization and to its specific socio-
institutional context.
On market characterization: Most existing accounts of
irregular employment have pointed to changes in product
markets, to firms' handling and partitioning of demand, as
the primary source of transformation in systems of
employment and of the use of irregular employment in firms
with internal labor markets. Accounts argue that, during
the 1980s, firms partitioned demand among themselves in ways
different from the practices of the 1950s through the mid
1970s. I draw extensively on the existing literature for a
characterization of the ways in which several trends of the
1980s -market fragmentation, internationalization of
markets, deregulation, and new technologies of production-
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have spurred firm adaptation strategies. I spell out how
these broad changes have affected insurance and banking and
how individual firms have modified their market strategies
and devised new workforce management practices and
employment systems (Chapters 4 and 5). This study describes
changes through the eyes of the firm, for the most part, and
does not take issue with their assessments of market change.
In other words, it mostly matters that firms' logic be
conveyed accurately.
On the institutional context in which irregular
employment is embedded: For our purposes, the institutional
context consists of legislation, administrative action and
the ways both are reinforced by union contract provisions.
This study spells out the key institutional features
upon which irregular employment depends. All employment
archetypes were developed given a set of institutions. For
example, subordinate primary sector employment in the U.S.
is basically a product of the context of the NLRA , or in
France of the combined action of unionization and state
regulation. Independent primary sector jobs depend on
developed personnel policy. Moreover, the characteristics
of secondary employment are defined in opposition to the
institutional characteristics of primary employment. For
instance, secondary jobs are excluded from due process rules
13 National Labor Relations Act.
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which govern primary jobs, or are excluded from coverage by
a collective bargaining agreement.
I identify changes in the French institutional context
and their relationship to firm use of irregular employment.
Regulation acts in two ways to form the institutional
context for irregular employment in France; both are
reinforced by collective bargaining provisions. First,
regulation provides a context for the employment
relationship through legislation and administrative action.
Regulation provides a legal norm, a standard employment
contract for regular workers in internal labor markets."
Most deviations from this standard fall under specific,
"irregular", employment contracts. Second, employment
regulation is also restrictive; it aims to control the
circumstances in which irregular employment contracts are
used. By examining changes in regulation and the companion
public debates, this study traces shifts in the societal
norm for regular employment during the 1980s and the
progressive acceptance of irregular employment as a form of
employment which is no longer exceptional. The banking and
insurance case studies provide evidence on the ways firm
4 This standard implicit contract is of indeterminate
duration (CDI, Contrat A Durke Indeterminee) as opposed to
irregular contracts such as CDDs (limited duration) and temp
contracts; see chapter 3.
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practices are embedded in this regulatory context. 15 By
doing the above, I provide elements which enter into an
archetype for irregular employment.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
Irregular employment raises the possibility of the
exclusion of significant numbers of workers from labor and
social protection that comes with the employment
relationship. The presence of irregular employment has also
raised concerns about the ability of labor force entrants to
gain access to durable and stable employment, training
opportunities and promotion. Its presence, and use as a
common form of hiring, has called into question the commonly
held assumption that the best way for some groups to improve
their economic position is to gain access to ports of entry
to internal labor markets.
The importance of identifying two polar cases for
irregular employment is that each has different implications
for the labor market. The first case, the "core-periphery"
strategy, predicts the significant and durable growth of the
share of secondary-like employment in the economy at large.
Thus, policy will have to address the long-term economic and
is Finally, we also identify innovative models of
regulation for temporary help service workers. France is
the only country in Europe to have a collective bargaining
agreement governing employment for temp workers. The
agreement provides industry-wide seniority and benefits for
these workers.
social needs of the growing periphery workforce. In the
second polar case, the "restructuring/transition" case, the
increase of irregular employment in some sectors may occur
on the way to a new system of employment which does not
necessarily entail a lasting core-periphery organization of
the workforce. In this second case, there is greater leeway
for policy to steer firms away from a lasting segmentation
of their workforce and a more limited (and temporary) need
to assist individual workers caught in the transition.
The above distinction resembles that drawn between
"normal" and "abnormal" periods by Piore (1987) regarding
institutional responses to unemployment. In "normal"
periods, the level of unemployment is anticipated and social
structures which respond to it are stable. During
"abnormal" periods, the nature and extent of unemployment is
unanticipated and the social structures with which societies
have traditionally accomodated that unemployment break down.
During these abnormal periods (such as the 1930s
Depression), governments have choices as to how to
intervene. They may create a set of institutions which
become permanent -as they did with regards to unemployment-
and which are the center around which the socio-economic
structures of succeeding eras are built. They may, instead,
create temporary structures designed to handle the crisis
but "destined to disappear with the economic recovery.""
Thus, drawing the distinction between "core-periphery" and
"transition" cases contributes information toward making
such a choice.
Economy-wide, the actual mix of the two polar
strategies will affect the numbers of workers who need
additional protection. If "core-periphery" strategies
prevail, then policy analysts and advisors" will need to
realize the importance of devising novel solutions for
worker protection. Either the network of social protections
needs to be further removed from ties to employment and/or
equivalent benefits (different from those of regular
workers) must be devised. Possibly, because they make
16 (By social structures, the author refers to those
structures which mediate the impact of economic flux and
uncertainty on people's lives.) This point is part of a
broader argument about the history of the emergence of
unemployment as an economic, social and statistical
category. In a review of histories of unemployment in
France (Salais et al, 1986) and in the U.S. (Keyssar, 1986),
Piore notes that large employers in France reproduced the
familial system by providing long term employment
commitments and that it is only when they failed (during the
Great Depression) that the state recognized unemployment as
a social and statistical category for which to compensate
workers. In the U.S., large employers developed permanent
employment in the 1920s (once immigration stopped and along
with it the inflow of cheap labor and the ability to have
casual employment); this process was brutally and durably
interrupted by the Depression. In this country too, the
state's response was to establish social structures to
cushion unemployment which have affected firms' employment
strategies and worker choices in a lasting fashion (Piore,
1987.)
17 Analysts who think about employment policy, advisors
to unions, legislators and policy makers.
worker protections uniform, these solutions may end up
steering firms away from core-periphery strategies by
removing any cost incentives to do so.
Even if "restructuring" strategies prevail, policy
analysts and advisors will need to have a model in mind of
alternate employer strategies. They will need to know that
these major employers will no longer provide numerous
"working class jobs for middle class pay" (Appelbaum, 1987)
nor many middle-level jobs. Policy analysts will need to be
aware that the nature of what they have known as primary
jobs has changed and that they will face labor market
transformations that are more complex than a change in mix
of primary and secondary employment as they are currently
understood.
The case of French banking and insurance also
underscores the importance, and the possibility, of steering
firms, through a network of compelling institutional
arrangements, away from core-periphery strategies, as was
already discussed above. It will also illustrate the
relevance and possible transferrability of the French
experience with these arrangements to the U.S. context.
CHAPTER SEQUENCE
Before moving on to the next chapter, I review national
trends on irregular employment which provide a cross
industry picture to put the banking and insurance sectors in
a context (see below.) In chapter 2, I review the
literature on the differentiation and heterogeneity of
employment arrangements within the firm, looking first at
accounts of changes in internal labor markets, and then at
specific studies of irregular employment. All accounts fall
into the tradition of institutionalist labor economics
broadly defined, with the exception of one neo classical
account. I review these accounts to show how closely they
are linked to demand uncertainty and fluctuations. In
chapter 3, the account of how France regulation of irregular
and regular employment evolved, during the 1970s and 1980s,
underscores how societal norms evolved when faced with
transforming employment structures and stagnant employment.
In chapter 4, I discuss the history of employment in banking
and insurance, the rules of personnel administration, the
workforce composition, the market changes to which firms
plan to adapt, and the workforce changes they want to
achieve. In chapter 5, I detail how each of three main
irregular arrangements --part-time, temporary help service
contracts and CDDs (limited duration contracts)-- was put to
use to accelerate the transformation of employment in
banking and insurance. Data sources include interviews,
sector-level and firm-level statistics. In chapter 6, I
discuss the relative effects of labor demand and labor
supply factors in the uses of irregular employment discussed
in the previous chapter. The conclusion, chapter 7,
describes what the next steady state of employment might
look like in insurance and banking, and economy-wide. It
also addresses whether the French banking and insurance
cases are idiosyncratic and discusses how the socio-
institutional context mediated the use of irregular
employment in these two sectors.
BRIEF OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL TRENDS
ON IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
This brief discussion of nationals statistics has two
purposes. One is to give an overview of the diffusion of
CDDs and temp contracts from the late 1970s to the early
1980s, and to show the trends which alerted researchers and
policy makers. These data are incomplete because consistent
national data collection efforts did not start until 1982
(with the inclusion of CDDs and temps in national surveys).
The second purpose of this section is to provide trends,
from 1982 to 1988, in the incidence of CDDs, temps and part-
time workers in each industrial sector and in each major
occupation group (part-time not provided for occupations).
The diffusion of temp contracts and CDDs in the late 1970s
and early 1980s
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, policy makers and
researchers reacted to the diffusion of irregular
employment, particularly that of CDDs and temps, throughout
the economy. As an early establishment survey" indicates,
18 Enquete ACEMO (Activit6s et conditions d'emploi de
la main d'oeuvre) surveys establishments with 10 or more
wage workers in private and semi-public sector. It excludes
employment in national and local governments, in public
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the share of establishments which use CDDs increased
steadily from 12.2 percent in 1977 to 30.6 percent in 1983.
Large establishments, with 200+ workers, were more likely
than smaller ones to be users of irregular arrangements.
Their use intensity (share of the workforce), however, was
no greater and, in the case of very large establishments
(500+), even smaller than the average. (see table I-1 in
Appendix)
In the same survey, temporary help service contracts 19
diffused across a growing share of establishments from 1977
to 1980 but they had retreated by 1983 although to levels
higher than in 1977. The 1983 survey year followed the
implementation of costly regulations on temp help contracts
which account for their decline. Note that, over the same
period, the diffusion of CDDs across establishments
continued to expand. Both use intensity and the degree of
diffusion of temp help contracts varied with establishment
size, however. Small establishments made less frequent and
less intense use of temp contracts than average, conceivably
because they cannot afford the premium charged by temp help
service agencies. Overall, temp contracts were used with
less intensity than CDDs (table 1-2).
administrative offices, in large nationalized firms whose
workforces have special status (public utilities, railroads)
and in public sector hospitals.
19 Two-way contracts between user firms, temporary help
services and individual temp workers.
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Early establishment surveys such as this one flagged
the growing importance of CDDs and temps in the workplace.
Another dimension of their use also drew the attention of
researchers and policy makers; they contributed increasingly
to employment flux, entries and exits from employment.
Statistics from the unemployment service20 indicate that
CDD expirations accounted for a growing share of new
unemployment claims from 1977 to 1985:"
CDD as % 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985,
of new
claims 19.1 22.7 25.3 27.8 30.3 33.4 34.3 35.3 37.4
year to 25.3 17.3 10.2 18.4 16.0 6.2 7.3 8.4
year chg I I I I I I I II
Temp contracts also constituted a growing, though
smaller, share of new unemployment claims, particularly for
young workers. Henriet (1988) cites figures ranging from 6
percent in 1977 to almost 10 percent in 1980.
CDDs also figures significantly in movements into
employment, the hiring flux. One analysis of establishments
20 Eligibility rules set by the ANPE (Agence Nationale
pour l'Emploi) are more inclusive than those set by the U.S.
unemployment insurance system. These rules affect the
extent to which the unemployed will register with the
unemployment and job search service but there is little
reason to expect workers on irregular contracts to be any
likelier to register than permanent workers once unemployed.
If anything, the reverse is more likely because benefits are
higher and last longer for permanent workers.
1 Henriet, 1988: 96.
with 50+ workers, 2 2 for 1985, put "hires" under CDDs at
13.5 per 100 workers employed at the year's beginning, up
from 12.1 hires under CDD per 100 workers for 1984.23 In
contrast, hires under regular contracts, CDIs, accounted in
1985 for 5.1 per 100 workers employed at year's beginning.
Authors of the study estimate that, in the firms surveyed,
CDDs account for 64 percent of access to employment and 46
percent of exits from employment in 1985.24
Cross sectoral trends in irregular employment in the 1980s
National trends from the main labor force survey,
Enquete Emploi, confirm the diffusion of irregular
arrangements in all sectors, albeit to varied degrees. The
starting year for this data series, 1982,25 is problematic
because it also marks the implementation of stricter
regulations on the use of CDDs and temp contracts (see
22 The data source is a compilation and analysis of
monthly employer reports on regular contracts and CDDs which
have either started or expired during the survey month
(D6claration des Mouvements de Main d'Oeuvre.) Public
administrations, local governments, public health services,
and National Defense establishments are excluded. Coverage
has only been extensive since 1981. These reports do not
give sufficient information on temp contracts. See Corbel
et al, 1986.
23 In terms of duration, 43.5 percent were for less
than one month, and 80 percent were for up to 3 months.
These duration figures do not say anything about how many
contracts were renewals.
24 Corbel et al, Op. cit.: 17.
25 Partial statistics are available starting in 1980.
38
chapter 3). By all accounts, these restrictions led to
reduced use of temp contracts in 1983. Nevertheless, the
patterns of diffusion across industries provide a general
picture of the pervasiveness of these arrangements.26
1. National trends on CDDs (limited duration
contracts):
From 1982 to 1988, the incidence (percent) of CDDs in
total private2 7 wage and salary employment grew in almost
all major sectors; a few experienced a decline from 1987 to
1988 (table 1-3). Economy wide, the numbers were 2.24
percent in 1982 and 4.14 percent in 1988. This growth was
not steady, however; most sectors reduced their use in 1983-
84. In 1982, the heaviest users were Agriculture, Food
Processing, Market and Non-market services, Construction,
and Trade (wholesale and retail). The same year, use
intensity ranged from a low of 0.7 percent in Energy
production to a high of 3.4 percent in Agriculture.
26 Note that the major industrial classification
scheme for France differs from the U.S system. Most
notably, the system draws a distinction between Market
services (Services marchands) and Non-market services
(Services non marchands). The latter category includes
social services activities.
27 Note that the incidence of CDDs and of temp
contracts is only reported for private wage and salary
employment because the public sector operates on a different
employment system (civil service) and does not report
employment in these categories. Private wage and salary
employment also includes workers in nationalized companies,
however.
By 1988, use intensity had increased in almost all
sectors; levels ranged from a low of 1.2 percent in Energy
production to a high of 7 percent in Agriculture. The same
sectors were the heaviest users in 1982 and 1988. With the
exception of Market and Non-market services -about whose
activities we know less- the heavy users are sectors known
for variability in economic activity due to sensitivity to
business cycle and seasonality.
Banks and insurance companies belong to the Financial
institutions sector, one of the lighter users of CDDs.
Nevertheless, the sector's use of CDDs doubled from 1
percent in 1982 to 2.1 percent in 1988. In coming chapters,
I will review more detailed statistics that are specific to
banking and to insurance.
2. National trends in use of Temporary Help Service
workers
Statistical trends on the number of temp workers used
at time of survey represent a smaller share of Total private
wage and salary employment than CDDs 28 (table 1-4).
Economy-wide, their share was 0.93 percent in 1982 and 1.26
percent in 1988. The incidence of temp contract use
fluctuated over the period 1982 to 1988. Temp use is more
erratic by nature because assignments can be brief, be
terminated on short notice and are quickly canceled in
28 Their incidence in Full time equivalents (which
takes account of the duration of assignment) would be lower.
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downturns in activity. Temp use has also varied with
regulatory changes (chpt. 3) over the period.
For the most part, temp use grew from 1982 and 1988,
and across sectors. In 1988, the heavier users were
Intermediate goods and Production goods, Construction and
Market services. These are the same as heavy users in 1982;
the latter additionally included Energy production. In
contrast to the U.S., goods production and Construction
concentrate the use of temp workers. As will be seen in
later chapters, particulars of French regulation, and the
fact that construction underwent a crisis and massive
layoffs in the late 1970s, all led to significant use of
temps in the construction sector.
Temp use statistics in Financial institutions
fluctuated over the period but was higher in 1988 (0.9
percent) than in 1982 (0.3 percent).
3. National trends on part-time:
I have three notes of caution regarding trends in part-
time employment. First, part-time statistics overlap
partially with those on CDDs and temp contracts because they
report hours worked instead of status; they cannot be added
to the other two statistics for an estimate of irregular
29 For a history of temp use in construction, see
Tallard, 1986.
employment in the economy at large.30 Second, because of
the constraints of published statistics, I report the share
of part-time in Total private and public wage and salary
employment." Third, there are two definitions of part
time. With the first, which counts all workers who work
less than 40 hours weekly (or at least one fifth less than
the regularly scheduled hours of the firm), part-time in the
whole economy grew from 8.5 percent in 1982 to 11.6 percent
in 1987. With the second definition, people who work less
than 30 weekly hours, part-time grew from 7 percent in 1982
to 9.3 percent in 1987. Neither of these definition equates
the U.S. definition of 35 hours or less for part-time.
I report rates of part-time based on the first (<40
hrs) definition because it captures what is considered as
part-time for self reporting in all sectors and for the
national labor force survey. Additionally, all sectors
that are heavy users following to this first definition also
are, according to the second, and growth trends are the same
regardless of the definition used (table 1-7).
30 Although it is true that part-time contracts per se
are a separate legal status and thus a worker cannot work
under a part-time contract as well as a CDD (limited
duration) contract. In insurance and banking, none of the
workers on CDD are reported to work part-time.
31 It is also appropriate to report statistics for the
public sector because it has been one of the earliest users
of part-time.
32 And even though a work schedule close to 40 hours
approximates full-time work.
All heavy users of part-time are from the Tertiary
sector (Trade, Market and Non-market services.) The
incidence of part-time is high in Agriculture as well
although this may be due to long standing traditions of
shorter weeks in the sector.
From 1982 to 1987,33 part-time grew from 8.53 percent
of total public and private employment to 11.6 percent. Its
incidence increased in almost all sectors. In 1988, levels
of part time varied widely across sectors from a high of
20.6 percent in Non-market services to a low of 2 percent in
Production (capital) goods manufacturing. Non-market
services experienced the most drastic increase; they more
than doubled their use of part-time from 1982 to 1987 (8.58
and 20.6 percent respectively.)
Financial institutions are not the heaviest users of
part-time, its incidence grew from 7.2 percent in 1982 to
8.6 percent in 1987. As will be seen later with more
detailed sectoral statistics, these levels of part-time were
only reached in the 1980s, up from almost zero levels in the
1970s.
National trends on CDDs, temps and part-time bring out
the pervasiness of these arrangements in the economy and the
wide diversity of use intensity across sectors.
33 At the time of my research, I collected data up to
1987 only. Later on, I found a source providing 1988
results for temps and CDDs but not for part-time.
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Additionally, during the 1980s, these arrangements grew
across most economic sectors, with few exceptions. Table I-
9 (in Appendix) provides the incidence of temps and CDDs
across major occupational groups34 from 1982 to 1987. They
confirm that the highest incidence of CDDs and of temp
contracts is among Employees and Manual workers. For both
these occupations groups, CDDs continued to grow as share of
employment throughout the period. Temp contracts, however,
continued to grow for Manual workers but not for Employees.
Later on, I discuss how temp contracts were increasingly
used only for specific purposes in clerical employment.
Comparative evolution of salaried employment and of
irregular employment
Finally, researchers noted that, throughout the 1980s,
irregular arrangements grew whereas regular, full-time,
employment declined in aggregate numbers, as the following
table indicates.
34 At the time of research, I did not gather data on
part-time by occupations.
Year-to-year and 1982-88 changes in thousands
82-88
1982 83 84 85 86 87 88 chg
Total -65 -269 -103 219 -47 120 61
salaried
employment
Regular -178 -287 -218 -210 -96 -80 -1069
empl. 1/
Part-time 73 97 161 208 3 88 630
Temps and -57 -17 69 89 83 102 269
CDDs
Internships -3 -3 84 146 46 22 292
Total 10 69 255 33 112 196 972
irregular
empl. 2/
l/ Regular employment is uli t:me CD: (reguiar contracts)
outside of national and local governments; 2/ Part-time,
temps, CDDs (limited duration) and internships with no
double-counting.Source: Cezard and Heller (1988) cited in
Gauvin (1989: 20.)
Nationwide, internships which were programs designed to
favor youths' access to the labor market also grew rapidly
in the 1980s as the table indicates. Firms used them as an
employment subsidy and there is controversy as to how much
training young workers do receive while working in
internships. They are, however, a phenomenon entirely
dependent upon national government policy which decides
whether or not to fund programs as part of its labor market
policies. As a tool to firms, these internships are not
steadily available. It may turn out, however, that they too
may become a fixture of personnel management if programs are
sustained well into the 1990s. In this study, I did not
look in great detail into internships but would have,
however, had I focused on how young workers gain access to
employment.
CHAPTER 2
THE LITERATURE ON EMPLOYMENT DIFFERENTIATION
The differentiation of employment --heterogeneity along
dimensions such as formalization of the employment
relationship, stability, access to promotion ladders, or
pay-- within industrial sectors and within firms has been
the subject of the literature on dual/segmented labor
markets. In pre-1980 formulations, the differentiation was
greatest across industrial sectors and, later, across firms
in a sector ("core" firms providing primary employment, and
"periphery" ones providing secondary jobs.) The research
and theoretical question for the literature of the 1980s,
however, has been the growing differentiation of employment
within firms with internal labor markets and providing
mostly primary employment. Thus, recent research has
focused on the erosion of primary sector internal labor
markets; I review this literature here. It has for starting
point the changes in markets that have engendered new firm
practices whose manifestation is a real observed
transformation in the nature of employment within firms and
the growth of irregular employment.
Empirically, the main observation has been that these
"core" firms seem to be providing less primary employment
and that the latter is of a different nature. Importantly,
employment differentiation within these firms, that is, the
presence of irregular employment, increasingly involves
tasks that belong to the main activities of the firm
whereas, prior to the 1980s, it had concerned peripheral
jobs (janitorial or warehousing) --and had been explained on
this ground. I examine explanations of changes in internal
labor markets and find that some accounts of the nature of
irregular arrangements treat the latter as a residual
category of firm practices.
The broader theoretical issue which the dual/segmented
labor market literature addresses is the exact process by
which micro economic dualism (here employment
differentiation) translates into macro labor market
segmentation and has consequences for inequality.' I do
not cover this aspect of the literature but note that the
pre-1980 literature offered one answer to questions on the
nature of this process (see Piore, 1980) that has been put
onto question by market changes during the 1980s.
Consequently, in the post-1980 research, both the process of
firm level employment differentiation (reviewed here) and
its translation into the macro labor market structure have
been up for redefinition.
CHANGES IN ENTERPRISE INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS IN THE 1980S:
REVIEW OF EXPLANATIONS
Microdualism is a relevant object of study for
economic and policy analysis only to the extent that it can
be tied analytically to macro labor market
dualism/segmentation (Piore, 1980).
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The existing literature on employment differentiation
within the firm has first and primarily focused on the
pressures exerted by the market during the 1980s on regular
employment in primary sector firms, that is, firms with well
developed enterprise internal labor markets. All accept
that, since the late 1970s, there is increased flux and
uncertainty in product markets. The first attempt to
explain how firms adapt to flux and uncertainty was made by
Piore (1980). Looking at manufacturing markets, Piore found
that dominant firms appropriated the stable segments of
demand and thereby provided regular employment to their own
workforce. Dominant manufacturing firms used networks of
subcontractors to absorb both flux and uncertainty. To
buffer themselves against the remaining flux in activity,
they used a few externalized workers --"temps," and workers
in decentralized locations.
As the 1980s wore on, dominant firms experienced
continued change and greater unpredictability in their
markets. They transformed significantly the ways in which
they structured their workforce use and their market
strategies. Below, I cover changes in workforce management
but not market strategy.
All the perspectives reviewed here outline how market
pressures have compelled firms, and new technological
opportunities have enabled them, to redesign their internal
labor markets and to push out -by externalizing or simple
rendering secondary- a category of jobs and workers
previously part of the internal labor market. In so doing,
firms have made the workers bear a growing share of the flux
and uncertainty in economic activity. Many accounts predict
that as flux and uncertainty become the primary
characteristics of markets in the 1990s, then there will be
a growing share of jobs in the economy whose function it is
to bear the consequences of fluctuations. These jobs will
exist both on the margin of primary (core) firms and in
secondary (periphery) firms.
Major "compelling" economic changes started in the late
1970s. Competitive conditions altered; they included even
greater uncertainty, variability, and more fragmentation in
product demand (Piore and Sabel, 1984), the increased scope
of markets and their internationalization (Noyelle, 1987;
Christopherson, 1988), and decreased market shares for firms
which until then had developed employment patterns suited to
their holding a large and stable market share.
These changed competitive conditions have had
consequences for employment systems. They have added
pressure on firms a/ to cut labor costs (Appelbaum, 1987;
Abraham, 1988; Osterman, 1989), b/ to achieve greater
flexibility in quantity and skill composition of their
workforce (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Abraham, 1988a; Osterman;
1989) and c/ to obtain greater predictability in workforce
use. In some arguments, competitive pressures have brought
attempts to alter firm boundaries (vertical disintegration)
to new intensity levels thereby shifting risk and some
production activities outside the firm.
The most "enabling" change is the availability of micro
processor based computer technologies (Piore and Sabel,
1984; Appelbaum, 1987). The particular way in which these
technologies have been implemented has enabled some firms to
respond to competitive pressures by rationalizing work in
order to cut labor costs. This rationalization has
contributed to the erosion of internal labor markets and to
greater use of contingent work (Appelbaum, 1987.) New
technologies have been used in other ways; they have put
pressure on employment systems by requiring broader job
definitions (Piore, 1986; Osterman, 1989.) By doing so,
they have put into question systems of job assignments and
seniority rights, themselves the long standing results of
compromises on job security concerns.
For service sector firms, a second significant
"enabling" change has been the diffusion of secondary and
post-secondary education which has allowed firms to recruit
externally greater numbers of workers for positions which
used to be filled by workers who had been trained in-house.
The two empirical observations, all cited to point to
the transformation of employment systems within firms, are
the erosion of internal labor markets, as higher level jobs
are filled from the outside, and the fact that entry-level
jobs are divorced from training ladders, become secondary-
like and in some cases are externalized.
Beyond shared views
Beyond the shared view that market pressures have
compelled firms to change their internal labor markets,
authors differ greatly on what firms do and how they
approach firm practices. 2 Describing the process at work
in the late 1970s in the United States, France and Italy,
Piore (1980) sees the generation of micro and macro dualisms
as a dynamic process. Its dynamism results from constant
attempts to remedy an on-going and unresolvable conflict
between the insecurity of economic activity and the
pressures for protection and security. 3 In industrialized
economies, the primary source of labor market structuring
are the attempts to manage this unresolvable conflict.'
Because no static solution can be found, it is likely that
2 Some of these differences may also be due to their
choice of the specific aspects of firm practices they chose
to study.
3 Large firms, in the 1970s, were able to provide a
substantial number of secure jobs.
4 Microdualism led to macrodualism because there was
similarity across economic sectors in three processes: 1/
similarities in socio-political and economic pressures for a
division between secure and insecure jobs; 2/ similarities
in the institutions (that are found rather than made) which
create and maintain the division and 3/ similarities in
terms of behavioral and economic characteristics of the
workers found in insecure jobs (they are either indifferent
to uncertainty or lack political power and social cohesion
to resist it.) (Piore, 1980).
different time periods, economic conditions and political
balance of power will result in different labor market
structures. Worker militancy is behind the organized
pressure for greater security. This worker pressure to
obtain shelter from flux and uncertainty plays a significant
role in the dynamic of adjustment; it is more or less
successful in different time periods but cannot be assumed
to disappear altogether even following periods of diminished
effectiveness or militancy.
Osterman (1989) characterizes the extension of core-
periphery structures in primary sector firms during the
1980s as a sign of transition of employment structures.
Major employment systems (two forms of internal labor
markets, the "industrial" and the "salaried" models), to
follow his typology, are in crisis.5 Firms with "salaried"
employment, characteristic of white collar workforces, are
endangered by competitive pressures and new technologies
which threaten the job security of their workforce. Firms
with the "industrial" (blue collar) model are also under
pressure from new technologies but, in their case, to
realize the economic benefits of new production systems,
5 The industrial model provides employers with the
ability to vary employment levels but restricts their choice
of who gets laid off (seniority) and their ability to deploy
labor because seniority rights are based on narrow job
definitions. The salaried model gives the firms greater
flexibility in labor deployment but restricts employers'
ability to have short-term variations in workforce size.
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they must broaden job descriptions and, to do so, must
elicit worker commitment by providing job security. In sum,
the need to change confronts firms in either model with a
number of dilemmas. Firms considering the expansion of the
salaried model (to gain worker commitment, effort and the
abandonment of narrow job descriptions) face internal
resistance. The cost of job security is perceived as a loss
of initiative by workers and a loss of control by managers.
Also, the greater economic uncertainty makes it difficult to
sustain explicit promises of security. If promises are
broken, firms face a loss of commitment and unionization
drives.
As these dilemmas remain unresolved, firms make
greater use of what are termed "secondary arrangements" to
form core-periphery structures. The latter allow them to
combine the salaried model, for some of their workers, with
the "secondary subsystem" providing a buffer workforce
against macroeconomic, cyclical downturns or labor force
reductions necessitated by technical change. This argument
is both analytical and normative. 6 Core-periphery
structures are unstable from an industrial relations
standpoint; secondary workforces will sooner or later make
claims to the same employment status as regular workforces.
Core-periphery structures limit efficient work organization;
6 "economic and, perhaps, political performance would
be improved with more widespread adoption of the salaried
model." (chapter 5, 1989).
a workforce not socialized in the norms of a firm may not be
efficient.7 Nonetheless, firms may stay with core-
periphery structures rather than resolve their dilemmas.
In these typologies of employment systems, the two
"major systems" are subjected to change and Osterman holds
that secondary arrangements retain a steady role (and
characteristics) with a varying volume over time. The
growth of secondary arrangements is the redistribution of
the burdens of flux and uncertainty on a growing segment of
the workforce. This approach confines itself to the
microeconomic consequences of market changes but assumes
that these core-periphery structures will lead to a growing
secondary segment in the labor market.
In studies of service sector organizations, Appelbaum
(1987, 1992), also attributes the rise of temporary, part-
time and other contingent work to the erosion of primary
internal labor markets in the 1980s. However, the
availability of micro-processor based technologies to
service sector firms and the particular use which firms have
made of them bear greater responsibility for the erosion of
internal labor markets in this account than in others.
During the 1980s, primary sector firms have been under
pressure to cut labor costs because of intense competition
and deregulation (which makes for fluctuating demand and
7 Finally, in the U.S. case, the pool of secondary
workforces is limited.
uncertain profits.)8 Much of this erosion is due to the
choice of implementation of new technologies made by firms.
At their most useful, when implemented to best realize their
productivity potential, new office technologies disrupt
"natural learning sequences" (e.g. from entry-level to
professional underwriting jobs in insurance); job ladders
and thus internal labor markets lose their importance for
non-professional workers. New technologies automate routine
tasks for low-skilled clerical work but also for skilled
technical and professional work. Entry-level and mid-level
positions that had provided access to skilled work are
eliminated. This is true even when firms implement
technologies in ways that integrate tasks, make job contents
complex and decentralize decision making. When firms,
however, implement new computer and communications
technologies to further specialize, fragment and
geographically disperse tasks, the technologies weaken
internal career ladders all the more (Appelbaum, 1987.)
In the U.S., as early as the late 1970s, firms which
anticipated both a loss of market share and/or the
displacement of workers by labor-saving technologies had
decided that "worker training was an unjustifiable expense
rather than an investment in the future" (Appelbaum,1992:
8 In implementing changes in workforce management,
firms have been also enabled by the greater availability of
secondary and post secondary education to the workforce.
(see also Noyelle, 1987.)
7.) They adopted strategies to subcontract work and
redesign jobs to be carried out by part-time and temporary
workers. By the 1980s, those strategies, coupled with the
new information and communication technologies, led to a
broad range of further firm adaptation strategies. 9 At one
extreme stands the search for "static flexibility"10
entailing the destandardization of terms of employment,
making hours of work more flexible and unpredictable (for
workers) and setting terms of employment at the individual
rather than collective level. In the U.S., it is the lack
of bargaining power and limited employment alternatives for
many workers that make this strategy possible." At the
other extreme, firms adopt strategies of "dynamic
flexibility" according to which they employ a highly skilled
workforce in an environment in which learning-by-doing is
encouraged and used to channel competitive pressures into
9 Strategies which affected the relationships between
information technology, worker training and skills, worker
participation in decision-making and the organization of
work, according to the author.
10 As the author put it: "Unfortunately, old habits die
hard, and the implementation of new technologies has often
relied on the obsolete management practices of an earlier
era in which productivity gains depend upon the
fragmentation of tasks, deskilling of labor, and the
reliance upon machinery for technical skills and control"
(Appelbaum, 1992: 9.)
" Golden and Appelbaum, 1990.
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innovation to the product, the service and the production
process (Appelbaum, 1992.)12
The typologies of production organizations and
consequent labor use, developed by Christopherson (1988),
are more directive in their predictions for employment and
give little room for dynamic change. Different production
organizations, following specific market strategies, dictate
typologies of core-periphery employment structures, each
with a distinct use of irregular employment. Contingent
work (to use the author's term) allows the externalization
of risks and of production by the firm. In the 1970s and
1980s, in response to changes in competitive conditions,"
production organizations moved toward the vertical dis-
integration of production and the movement of many
production activities to the external market (changes in
make/buy ratio.) Temporary, part-time and self-employed
12 Referring to work by Piore and Sabel (1984), Best
(1990) and Harrison and Kelley (1991), the author points out
that these strategies also have spawned two types of
relationships between major firms and their subcontractors.
On one hand, the relationship can be collaborative with
subcontractors participating in product design and employing
a skilled workforce. On the other hand, it can entail the
wholesale shifting of the risks of market fluctuation and
uncertainty from large companies to small ones which will
compete based on low wages and low prices. (Appelbaum,
1992.)
13 Growth in the scope of markets, changed character of
product demand, and fact that demand for many products is
more variable and less predictable.
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contractors, who in the past served to back up the regular
workforce, are increasingly doing work specifically designed
for a contingent workforce. To each of four production
organizations -each of which operates in market segments
with distinct demand characteristics and skill requirements
of production- corresponds a particular pattern of use of
contingent workforces (the details of which are in the
footnote.)"
In this interpretation, markets dictate the boundaries
of the firm, the characteristics of labor demand, and the
overall employment picture. Markets being what they are,
the volume of regular employment will decrease and
contingent employment will grow in the 1990s. The
characteristics of employment within the firm matter only to
the extent that they affect the firm's ability to
externalize a workforce or production process. For example,
the firm specificity of skill carries almost all the weight
in determining the size of the workforce in regular
employment.
" Under "large firm internal labor market production"
(type 1), firms use a periphery of low wage part timers and
extensive production subcontracting to periphery firms.
Under "Finance, services and sales activities in large
firms", a skeleton of full-time permanent workers with firm
specific knowledge works with a large workforce of permanent
part-time, on-call or intermittent workers. Under "Producer
and support services" (type 3) production, most of the work
is done through market transactions. Under "Project-
oriented independent contractor production" (type 4)
activities are ephemeral. This kind of work can be low
skill or high skill.
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Before moving on to studies of irregular employment per
se, I cover how neo-classical analysis would model the
presence of irregular employment in large firms. The
earliest neo classical analysis of irregular employment,
Abraham (1988a, 1988b), developed a model of marginal
decision making by firms under intensified competitive
pressures and increased demand fluctuation in the 1980s.
For neo classical analysis, irregular arrangements (termed
"flexible")15 inside firms with internal labor markets pose
a particular problem of interpretation because they are a
non-wage adjustment mechanism to short term changes in
demand and a non-traditional, non-wage, adjustment mechanism
at that. According to Abraham (1988a), firms have altered
their proportional mix of employment arrangements in favor
of flexible arrangements, a category which covers short-term
arrangements and contracting out for business services. The
task of a neo-classical model is to isolate the parameters
for firms decisions concerning quantitative adjustments to
their proportional mix of jobs within the internal labor
market and those in flexible arrangements.
Thus, firms use flexible staffing to adjust the
quantity and skill mix of their labor inputs in order to 1/
respond to short term demand changes, 2/ buffer their
15 The term "flexible" contrasts irregular arrangements
to regular employment which, according to neo classical
theory, has turned labor into a "quasi fixed factor" of
production (Oi, 1962.)
regular workforce from demand fluctuation, and 3/ because
the rules of internal labor markets preclude their taking
advantage of low market wage rates (thus the use of
production subcontracting and contracting out for services).
In the 1980s, greater volatility in economic activity,
increased costs of hiring and firing, and widening wage
differentials between high- and low-wage firms all have
combined incrementally to steer firms toward greater use of
flexible staffing to the detriment of regular jobs in
internal labor markets.
This neo classical account combines traditional
variables of neo classical analysis (costs, relative wages,
technological specialization as added cost) 16 with socio-
institutional features that factor into firm decisions as
constraints (and are also assimilable to costs.) For
example, firms use differentiated employment within the firm
when, having decided not to provide training and promotion
to all, they cannot maintain boundaries between workers (and
limit their compensation claims) without setting "explicitly
16 Decision variables are: 1/ using flexible staffing
during peak demand allows employers to hire a smaller
regular workforce; 2/ the ratio of flexible staffers to
regular workers will rise with increases in variability or
uncertainty of product demand; 3/ reliance on flexible
staffers will be greater the wider the differential between
their wages and those of regular workers; and 4/ reliance on
flexible staffers will be greater in positions requiring
less firm-specific skills.
temporary terms" or using outside contractors (1988a:
11.)17 Additionally, firms which pay above-market wage
rates to reduce turnover and increase work effort by their
regular workers" avoid doing the same for workers
performing less central tasks by relying on outside
contractors for low wage services.
In this model of firm marginal decision making, the
features of the internal labor market are cost constraints.
The notion that greater product market variability and
uncertainty makes internal labor markets costlier is
implicit. Irregular arrangements are interchangeable as far
as their institutional form is concerned; firms compare them
along the cost dimension. In this cost-comparison model,
and from the firm's standpoint, irregular arrangements
within the firms are functionally equivalent to contracting
out and to other short term adjustment strategies such as
overtime and inventory buffers. Over time, the proportional
mix of regular and irregular employment adjusts but the ways
in which either form of employment changes in more
fundamental ways is deemed irrelevant -as most structural
change is- to neo classical analysis.
17 Others who have studied the industrial relations
implications of segmented employment within firms have made
similar arguments (see Piore, 1980; Gordon, Reich and
Edwards, 1982.)
8 An idea well developed by efficiency-wage models.
Abraham also cites evidence to the effect that firms which
pay high wages to some occupations tend to pay high wages to
all occupations.
What neo-classical analysis does not do, but all other
accounts presented here do, is to consider that employment
differentiation within the firm is also a tool to discipline
the workforce in regular employment. Neo-Marxist analyses
have described the division of work within the firm (and its
accompanying segregation and hierarchy) and labor market
segmentation as tools for social control of the workforce
(Gordon, Reich and Edwards, 1982.) The perspectives
reviewed above do not identify the need to control the
workforce as the main cause of the erosion of internal labor
markets and the use of irregular employment. Several,
however, point out that disciplining the regular workforce
is one of the goals achieved by differentiating employment
arrangements within the firm. Michon (1982) contends that,
particularly in French manufacturing blue collar employment,
irregular employment serves firms' need for hierarchical and
disciplinary control of the workforce. Evidence for the
U.S. for the 1980s points to greater use of irregular
employment in sectors in which union power has waned (Golden
and Appelbaum, 1990.) In these arguments, one of the
advantages of irregular employment lies in conveying a clear
message to the workforce that access to regular employment
is in some sense "rationed." Other arguments point out that
firms make use of the differentials in workforce abilities
(or even desire) to resist the use of irregular employment
and to claim employment security (Piore, 1980; Osterman,
1989.) In these views, power relations affect the
distribution of the burden of economic uncertainty. In all
perspectives, employment differentiation is partly the
result of power relations in the society at large.
Arguments on changes in internal labor markets treat
irregular employment as a residual category
In all arguments developed during the 1980s, the focus
of concern and inquiry has been on the change to internal
labor markets and to regular employment (which, as a
theoretical category, only includes primary employment).
They identify market and social pressures for change in
employment systems and conclude that secondary-like jobs
being generated in increasing numbers are the residuals of
structural change in firm practices. Jobs that do not fit
in the new employment organization become contingent,
secondary-like, jobs that are all designed to bear the
accrued flux and uncertainty. For example, entry-level jobs
become secondary; they no longer lead to further training
and promotion.
The growth of any and all forms of irregular employment
is cited as further evidence of a/ changes in internal labor
market structures and b/ the equation of these irregular
arrangements and the theoretical construct of secondary
employment. Their "raison d'6tre" is bearing demand flux
and uncertainty as these market forces translate into firm
need for reduced and more flexible labor costs.
In summary, all arguments reviewed above have sought to
explain the impact, changes in market structure have had, on
primary employment which, for purposes of analysis, is
assumed to be the main aspect of firm employment strategies.
The wide range of jobs that are externalized, casualized,
contractualized, downgraded, or disconnected from training
ladders, falls by default into the broad category of
irregular employment which is equated with secondary
employment.
In the original dual labor market model, the
interactions between primary and secondary jobs were key to
understanding how firms structured employment. Similarly,
the relationship between regular employment in the "new"
internal labor markets and irregular arrangements will not
be fully understood until and unless an empirical
characterization of irregular employment captures the
boundaries of the phenomenon.
STUDIES OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT PER SE
While most arguments have focused on changes to
internal labor markets, some research has taken irregular
employment as its starting point (as I will) and tried to
tie it back to flux and uncertainty (Germe et Michon, 1978;
Michon, 1982) and to changes in the skill contents of jobs
(Noyelle, 1987; Noyelle and Bertrand, 1988, 1989).
Manufacturing cases
In surveys of French manufacturing firms, Germe and
Michon (1978)19 set out to prove that the existence of
irregular employment in primary sector firms was one of the
prime forms of microdualism which would lead the type of
macrodualism in French labor markets described by Piore
(1980). They aimed to argue that firms resorted to
irregular employment in similar market conditions, for
similar purposes and in the same fashion. They set out to
identify patterns of use of irregular employment (short-
term, temporary and contracting out) and to associate them
with economic dimensions such as market conditions, size of
firm and employment conditions (growing, stable or shrinking
labor force). They concluded that empirical studies could
not draw a clear and direct relation between use of
irregular employment and types of establishments as
described by product characteristics and the uncertainty of
their markets. 20 The variety of users was as great as the
19 See Germe et Michon (1978) and Michon in Bartoldi
(1982). The authors devised an operational definition to
characterize employment arrangements, called "forme
d'emploi", a term which encapsulates the institutional
definition of jobs and includes customary, contractual and
legal contents of jobs.
20 The second main conclusion was that insecurity was
not a sufficient explanation for the uses of irregular
arrangements witnessed in case studies. This led Michon to
formulate elaborate patterns of partitioning of demand by
firms , and of labor market structuring. His contention was
that the appropriating of the stable segment of demand by
dominant firms was only one of the patterns of market
organization in force in the 1970s and 1980s. He also
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number of reasons for use. In retrospect, the study
encountered variability in the arrangements to such great
degree that typologies built from its results had too many
dimensions to allow for clear analytical conclusions.
In concrete settings, the authors argued, the use of
irregular employment was best analyzed in one of two ways:
either a/ as a tool allowing firms to avoid a reorganization
of activities and a change in workforce management or b/ as
a tool facilitating the implementation of a new organization
of production and workforce management practices. It could
be put to seemingly contradictory uses and was a polyvalent
tool for workforce management. Presumably, the
characteristics of each sector and production organization
determine in which of the two ways firms use irregular
arrangements.
Increased flux and uncertainty in markets remained the
source cause of adaptation requirements for firms which are
portrayed as looking for lower and more predictable labor
costs. To these two forces, these researchers attributed
factors more proximate to the firm operation such as the
need for qualitative (skill contents) as well as
quantitative variability in labor use, or the need to
externalize some labor costs or to draw on outside
contended that the formulation of the macrodualist thesis
depended upon employment systems being homogenous within
firms and heterogenous across firms while he found
heterogeneity within firms.
specializations, or the need for intensified disciplining of
the workforce.2 1
As the 1980s wore on, and competitive conditions
changed, French researchers observed the diffusion of
irregular employment throughout the economy and its
durability. Until 1980, irregular arrangements had been
complementary to stable, regular employment. The latter was
hierarchically superior to the former. Following the
recession of 1981-82, irregular arrangements seemed to
"compete" with regular ones as possibilities for
substitution became greater in many sectors (Freyssinet,
1983.)
Studies of white collar employers
For Noyelle (1987a), the impact of market changes has
been enhanced by technological innovations whose
implementation has drastically altered the skill contents of
jobs and generated heterogenous contingent employment.
This author studied employment restructuring in service
2 "... (the study) shows that variability and
flexibility are broader requirements than uncertainty, that
uncertainty itself cannot be reduced to the sole phenomenon
of product market fluctuation. It also indicates that
irregular forms of employment are neither the only
instrument of flexibility, nor an instrument used to this
sole end." (Michon, 1982: 94.) Translation mine.
22 New information technologies have had for
consequences 1/ the altering of old products, the
development of new ones, and the transformation of the
relationship between firms and clients and 2/ the opening of
opportunities for reorganizing the division of labor, with
direct impacts on the skill structure and the demand for
labor.
sector firms both in the U.S. and Western Europe (see also
Noyelle and Bertrand, 1988.) The changes in skill
requirements have been accompanied by labor supply changes:
the growing supply of secondary (part-time) workers and
higher educational attainment for the whole workforce (rise
in workers with secondary and post-secondary education).
Both labor supply and labor demand changes have transformed
large employers into multi entry point structures. As many
medium- and low-skilled workers as possible will be removed
from the reach of the internal labor market. To account for
the great heterogeneity of the irregular (contingent) jobs
encountered, Noyelle (1987b) develops the distinction
between skilled contingent work (externalized para-
professional and professional activities) and unskilled
contingent work (which bears all the characteristics of
secondary employment). In this interpretation, firms
characteristics (e.g. size) lose their importance in labor
market structuring. Instead, the nature of skills is
increasingly at the origin of segmentation. This is only
true, however, for the distinction between core and
contingent skilled workers (whether skills are firm specific
or generic). For unskilled contingent work, it is the pace
at which computerization will eliminate menial tasks that
determines the relative volume of this workforce.
While this perspective fits current outcomes
accurately, it leaves open questions about what drives the
pace of computerization and the characteristics of its
implementation. Also, given that the skill content of jobs
is a somewhat malleable dimension under the control of
firms, one is left with a framework that is not flexible
enough to understand a reality with dynamic components.
This explanation leaves under explored the circumstances
under which unskilled jobs remain inside the firm and within
the internal labor market and under which the skill content
of jobs can be improved (there may be a payoff to firms in
doing so). Because this account is empirically grounded, it
leaves out of future trajectories other possibilities for
work organization.
In later studies of cross-national, cross industry
variations in contingent employment, Bertrand and Noyelle
(1989) find significant differences in the employment status
(degree of insecurity) of contingent workforces; not all can
be described as being in secondary employment. There seems
to be no compelling single reason of economic efficiency to
require that all contingent arrangements be insecure. The
causes for cross country variation include: labor market
slackness, and the degree of commitment of work
organizations to training and to providing stable employment
to as great a share of the workforce as possible (so as to
elicit greater effort and productivity.)23
23 See Bertrand and Noyelle, May 1989.
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MOVEMENTS AWAY FROM THE EQUATION BETWEEN IRREGULAR
EMPLOYMENT AND SECONDARY EMPLOYMENT
Both Germe et Michon (1978), and Noyelle (1987b)24 ,
opened the door for conceiving of irregular employment as a
heterogenous set of arrangements and, more importantly, as
something other than secondary employment as it is defined
in segmented labor markets models. In these models,
secondary employment meshes job characteristics such as
instability (where the effect of demand is felt) and skill
contents, with workforce characteristics (alternative
commitments to non market activities) and behavior (lack of
attachment to the labor market). The outcome, secondary
employment, is characterized by both the nature of tasks and
institutional arrangements that are looser, less stable and
less protective of worker rights. Thus secondary
arrangements, governed by weak institutional protection for
workers, fit the jobs and the workforce. They resulted from
the distribution of risk and uncertainty onto workforces
less interested in, or less capable of, resisting it. As
already discussed, they fit situations in which flux and
uncertainty characterize economic activity. Thus, as flux
and uncertainty increased in the 1980s, so was the use of
secondary employment, according to some analyses.
24 As well as Bertrand and Noyelle, 1989.
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How is one to understand the heterogeneity of irregular
employment in the 1980s?
In recent years, the neat fit between job
characteristics and institutional arrangements (in both
primary and secondary employment) was stretched with the
growth of irregular employment. The latter is an empirical
observation in most studies.25 It is a "catch all" category
of institutional arrangements that have come to be used in
widely different ways and cannot be easily associated with
one type of firm strategy or one kind of product market.
Piore (1980) posited the possibility of dynamism in the
distribution of flux and uncertainty between firm and worker
and argued that temporary solutions to the conflict are
encoded in institutions of social and labor protection. In
so doing, the author opened the way for researchers to
conceive of irregular arrangements as institutional
arrangements above and beyond being jobs whose
characteristics are driven by purely economic (market)
imperatives.2 ' Thus, were the equilibrium of social and
political forces to change, so would the distribution of
25 In most accounts, irregular employment is any
employment arrangement which differs from regular, full time
long term employment on any one of a number of dimensions:
connection to the internal labor market, skill level,
schedule, social protection, legal ties, implicit employer
commitment and wages.
26 Earlier statements of the primary/secondary
dichotomy had also made clear that secondary jobs could be
turned into primary jobs through unionization and their
incorporation into the enterprise internal labor market.
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risk between worker and firm, and so would the institutional
characteristics of both primary and secondary jobs.
Piore (1986) further developed tools for understanding
how societal regulation of the labor market can foster
attachments between firms and workers thereby "reshuffling"
what were previously understood as primary/secondary
employment distinctions. 27 For example, "secondary-like"
jobs can develop attributes of primary employment, such as
employment security or even connection to other jobs, if
firms are compelled by social and political forces to do so.
In the process of advocating a form of employment that would
permit the diffusion of a flexibly specialized mode of
economic organization, the author points out that
contractually or institutionally provided employment
security may compel employers to train workers more broadly
and deploy labor more flexibly, thus affecting the
characteristics of a position such as skill contents,
connection to other jobs and thus the likelihood of
belonging to the internal labor market of a firm.
27 These arguments are embedded in a much broader
discussion of the appropriate mode of economic organization
if firms are to shift away from standardized mass
production, and of the institutional form of employment most
likely to render flexibly specialized production productive
and to help it diffuse throughout the economy.
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The need for an analytical tool that spans the full range of
irregular arrangements
Once the possibility opens that irregular arrangements
encompass a heterogenous group of jobs and represent a set
of pliable institutional arrangements, then the following
equation no longer holds: irregular employment=secondary
employment=employment that bears flux and uncertainty and =>
leads to greater numbers of periphery/secondary jobs in the
economy. Once the terms of this equation are strained,
there is a need to develop more detailed and textured
accounts of actual uses of irregular employment. In other
words, if a catch-all, residual, category of changes in
internal labor markets (thus of regular employment) no
longer can be characterized easily with existing analytical
tools, then existing employment types need to be amended.
During the 1980s, the empirical characterization of primary
employment has changed along with studies of changes in
internal labor markets. Thus, the empirical
characterization of irregular employment --and whether the
secondary employment "archetype" actually fits it-- also
need further investigation and re-evaluation.
What are the analytical purposes of empirical
investigation of irregular employment?
First, developing empirical accounts spanning the full
range of irregular employment arrangements is a research
agenda if the formers' essence cannot be fully captured by
an equation with secondary employment.
Second, as enterprise internal labor markets undergo
transformation, and by many accounts have not settled into a
fully stable form yet," and given that irregular
employment is closely tied to the evolution of regular
employment in these internal labor markets, then empirical
accounts of irregular arrangements must be developed that
follow the transformation of internal labor markets in
specific industrial sectors.
Third, to begin this process of spanning the full range
of uses of irregular employment, an account of how it is
being used in sectors not characterized by flux and
uncertainty provides a polar case that sets an outer limit
to the range of characterizations of irregular arrangements.
This case creates a polar opposite to the starkest
prediction of irregular employment as a result of firms
pursuing "low-wage/core-periphery" strategies as a short-
cut out of the pressures created by the new economic
environment of the 1980s and 1990s.
Fourth, for this second polar case, the role of the
institutional context must also be fleshed out. In most
accounts reviewed here, institutions are a (more or less
costly) constraint on firm decisions. In Piore (1987), they
28 Of the kind of stability knows from the late 50s to
late 60s.
are a factor embedded in a broader societal context 29 which
changes over time and whose features can compel firms to
make decisions in favor of more efficient uses of
technologies, labor and other resources.
In conclusion, the identification of a polar case other
than the "core-periphery" strategy for irregular employment
does not, in and of itself, invalidate contentions made in
most accounts that changes of the 1980s indeed have
endangered what have been succinctly depicted as "working
class jobs for middle class pay" (in the U.S. context;
Appelbaum, 1987: 269.) Rather, the second polar case
broadens the range of possible occurrences of the phenomenon
of irregular arrangements to encompass cases not neatly
captured by existing characterizations.
29 For example, the author points out that the
universality of social controls on layoff decisions are the
expression of social and political forces which cannot be
suppressed without a political explosion. The product of
these forces varies across countries, however.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LEGAL CONTEXT FOR IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
Before going into the details of irregular employment
in particular industrial sectors, we must grasp the
institutional context which manages employment stability in
France, it being different from the U.S. system. The
purpose of this chapter is two-fold. First, the chapter
provides the details necessary to understand firm decisions
that are described in the next three chapters. Second, this
chapter provides an account of how the norm of employment
stability in force in France during the post war period
underwent a significant shift during the 1980s. It
illustrates how irregular arrangements first existed in a
legal vacuum (because they differed from regular
employment), then challenged employment norms held by all
social actors and, finally, were accommodated by both
government and unions.
In short, irregular employment put into question the
notion adopted by policy makers, unions, and employers
alike, that the sign of economic development for the country
was the progressive integration of all workers and all
sectors into regular and long term employment with a single
employer. Regular employment was to include features such
as "mensualisation" (move from hourly to salaried
employment), full-time work hours and year round work.
This chapter describes the main dilemma for policy
makers and unions between restricting use (combatting) and
controlling (thus accepting) conditions for workers in the
two main forms of irregular employment: CDDs1 (limited
duration contracts) and temporary help service contracts.
It treats part-time in a wholly separate section because the
latter, while a form of irregular employment, was regulated
in a different perspective. Its regulation was embedded in
a "win-win" debate where making work hours more flexible for
workers through a broad range of policies would provide
firms with needed flexibility. As will be seen later, part-
time employment is two faced. It has a work time
flexibility component (reduced work hours for permanent
workers) and a constrained options component (the hours
available to most newly hired workers in retailing are now
part-time).
KEY ELEMENTS OF FRENCH INSTITUTIONS AND
DEFINITION OF "POLICY"
The French norm for employment for the post war period
is embedded in the common law contract of indeterminate
duration, the CDI. 2 The Labor Code states that "a contract
of employment is made without limit of time."3 This legal
Contrat A Duree Determinee.
2 Contrat & Durde Ind6termin6e
3 Section 121-5 of Labor Code.
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standard stands at odds with the U.S. legal standard of at-
will employment but is shared with other European countries
(former FRG, Italy, Spain.)
Over time, the package of worker rights and benefits
has been constructed around this norm. A worker would
benefit from socially provided benefits, the right to
organize and bargain, and specific conditions governing
firing, discharge and, in the 1970s, economic layoffs as
well. Thus, for a worker to stand outside of the standard
employment contract by being hired for the short term or
employed by a temporary help agency, meant working in a
legal vacuum and foregoing many of the benefits of the
employment relationship.
The package of benefits and terms of employment that
have accrued over time to the standard employment
relationship are the results of the combined action of
government regulation and collective bargaining, a mix that
is also peculiar to France. Employment conditions in
France, to a greater degree than in the U.S., are encoded in
legislation and regulation. This makes for a more formal
environment for employment and one whose evolution is easier
to track.
The perspective that I take in describing this
institutional context holds that national systems of
employment must be viewed as a whole which provides degrees
of employment protection to workers in a variety of ways
(Piore, 1986.)4 Systems of employment are best seen as a
conjunction of spheres which contribute to different degrees
toward building the terms and conditions of employment
relationships. These "spheres" are legal, judiciary,
administrative, collective bargaining, personnel policies to
the extent that they embody "social protection" norms and
informal social norms.'
In contrast, a purely legal view, which one would
obtain from only looking at the legal elements described
above, would argue that the shape of employment relations in
each country is directly shaped by the frame of labor laws.
An overdrawn version of this legal perspective would argue
that French employment relations are long-term and
continuous because they are mandated to be so by the common
law standard contract of indefinite duration. This
perspective would dramatically contrast the French system of
continuous contract to the U.S. system of at-will
employment.
If each sphere is taken separately (for instance, the
legal sphere), then great discrepancies exist across
countries. However, if one looks at the conjunction of all
spheres, then relevant research questions become:
4 Also, Boyer, 1986.
5 See Jacoby, 1987. The author contends that in the
U.S. more than other countries the "social protection"
tradition has become embodied in workplace benefits and
personnel policies.
.what norm of employment does the combined actions of
all spheres reflect ?
.not whether a system provides employment security;
rather, in what ways is each system of employment put to
test by the growth and diffusion of irregular arrangements
and how it has adjusted?
OTHER KEY ELEMENTS OF THE FRENCH SYSTEM
The employment relationship in France has been governed
by long standing state policy for providing social benefits
(nationalized health insurance and pension), by labor policy
and by collective bargaining. The term "labor policy"
serves to describe the role of case law (court decisions
concerning the employment relationship), of laws which
establish the standards for the employment relationship, and
of executive ordinances which spell out the specifics of
regulation. It is appropriate in the case of France to
portray the effects of actions taken by the legislative and
executive spheres as complementary since most key
legislation is initiated by the executive.6 In some
instances, the executive can issue "ordinances" which take
the role of legislation and can be far reaching.7
"Union policy" serves to describe union positions on
key legislation and the degree to which unions have relied
on the state to enforce employment standards. In France,
6 Delamotte, 1987, p.47.
7 Delamotte, 1987, p.47.
unions rely on the state to enact legislation mandating
employment-related benefits. They also rely on government
institutions to enforce key employment standards such as
work hours, health and safety, due process in dismissals or
during industrial conflicts (through a corps of Ministry of
Labor inspectors). Additionally, they can benefit from the
government's ability to extend by administrative decision
the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement
concluded with major employers to all firms in a sector,
although such extension is in fact rare. As a result,
whether a firm is unionized or not, and whether the employer
has partaken in an agreement or not, all workers of a sector
are covered by key provisions of collective bargaining
agreements on wages, hours, conditions of employment, causes
for discharge and procedures for layoffs.
RESTRICTING VERSUS CONTROLLING: THE PRIMARY DILEMMA OF
POLICY MAKING ON CDDs AND TEMPORARY HELP CONTRACTS
As irregular arrangements -mostly CDDs and temp
contracts- grew, workers hired under them found their
employment conditions increasingly at odds with those of
workers in regular employment. In the 1970s, workers
holding standard contracts benefitted from pre-notification
of layoff and discharge, from "just cause" discharge
protection, from severance benefits, from more generous
unemployment benefits and, particularly from 1973 to 1986,
from an administrative oversight of economic layoffs of more
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than 10 workers. Also, their weekly work hours were
standardized by legislation (full-time, year round, and day
or evening shifts with few exceptions). This standard
contract constituted the basis on which social and labor
legislation rested so that not holding one entailed a
significantly less protected position.
The sustained presence of CDDs and temp contracts threw
havoc in the system of social and labor protection which had
been built around the standard contract. By the early
1980s, policy makers and unions feared that irregular
arrangements contributed to the erosion of internal labor
markets. They faced a dilemma. Working toward constructing
regulation for irregular contracts implied an acceptance of
their presence in the workplace as legitimate employment
practices. Conversely, discouraging their use, by refusing
to give them a distinct status and a place in the legal
system, left workers in irregular arrangements outside the
net of social and labor protection.
The record of regulation is most exhaustive and
clearest for CDDs (limited duration contracts) and
temporary help service contracts, the earlier and most
common forms of irregular employment in the economy at
large. They are also the two forms of irregular employment
in use in the banking and insurance sectors.8
8 Other forms include independent contracting, or
intermittent contracts.
Regulation of CDDs
CDDs had existed for a long time prior to the 1979
legislation which gave them a distinct legal status. They
were often used in sectors with a tradition of unstable
employment such as tourism, hotels or some food processing
industries. The distinction between contracts operated as
follows: workers without any explicit contract held regular
contracts of indeterminate duration (CDI), while workers
with an explicit contract were those holding a limited
duration or fixed-term contract (CDD). Enforcement of
worker rights under CDDs was often lax.
The laws of 1973 and 1975 on layoffs for regular contracts
changed the context for CDDs
Economic conditions changed in the 1970's; firms made
more extensive use of CDDs in situations and in industries
in which regular contracts had been the norm. As CDDs
became more frequent, labor courts developed an extensive
case law which specified the conditions under which a CDD
could become a long-term contract. Workers who succeeded in
making the claim that their CDD should indeed have been a
long term contract could benefit from two levels of
protection. They already had guaranteed employment for the
duration of the CDD and, when it expired, could claim the
protection available to workers with long-term contracts
such as prior notification of layoffs, severance pay, and
coverage by the 1973 and 1975 laws on dismissals and
layoffs.
These two laws had changed significantly the conditions
under which regular contracts were terminated. The 1973 law
established mandatory prior notification of layoffs,
severance pay and their oversight by the Ministry of Labor's
corps I of labor inspectors. The 1975 law further
reinforced these provisions by giving a broader mandate to
labor inspectors to lengthen and make more elaborate the
procedure for layoffs. This later law gave them specific
guidelines to monitor the grounds for economic layoff. It
expanded requirements for compliance with consultative
procedures with unions and institutions of worker
representation, and broadened the scope of the "social
plan", the set of transitional measures which employers had
to design to cushion the impact of a layoff. A major
benefit of this legislation for workers under the standard
contract was that it also expanded unemployment benefits to
90 percent of gross pay in the previous year, for the first
12 months of unemployment.
During the 1970's and until 1979, the case law had
tended to define broadly and generously the situations in
9 The Labor Inspectorate of the Ministry of Labor is a
corps of administrative inspectors who respond to complaints
lodged by individuals, unions and worker representatives,
conduct site visits and monitor the enforcement of labor and
health and safety legislation.
10 Layoffs affected by this law concerned at least 10
workers over a 30 day period. The law required employer's
consultation with institutions for worker representation,
and the formulation of a "social plan" (attempt to cushion
the impact of the layoff on workers).
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which a CDD could be assumed to turn into a long-term
contract. Court decisions leaned in favor of converting a
CDD to a regular contract in most cases in which there were
ambiguities surrounding the duration of employment promised
a worker. The spirit of much of this case law was to
protect workers from frequent abuse entailed by the use of
fixed-term contracts to employ "otherwise regular" workers.
"Abuse" of a CDD was defined as including situations in
which a worker was hired on a CDD repeatedly, with no
prospect of being hired on a regular contract, and for the
sole purpose of bypassing social and labor legislation."
The cases of "fraudulent use" of CDDs were those in which an
employer obviously had used these contracts for a position
bearing all the characteristics of a permanent one. Courts
based the concept of "fraud" or "abuse" of CDDs on the
notion that a "permanent" job should be held by a worker
under a regular, long-term, contract.
The 1979 legislation consecrates the use of CDDs throughout
the economy:
The 1979 legislation gave CDDs a distinct legal status,
set specific requirements for their written form such as
explicitly stated termination dates and conditions for
renewals, and established broad requirements for conditions
under which such contracts could be used. In doing so, it
also restricted the developments of case law in directions
" Verdier, 1986.
granting workers more extensive rights to a regular
contract. By establishing a minimum of standards to be met,
the law prevented the pre-1979 case law made in reaction to
"fraudulent use" from becoming the standard for all CDDs.
As such, it gave back to employers some ease of use of CDDs
that had been threatened by developments in case law.12
This law was passed in the last years of the conservative
government, in contrast to the following regulations put in
place in the early years of a new socialist government
elected in 1981.
The 1982 attempts at directly restricting the use of CDDs:
The 1982 regulations of CDDs, which were part of the
Auroux laws issued by the new socialist government,
acknowledged that these contracts were routinely used for
"normally permanent jobs,"" i.e. in settings in which most
employment took place under long-term contracts and not in
industries which had traditionally resorted to short-term
employment and short contracts. The 1982 regulations tried
to do two things at once: to provide guarantees to workers
under CDDs which were similar to those of permanent workers
and, concurrently, to restrict the use of CDDs to non-
permanent jobs and limit their duration. In the end, they
succeeded partly with the first goal but not the second.
12 Ibid.
" Verdier, 1986, p.293.
First, the ordinances applied a principle of "non-
discrimination" which held that laws, collective bargaining
agreements and practices which were applicable to regular
contracts and concerned compensation and socially provided
benefits would also apply to CDDs.1' As long as a
workplace included workers on both types of contracts, then
workers on CDDs would benefit from these provisions.
The second thrust of the 1982 ordinances was to
restrict the use of CDDs so as to prevent the "erosion" of
internal labor markets by restricting the substitution of
CDDs for regular, long-term, contracts. The legislation
spelled out explicitly the situations in which CDDs would be
allowed. It drew a distinction between situations in which
short-term employment, and thus short contracts, were the
common practice" and "specific situations" in which CDDs
use should be an allowed exception. The 1982 laws tried to
be as specific as possible as to the cases in which CDD use
1 This extension of coverage was possible because many
work-related benefits are legally mandated by the French
state even in the cases in which a substantial share of
their cost is borne by the employer. The state could
include a new category of workers because it has the power
to extend the provisions of an industry-wide collective
bargaining agreement to sections of an industry via a mix of
legislation and administrative regulations.
15 The sectors covered were: hotels, restaurants,
entertainment, information and communications, movies,
education, forestry, vacation and summer camps, professional
sports, foreign construction, foreign technical assistance
and, finally, international scientific research. These
sectors are also among those in which employment is short-
term in the United States.
would be allowed in those industrial sectors and work
settings where long term employment and regular contracts
had been the norm and CDDs a comparatively recent
phenomenon. By establishing limits, the regulators had
hoped to curtail any growing and routine use of CDDs in
settings with little history of them.
The requirements to be met by these "specific
situations" included: the replacement of an absent
permanent employee, a replacement (stand-in) while waiting
for a new hire, an exceptional and temporary excess of
activity, an occasional task, and an urgent task. Limits
were set for the duration of each contract, the
possibilities for renewal and the total duration any worker
could be kept on CDD in the same position." These limits
were subject to much debate and change over time as employer
associations pushed for relaxation of restrictions.
16 . the replacement of an absent permanent employee,
with a specified term or that of a minimum and maximum
duration;
. an exceptional and temporary excess of activity
imposed by changes in overall economic conditions and not by
variations in production due, for instance, to a unique or
unusual order or the launching of a new product. In this
case, the contract had to be of a specified duration, not to
exceed 6 months. These contracts were the subject of much
debate and of much modification over time;
. an occasional task which was specified, non durable
and outside the normal activity of the firm, could be
covered by a contract with a specified duration of no more
than 12 months;
. a replacement (stand-in) while waiting for a new hire
for a regular contract could have a fixed-term contract with
a duration specified in advance and no longer than 6 months;
. urgent tasks, such as accidents, rescues and repairs,
could entail a contract of up to 6 months.
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Giving up on restricting the use of CDDs:
By 1986, however, after several years of little or no
job growth, under pressure from the public debate on
"deregulation" and labor market flexibility and with a
change in parliamentary majority, 7 most restrictions on
use of CDDs were removed. All specific restrictions were
replaced with a very broad, and thoroughly unenforceable,
statement:
" (a short contract)..may be signed only for the
carrying out of a specific task. It may not have, as
an objective, the creation of a lasting job linked to
the normal and permanent activity of the enterprise."
In this way the government had given up its efforts to
control, by legal means, the potential transformation of
conditions of employment within firms. What was kept,
however, was the principle of "non-discrimination", that
is, the parity of wage and benefits between workers on CDDs
and those on regular contracts in similar positions. Also,
CDDs still could not be used as strike breakers (as was true
for temp workers).
The regulation of temp help contracts
The regulation of temp contracts follows a similar path
to that of CDDs although the former have proved to be
somewhat easier to monitor than the latter.'8 Temp
17 Back to a conservative coalition in parliament but
with a socialist president.
For more detail, see Carr6, 1987.
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employment, with its two way relationship, is particularly
problematic for the French labor law system because the
latter mandates explicit, written, contracts for exceptions
from the norm. Thus, temp employment involves 1/ a written
contract between the worker and the temp service valid only
for the duration of assignment and 2/ a service contract
between the temp service and the user firm. The temporary
help service industry per se has been subject to regulation
since 1972; this early legislation was prompted by employer
excesses in the 1960s. The industry has received
significant regulatory attention because of its reputation
of having numerous "sweat merchants" in its ranks.19 The
industry also had a large segment of providers of laborers
in construction and heavy manufacturing and thus drew on a
pool of labor less able to protect itself. Since 1972, temp
services must register and provide information on their
activities to administrative authorities. More importantly,
they must purchase of form of financial insurance which
guarantees payment of social benefits to workers in case of
bankruptcy. Since 1985, the industry has had a national
collective bargaining agreement between the two industry
19 "Sweat merchant" or even "slave traders" (negriers)
are terms used to describe marginal temp help services
operating with little respect.for labor law, with little
stability, and which were prone to shut down overnight and
leave workers stranded with back pay owed to them and
without the mandatory contributions to national health and
unemployment insurance funds having been made.
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associations (PROMATT and UNETT) and several union
federations (see below).
The 1982 Auroux laws:
In spite of the 1972 legislation, and by the account of
industry representatives 20 , excesses and severe violations
of worker rights continued throughout the 1970s. The
socialist government elected in 1981 had even vowed to
eliminate all forms of for-profit temp services and to turn
their functions over to a national employment service. The
legislation actually put into place in 1982 was along the
same lines as that for CDDs. It is the responsibility of
the temp service to maintain parity of compensation and
benefits (paid holidays and vacations) between temp workers
and regular employees of the user firm. Parity is
effective only in cases in which the temp worker can be
compared to a regular worker with similar skills and
position. More importantly, every temp worker receives a
lump sum payment at the end of assignment to compensate for
the benefits of stable employment not received; it is the
"precarity premium."2 1 The temp service must pay a minimum
of 15 percent of total gross compensation for an assignment.
This amount is reduced to 10 percent if the temp service
offers the worker another assignment within 3 days that is
20 See Portier, 1988, "Communication par le secr6taire
general de l'UNETT."
21 Indemnit6 de pr6carit6 de 1'emploi.
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similar in duration, compensation and other conditions of
employment. This provision enforces a certain stability of
activity upon temp help services. Another key benefit,
maintained ever since, is the requirement that the temp
contract specify ex ante the exact dates of start and end of
an assignment.22 As with CDDs, the use of workers on temp
contracts as strike breakers was prohibited.
The restrictions experienced by user firms on the
grounds for use of temp contracts that were put into place
in 1982 were similar to those on CDDs but even more
stringent. Most noticeably, the regulation removed the
option to use temp contracts for the "creation of new
activities" a motive frequently used by user firms for
resorting to temp workers to open a new branch office for
example.
What the socialist government had done in effect, with
the 1982 laws, was to resolve the ambivalence between a/
bettering conditions for temp workers by providing them some
employment rights and b/ avoiding the consolidation of what
was officially considered a "marginal" form of employment,
in favor of the former approach (a).
A 1985 law fully harmonized the grounds for use of temp
contracts along with those for use of CDDs thus ending the
comparatively stricter treatment of temp contracts which
22 Each contract for an assignment can be no longer
than 6 months.
might have accounted for a slower growth than that of CDDs
over the period.2 3 Temp contracts are also more sensitive
to downturns in economic activity, however. In another
attempt to prevent the "erosion" of internal labor markets,
this 1985 law explicitly forbade the succession of temp
assignments and CDDs in the same position because such
succession would be the best indication that the position
was being transformed progressively into a temporary one.
The relaxation of regulation in 1986:
By 1986, the government removed restrictions on use of
temp contracts and replaced them by the same general clause
on prevention of erosion of standard employment as that
cited above for CDDs. The grounds for use of temp contracts
were further relaxed in 1989 making temp contracts even
easier to use than CDDs.
Workers on temp contracts have benefitted from greater
protection to the extent that the temp service industry
continues to be regulated as an industry. The provisions,
on form and substance, of the contract between the temp
service and the user firm are enforced by penal sanctions
applicable to the temp service (e.g. for failure to purchase
insurance for bankruptcy) and to the user firm (e.g. for use
of illegal duration or in a prohibited case.) This stiffer
regulation has led some to argue that temp employment is
23 La lettre du travail temporaire, 58, March-April,
1986, pp.4-7.
becoming the better protected form of short term employment
for workers.24 The principle of wage and benefit parity
has made the hour of temp worker more expensive to the user
firm than that of a worker on a CDD once the temp service
markup is added. The increasing concentration of the
industry over the period, which some observers argue was
speeded up by the 1982 restrictions, might also have
contributed to it providing better employment conditions.25
Marginal temp help service companies -those most
financially insecure and most likely to put workers at great
risk financially and otherwise- have been weeded out by
penalties or the inability to sustain higher costs.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRICTIONS ON CDDS AND TEMP CONTRACTS:
HOW MUCH DID REGULATION MATTER?
Attempts at directly restricting the use of CDDs and
temp contracts succeeded only in limited ways as the above
chronology makes clear. Establishing pay parity with
permanent workers in similar positions is effective if and
24 See Rioux, 1988, "Le match interim/CDD".
25 The number of temp help service firms was 963 in
Dec. 1973 (1965 establishments). It grew to 1614 by Dec.
1979. It then decreased to 1266 in Dec. 1981, to 1049 in
Dec. 1982 and reached 764 in 1984. Temp service
establishments which belonged to firms with 10
establishments or more accounted for 30 percent of
establishments in Dec. 1979, 54 percent in Dec. 1981 and 53
percent in Dec. 1983. Ministry of labor data cited in "La
Flexibilite du Travail", Cahiers Francais, 1987, p. 10 and
Tableaux Statistiques, p.201. (1973 statistics from Germe et
Michon, 1978).
only if workers with irregular contracts are in the same
workplaces as workers with regular contracts. Important
restrictions were maintained past 1986, however; they
included the prohibition on the use of temp contracts and
CDDs as strike breakers and that of temp workers in
particularly dangerous work conditions.26
The 1986 removal of most restrictions on motives for
use of CDDs and temp contracts seems more drastic than it
might have been in reality. The list of motives for
recourse was already lengthy and rather tolerant. More
importantly, according to some Ministry of Labor inspectors,
a few of the common grounds for use such as "exceptional
work overload" or "occasional task" were difficult to verify
because enforcement consisted of occasional checks by
inspectors. The difficulty of enforcement of specific
controls was significant enough that some inspectors see
little change, beyond simplification, brought by the 1986
lifting of restrictions.27
Regulating the duration of CDDs and temp contracts has
also presented regulators with odd dilemmas. If the maximum
duration of a contract is long, then the legislation
26 Dangerous working conditions and settings are
specified in a list given by the Ministry of Labor. This is
a particularly significant piece of regulation that is
severely lacking in the U.S. where temp workers operate in a
grey area in terms of employer responsibility in cases of
accidents.
27 Sciberras, J. C., 1987.
96
encourages the use of, say, CDDs instead of regular
contracts because firms can keep worker on CDD for a long
time. But it is also true that if the CDD is for a long
duration, then the worker is "guaranteed" a definite and
moderately long period of employment even if his employment
status remains unstable. In practice, the number of allowed
renewals matter significantly. Sciberras (1987) argues that,
in the 1986 ordinance, what he sees as the benefits of a
long CDD cumulative duration (24 months) is lessened by the
possibility of 2 renewals so that a firm can hire the same
worker for three 8-months contracts and thus have three,
consecutive, extended probationary periods. CDDs are
frequently used as a form of hiring so that firms benefit
from extended probationary periods,2 a practice in banking
and insurance too.
The 1986 relaxation of regulation is perhaps symbolic
more than a radical turnaround in policy. It symbolizes the
public abandonment of highly visible and controversial
restrictions -themselves part of a controverted package of
workplace reforms, the Auroux laws- more than a significant
change in the government's ability to prevent the use of
workers on irregular contracts in settings in which long
term employment is the norm.
What these regulations probably did, however,
particularly during the 1982-1986 period, was to shift the
28 Sciberras, 1987; Claude, 1987.
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relative costs of different forms of irregular employment.
For instance, by putting stiffer restrictions and higher
costs on temp contracts, regulations steered some of the use
toward CDDs. What they did not do was to affect other forms
of irregular employment riskier to workers; their scope was
limited. Subcontracting continued to grow during the
1980's, including the "subcontracting" of tasks to
individual workers29 , rendering enforcement of labor and
social protection difficult and the task of labor inspectors
increasingly problematic.30 In fact, some labor inspectors
have argued for the redesign of the definition of employment
relationship. They advocate the extension of protections
afforded to regular employees of a firm to all workers who
are supervised and directed by an employer regardless of
their individual employment status and regardless of the
structure of the enterprise (for cases in which a firm
subcontracts with a succession of intermediaries who
themselves contract with independent workers).
29 Akin to independent contracting in the U.S.
30 Chetcuti and Lenoir, 1988; Direction de la Securit6
Sociale, 1988; Strohl, 1988.
Controlling the conditions of employment, rather than
restricting use, turned out to be easier to do in the temp
industry
Once they abandoned the goal of directly preventing the
widespread use of temp contracts by user firms, regulators
found it easer to improve the terms of employment of temp
workers than changing the conditions for workers on CDDs.
They could deal directly with a single industry and its
representatives as opposed to controlling the behavior of
scattered user firms. Regulation ended up affecting user
firms practices indirectly by raising the price to them of
temp contracts, as will be seen later in the cases of banks
and insurance companies.
CONTRACTUAL POLICY
The 1985 national collective bargaining agreement in the
temp industry
The government enforced a trade off; continued
stringent government monitoring of the temp industry or
participation by industry representatives in a government-
initiated national collective bargaining effort. This was
the first such effort; until then, the only major agreement
had been a 1969 enterprise level agreement between Manpower
Inc. and the communist-led union federation CGT.31 Both
temp service business associations, PROMATT and UNETT, chose
31 Confederation Generale du Travail
99
to participate (union attitudes are discussed in a separate
section below). The bargaining rounds led to staggered,
piecemeal, agreements starting in 1983; each was extended to
the entire temp workforce through the extension
procedure.32 The national agreement, reached in May 1985,
established a clear and distinct "employment status" for
temp workers, including their most important employment
rights. It was signed by both employer federations and all
major union federations (CFDT, CFTC, CGT-FO, CGC).
The terms of this agreement make it unique in Europe.
Worker rights are organized around three principles. The
first, probably the most novel, follows the credo "The only
freedom of the temp worker is to be able to change temp
services (employers)". It is conceived as the counterpoint
to the freedom of the user firm and of the temp service to
terminate employment with short notice and no cause. This
principle is embodied in the "mixing" of enterprise-level
and industry-level seniority 33 for key benefits (paid
32 See Bacquet, 1988. Negotiations moved faster
thanks to a prior agreement to break up the negotiations
into smaller topical segments and starting with the least
controversial ones. The procedure of extension is
characteristic of the collective bargaining process in
France. The government can chose to extend the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement concluded in one part of an
industry, or a region, to the entire workforce of a sector,
thus uniformizing the employment conditions. The workforces
of employers who do not belong to the signatories employer
associations are also covered.
33 Seniority levels required for some benefits are
substantially lower than those in force for regular workers
who have much longer job tenure.
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vacations) which become portable across temp help services.
The second is "mutualisation", that is the creation of
mutual social insurance structures in the industry to create
benefits that are, at least in theory, equivalent to those
of workers on regular contracts (CDI) in the economy (such
as access to training leave, compensation in cases of work
related accidents or illnesses, supplementary retirement
benefits.)34 The third principle is that of maintaining
worker access to some job-related benefits beyond the
duration of their contract (i.e. assignment with user firm).
For example, worker compensation payments for accidents or
injury continue beyond the date of expiration of the temp
contract (assignment) and when the worker is theoretically
without employer. The more innovative of the two industry
associations, PROMATT, has also tried to develop ways for
temp workers to by-pass what is seen as "discrimination" in
consumer and home credit markets.35
As a footnote, the 1985 agreement was bargained, on the
employer side, by PROMATT and was innovative enough that a
few major employers chose to shift their membership to
3' The industry created its own fund for training
leave, Fond d'Assurance Formation du Travail Temporaire. It
is peer managed.
35 The association has developed an agreement with one
credit institution which accepts to treat temp workers with
a proof of a specified level of seniority as regular workers
for credit reviews. (Bacquet, 1988: 21). In July 1992,
industry representatives further committed themselves to
establishing a system of guarantees to limit discrimination,
and risks to lenders (Le Monde, "La protection..," 1992).
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UNETT. The latter business association, although a
signatory to the agreement, has publicly distanced itself
from some of the positions taken by PROMATT
representatives.36
In contrast to the benefits gained by temps under the
1985 agreement, workers on CDD do not have any special
status beyond parity of wages with regular workers and
access to communal structures within the firm for which they
work. In terms of social benefits protection, they receive
the minimum benefits provided by the national government
(such as health benefits) but are more prone to "fall
between the cracks" where enforcement of labor, health and
safety regulation is concerned.
WHAT HAPPENED TO UNIONS?
So far, the story of the institutional context for
irregular employment has, for the most part, left out union
attitudes and strategies. It has made sense to do so
because the structure of the French employment and
industrial relations system is such that unions have relied
significantly on national legislation to enforce employment
standards. Their strategy has been to extend gains made in
key sectors to a larger segment of the workforce through
national labor legislation and the extension of collective
bargaining agreements to previously uncovered workers.
36 Manpower Inc. moved to UNETT. On the whole,
however, PROMATT represents larger high-end employers, while
UNETT represents smaller temp help services.
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Thus, key elements of the legislation on irregular
arrangements embodied provisions that were originally part
of some company specific agreements. Unions have also
worked primarily by pushing for their agenda in universal
legislation rather than at the bargaining table.
With the explicit removal in 1986 of formal
administrative controls on the use of short contracts,
unions have been under greater compulsion to bargain at the
branch (industrial sector) and local level for provisions
regarding the status and the use of workers on short
contracts (see below).
Historical note on union positions on employment
differentiation within the firm
The role of major union federations and collective
bargaining in regulating irregular arrangement remains ill
defined and scarcely studied. Clearly, these arrangements
were visible in workplaces, for the unions to contend with,
long before they became the subject of regulatory attention.
Rozenblatt (1988) argues that differentiation of employment
status has always existed within unionized firms although it
has been somewhat hidden by a public union stance of
"uniform treatment of an homogenous working class."37
37 Rozenblatt uses this phrase to describe a mode of
development of unions in manufacturing in which unions
started with the defense of skilled and professional workers
in large private and public enterprises, and adopted a long-
term view toward the abolition of the wage relationship and
the extension of advantages gained by established worker
groups to those least protected.
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Using evidence on the chemical industry" which is
considered the "core" of the unionized sector, the author
argues that differentiation existed through the 60's and
70's. In heavy chemical processing, short term and
precarious employment existed particularly in shipping and
warehousing. In the 70's, data from one large firm reported
20-25 percent of employment taking place under short
contracts mostly in shipping activities but some also in
manufacturing. A union publication for the same firm,39
reported for 1973 that, out of 1032 workers, 809 were
"permanent" workers and 223 were under short contracts.
Anecdotal evidence indicates less union resistance to short
contracts in shipping activities than in manufacturing or
maintenance departments.
Rozenblatt reports that local union responses differed
widely. In one case, workers formed a new union local to
protest and denounce the large proportion of short contract
arrangements tolerated by the main union. In another, the
collective bargaining contract fixed the maximum level of
short contract workers without making any effort to
integrate such workers under union contract provisions. In
several other cases, the issue of differentiation of status
only came up with industrial restructuring, massive early
retirements and the ensuing claims by short term workers to
38 Jobert and Rozenblatt (1983, 1985.)
39 CFDT publication, cited in Rozenblatt, 1988.
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take the place of workers who left and thus gain job tenure.
This fragmentary information indicates, at the very least,
some ambiguity in the position of unions toward the
differentiation of employment status.
This same evidence leads Rozenblatt to argue that the
union attitude of tolerating, and even welcoming, a
hierarchy of status in the workplace during the 1960s and
1970s made it possible for employers to expand their use of
such workers during the late 70's and 80's. Whether or not
this diagnostic of neglectful attitude is accurate, it is
likely that as the rise of unemployment showed no sign of
abating, unions became less willing or less able to
recognize differentiation and to move away from the defense,
and representation, of a falsely homogenous and unified
labor force. Their strategy in the 70's and early 80's
consisted mainly of defending the "right to employment" for
all workers and, given their lack of means of action at the
local level, to rest on national government for policies to
assist with the re-employment of displaced workers.4 This
strategy probably led them as well to rely on an
"institutional strategy" for the regulation of irregular
employment arrangements with the resulting drawback of being
unable to control practices within the firm.
4 Rozenblatt also draws a further connection between
this union stance and an increased divergence between laid
off workers, workers excluded from the core and externalized
from the enterprise and the union movement which has been
unable to devise concrete strategies for displaced workers.
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Unions' adaptation to the presence of temporary help service
employment
The form of irregular employment whose presence
required the most adaptation from unions was the temp
contract and its companion for-profit temp help service
industry. By participating in a national collective
bargaining effort for that industry starting in 1982, unions
had to alter their official position on temp contracts
significantly.
In spite of the fact that one federation, the communist
led CGT, had signed an agreement with Manpower Inc. as far
back as 1969, the official union position throughout the
1970s was that temp employment should either be made illegal
or taken over by the public employment service. In no case
should temp employment be the source of profit making.
Meanwhile the socialist led CFDT chose to bargain with user
firms on limiting the use of temps rather than negotiate
with the temp industry.41 Attempts at an agreement between
the temp industry associations and major union federations
were abandoned in 1980. However, both sides of the
bargaining table were compelled to meet again by the 1982
restrictions on use which, first, gave employers a taste of
possible stricter government monitoring and, second, gave a
message to unions that the socialist government, by
41 Account given by Bacquet, (1988) representative for
the major employer federation, PROMATT.
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regulating, was also in fact accepting the presence of the
industry as a significant employer. (As mentioned above, the
Socialist election platform initially called for the
replacement of the temp industry by the a public employment
system run by the unemployment insurance service, while the
Communist Party had called for the elimination of temping).
Finally, the 1982 legislation mandated a 3 year bargaining
effort between industry representatives and unions.42
What it took for major unions to bargain for temp
worker rights was a mix of innovative bargainers4 3 coming
up with unusual proposals for protecting worker rights,
described above, and for unions to accept the temp industry
as an employer with which to reckon. The 1982 government
regulations had de facto accepted for-profit temp employment
and made union requests for its abolition moot. The
official union position also moved significantly during
negotiations. Union federations had to give up on important
demands such as that temp workers be considered permanent
workers of the temp service and thus hold a regular long
term contract (CDI) with all the rights that such contract
42 The mandate was for parties to negotiate modalities
for sick benefits, training, industrial medicine, and
compensation for unemployment due to weather conditions.
43 According to some observers, the bargainers on the
government and union sides had social science backgrounds
and were particularly innovative. So were some
representatives from the employer side. The most active
came from PROMATT.
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entails." They settled instead for the package of rights
outlined above with its concomitant acknowledgement that
equivalent, rather than identical, rights could be devised
for temp workers. This was a significant departure from the
position of extending the same package of rights, now
available only the permanent workforce, to all workers.
Union strategies in user firms: the reality of contract
language on CDDs, temps and other forms of irregular
employment:
Existing collective bargaining agreements (sector-
level) for user firms do little more than restate or refer
to the legislation on temp and CDD use within firms. This,
according to some researchers, is due to the fact that the
legislation is so exhaustive that it leaves little room for
collective bargaining.45 A 1989 study of a representative
sample of collective bargaining agreements (100 sector wide,
and 120 establishment level) reveals that out of 66
sectoral agreements that refer explicitly to CDDs or temps,
22 refer directly to the text of current legislation.4 '
Others refer to outdated legislation and are preempted by
the existing one. (Out of 120 enterprise level agreements,
only 20 refer at all to CDDs or temp contracts.) None of
44 A request apparently modeled on German legislation
at the time.
4s See Nenot (1989), Guitton (1989).
46 The study sample accounts for 100 percent of sector
level agreements and two percent of enterprise level
agreements (Nenot, 1989).
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the agreements surveyed provide explicit restrictions on the
amount of irregular employment that firms can use. Very few
sectoral agreements add provisions beyond those provided for
legislation. For instance, the authors of the study find
only three agreements in the sample which compute seniority
for CDD holders for the purpose of access to regular
employment and establish a principle -but not an obligation-
of priority access to permanent hiring for CDD holders. One
of these is the Banking collective bargaining agreement.47
Sectors vary in how they measure the minimum seniority level
for irregular workers to gain parity with regular workers in
terms of legal and bargaining rights. Some count cumulated
time spent on CDD with one firm, others apply sector-wide
seniority, yet others only count assignments longer than two
or three months (cookie manufacturing and bulk printing
respectively). 48
Reporting on the same survey, Guitton (1989) notes that
heavy use of irregular employment49 is not well correlated
with coverage of irregular arrangements in the sectoral
47 The other two sectors are Cookie manufacturing and
Consumer cooperatives. (Nenot, 1989: 10).
48 Collective bargaining agreements display more
specificity and variety when dealing with intermittent
employment contracts in force in seasonal industries such as
food processing. These contracts are more recent and the
legislation sends the responsibility for managing details of
their enforcement back to sector wide bargaining. (N6not,
1989.)
49 Share of the workforce on CDD, temp contracts, or
part time.
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collective bargaining agreement. Sectors with collective
bargaining agreements with extensive coverage are not
necessarily the heaviest users of irregular employment as
one could expect. Conversely, industrial sectors which are
the heaviest users vary greatly in their degree of
collective bargaining coverage for irregular
arrangements. 50 Irregular arrangements are not perceived
by parties to collective bargaining as a set of related
issues, according to Guitton. Instead, CDD and temp
contracts are viewed as exceptions best left to the legal
system.51
SHIFTS IN THE NORM OF REGULAR EMPLOYMENT AND
CONSEQUENCES FOR IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
As was discussed earlier, from the late 70's and into
the 80's, policy on irregular employment evolved and shifts
in the norm of regular employment occurred along with it.
By 1986, some of the terms of employment of workers on
standard contracts (indeterminate duration) had changed as
50 For instance, among the six heaviest users, only
three, food retail, hospitals, and restaurants, are among
those sectors which bargain most on irregular arrangements
(Guitton, 1989:16.)
51 Part-time is perceived as requiring a dispensation
from the standard workweek, also a matter for legislation
and not bargaining. Part-time, however, is more likely to
be the subject of bargaining than other forms of irregular
employment in those sectors where it is a choice tied to
regular employment and thus part of the internal management
of employment, rather than a constrained form of employment
as it is in fast food retailing.
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well. Most visibly, an ordinance removed the administrative
oversight of layoffs of more than 10 workers. 5 2 A major
source of protection for regular workers, that set them
apart from workers in irregular employment, had been
eliminated.
Over the period, explicit reference to the notion of
"fraud" or "abusive" use of CDDs and temp contracts
disappeared as well from the text of regulation. During the
70's and early 80's, the "abusive use" of short contracts
had meant their use for jobs which bore all the
characteristics of a permanent job and in order to bypass
social and labor legislation. By the mid-80's, this notion
was no longer in use partly because the attributes of a
"permanent" position had become ambiguous. Even if this
notion had been formally maintained, it had become
unenforceable. Moreover, the distinction between a regular
contract and an irregular contract had become less stark.
The position of the national government changed over
the period. These shifts only partially reflect changes in
parliamentary majority (from the conservative to the
socialists in 1982, back to the conservatives in 1986 and
back again to the socialists in 1988. ); they likely reflect
successive ad hoc reactions to the transformation of the
French economy into one with low job growth. From 1982 to
52 Preliminary results on employer plans for job
creation after the removal of layoff restrictions show
little change. See Elbaum, 1988.
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1986, the government ostensibly tried to limit the use of
irregular employment by regulating its uses while
simultaneously eliminating most significant restrictions on
the use of such contracts for the hiring of the long term
unemployed. By 1987, the Minister of Labor from the
conservative government argued that the only way to create
employment for those workers not integrated in the labor
market was to bypass the rules regulating the labor market
because these rules could not be changed due to "societal"
opposition:
"The rules which strap the labor market are for
now quasi immovable because the social body does
not want to touch them. It is possible that they
will have disappeared 20 years from now but, in
the short run, the only way to create these types
of jobs is to bypass the normal functioning of the
labor market. For a large number of activities,
employment does not exist because its price is too
high: you get either a potential job offer, or
the growth of underground employment."53
In late 1988, the Minister of Labor of the time
reiterated a similar view: very few changes to the rules
governing standard (indeterminate duration) contracts and
CDDs are foreseeable but no further regulation will be put
on all other irregular contracts.
s3 Interview with Philippe Seguin, Minister of Labor
reported in "Politique de l'emploi et precarit6," Revue
Francaise d'Economie, 1987. (Translation mine)
54 Presentation by the Minister of Labor, Mr. Soisson,
at Colloque international sur les nouvelles formes d'emploi,
Paris: Ministry of Labor, Nov. 1988, reported by Nicole
Kershen.
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On the part of unions, shifts in positions occurred as
well. The position of the CGT (communist led union)55
continued to be in 1985, as in 1975, to argue for different
investment priorities, more training and retraining, and
resisting all modifications to the legislation governing
standard employment contracts. The position of the CFDT
(socialist led union) by the mid 80's was to propose the
notion of "equivalent guarantees", a package of benefits and
labor protection to be tailored to differential employment
status and which would permit the "normalization" of
irregular employment. For this union, adopting this novel
stance entailed a public recognition that some
differentiation of employment was employer-led (and worker-
borne) but that another part of it met the aspirations of
some workers. 56 This was a risky position for a union to
take. It was embedded in a larger program advocating the
democratic planning of the economy, more local development,
and the stimulation of a "new demand" for social services
generating jobs in the para-public "cooperative sector."57
15 This union had been the largest during the post war
period but has suffered significant declines in membership
and support in recent years.
56 See Rozenblatt, 1988.
s' Ibid.
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PROMOTING PART TIME AS PART OF WORKTIME FLEXIBILIZATION
Historically, the state has regulated maximum yearly,
monthly and weekly work hours for broad industrial sectors.
It has regulated conditions in which overtime, shift work
and part-time hours were allowed. During the 1980s, a
number of these regulations were altered.
As mentioned in the preceding sections, the new
socialist government engaged in a reform of work hours
starting in 1982 (ARRT); part-time regulation is embedded in
this broader context.58 The worktime policy had several
purposes. It was to acknowledge the demands of the "new
socialist left"59 for greater individual freedom in
designing work schedules and career; part-time fit under
this header. It was also to meet the expectations of the
"old socialist left" for overall work hours reduction for
the entire workforce without any pay reduction.' Finally,
it also aimed to give employers lightened rules on work
schedules to enable them to use new machinery more
efficiently in manufacturing. This last goal fit in with
58 Politiques d'Am~nagement et de Reduction du Temps de
Travail (ARTT), see Commissariat G6neral du Plan, 1985.
59 The post May 1968 left movement.
'0 The campaign slogan had been the 35 hr week. The
1982 compromise was 39 hrs per week and there has been no
reduction since.
61 See "Pour une nouvelle organisation de la
production: allongement de la dur6e d'utilisation des
equipements, amenagement et r6duction du temps de travail,"
Rapport Taddei, 1985.
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the general government commitment to facilitating the
creation of employment by allowing work hours which diverge
from standard, full time and daytime, schedules. Some
prohibitions on the distribution of work hours (night work,
sunday hours) were relaxed in very specific cases. Special
legal status was provided for long-term, part-year,
employment through intermittent employment contracts
(EIRR,1986.)
The evolution of policy on work time is, in and of
itself, an extensive topic. Here I cover only those details
which make understandable the evolution of regulation on
part-time work. Overall, the early regulations of 1982
established the 39 hour week (at existing pay) and the fifth
week of annual vacation for workers on regular contracts.
In establishing a national standard, the law cut short a
wave of sector level, and even enterprise level, agreements
in which worktime reductions, and alterations of rules on
work hours, had been negotiated that gave more room to the
idiosyncracies of each sector and, some would say, to the
specific needs of the workforce. Once embedded in
legislation, work time policies became the province of
regulators and national collective bargaining and tended to
be viewed as a tool to increase productive efficiency. The
innovative concepts of worker choice and individual freedoms
took a back seat to the imperatives of the moment.
62 Interview with J.B. de Foucault, 1986.
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Since the mid 1970s, part-time had been the subject of
negotiations in a number of sectors and, in these, was seen
as a worker benefit along with flexitime and the 4 day
workweek. For a number of unions, negotiations on
alternative work schedules were part of their broader
efforts toward a long term reduction of weekly or yearly
work hours. Part-time had first been encouraged by the
national government in 1975 which offered civil servants a
range of possibilities to reduce their work hours (from 90
percent to 60 percent) and to redistribute them over the
week. In the 1980s, however, encouraging part-time became a
matter of employment creation. If part-time jobs could be
created, and employment thus be "shared" across the
workforce, then the national unemployment problem would
lessen. A number of policy packages on unemployment during
the 1980s gave financial incentives to firms which hired the
unemployed onto part-time contracts.
It turns out that part-time had started to grow in
retail trade, fast food distribution and other services
prior to the legislation of the early 1980s. These sectors
had drawn on part-time women workers and young labor force
entrants. For these sectors, then, part-time has been a
main form of hiring that is, a constrained option for
workers, rather than a benefit. These sectors benefit
greatly from the availability of "complementary" work hours
in the legislation. According to it, part-time workers can
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be asked to work up to a third more hours than their
regularly scheduled part-time hours (weekly or monthly
average). These complementary hours are paid at straight
rate and do not constitute overtime.'3 Ironically, part-
time workers can work hours up to an almost full-time
schedule whereas regular, full-time, workers cannot work
part-time episodically; they can change to a part-time
contract or they can participate in a flextime program if
available.
Nevertheless, under the 1982 and 1986 legislation,
part-time workers have a specific employment contract and a
set of rights which are best enforced for those workers who
convert from full-time to part-time (rather than be
recruited in a part time job). This is the situation most
relevant to part-time workers in banks and insurance
companies. The hourly rate of part-timers is supposed to be
equivalent to that of full timers with the same skill level
occupying a similar position in the establishment or firm.
They receive vacation days as if they worked full time but
at, obviously, lower compensation.'4 They can vote and be
elected for worker representation institutions. Their
63 Part-time Workers can refuse to work complementary
hours beyond this one third maximum set in the contract.
64 Are considered on part-time contracts, those workers
whose monthly work hours are at least one fifth lower than
the legal maximum or the maximum set in the sector level
collective bargaining agreement. There is not set mimimum
monthly hours. (Delamotte, 1987: 82.)
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seniority years are counted as if they worked full time.
Full-timers have in principle priority access to part-time
employment when it becomes available in their job category.
They also have the right to refuse it.
A survey of collective bargaining agreements conducted
in 1989 (discussed above)65 indicates that the latter show
significantly greater variation when it comes to part-time
(than for CDDs and temp contracts) precisely because the
context for policy on the latter was more mixed. Some
sectors had started using part-time systematically as early
as the mid 1970s as a cost saving strategy while in others
part-time schedules were introduced at the instigation of
government policy on worktime choice and of union advocacy
of it. Collective bargaining agreements span a range of
perspectives. First, in some agreements, part time is
voluntary and fits under the category of improvement of
working conditions. Second, in others, part-time is a
compromise between unions and employers for the latter to
gain more flexibility in work organization (Food
warehousing, clothing retail). Finally, other collective
agreements report the use of part-time to share employment
and avoid layoffs, or to facilitate employment creation
(fast food sector).
65 Nenot (1989) and Guitton (1989).
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING COVERAGE OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
IN INSURANCE AND BANKING
In these two sectors, the collective bargaining
agreements add little rights and no restrictions to CDDs and
temp contracts beyond those provided by the national
legislation discussed above. Workers on CDDs have in theory
some priority of access to regular employment in banking.
Unions in both sectors have noted the systematic use of CDDs
as extended probationary periods particularly in the last
years of the 1980s. They have done little, however, beyond
noting the existence of irregular arrangements and decrying
their presence. During the late 1980s, in cases of high
concentration of CDDs in some processing centers for
extended periods of time, locals have appealed to labor
inspectors to report possible illegal uses. In the end,
they could "win" the cancellation of CDDs, meaning that the
workers lost their jobs. They were not able to gain
wholesale conversions of workers on CDDs to regular long
term contracts. In the two sectors, however, unions from
the socialist led federation CFDT worked actively starting
in the 1970s to promote the access of full-timers to part-
time schedules and to flexitime. They succeeded earlier
than unions in other sectors in defining these options as
worker benefits. For unions in both insurance and banking,
part-time and flexitime were just stepping stones in a much
longer term effort toward worktime reduction. In insurance
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for instance, the weekly work hours were 38 1/4 hours, lower
than the national standard of 39 hours.
In conclusion, CDDs and temp contracts have been
regulated in a socio-institutional environment in which the
norm of regular employment was allowed to change
significantly as well. By the late 1980s, these two forms
of irregular employment had been accommodated by both policy
makers and unions. Ironically, over the same time period,
part-time which had begun the decade looking like a
potential tool for developing individual worker rights had
become primarily a tool for employment creation and for the
"sharing of work." In the next chapters, we will see how
CDDs, temp contracts and part time schedules have been used
for workforce management and transformation.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPLOYMENT TRANSFORMATION AS A CONTEXT FOR THE USE OF
IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN FRENCH BANKS AND INSURANCE COMPANIES
As discussed in chapter 1, during the 1980s,
scholarship came to rely on the analogy between irregular
arrangements and secondary employment. Research has asked
primarily how many of the characteristics of secondary
employment fit irregular arrangements.' Researchers' use
of the primary/secondary employment model has also led them
to interpret irregular employment as a response to greater
flux and uncertainty just as original definitions of
secondary employment would indicate.
The use of irregular employment made by French banks
and insurance companies during the 1980s runs counter to
these expectations. During the 1980s, French banks and
insurance companies used irregular employment to take their
overall system of employment, and their existing workforce,
through a major transition to a different structure. As I
discuss in the coming three chapters, irregular employment
in these two sectors turns out to be both a manifestation of
the transition in employment systems and a key strategic
tool for the implementation of this same transition.
Furthermore, the uses of irregular employment made by the
The possibility of conversion of primary jobs into
secondary ones also existed during the 1960s: "..primary
employers, through devices like subcontracting and temporary
employment, can convert primary employment into secondary
employment. (Doeringer and Piore, 1971: 166).
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banking and insurance sectors do not fit descriptions of
secondary employment, nor expectations of the growing core-
ring organization of the workforce in these sectors.
WHY THESE TWO SECTORS
First, I found that irregular arrangements deserved
being studied in specific industry contexts because the
evidence, up to this point, has been ambiguous as to whether
irregular employment is indeed the same thing as secondary
employment. This ambiguity comes from the fact that
irregular employment is a "catch-all" term for a set of
institutional arrangements that are quite pliable. Research
usually proceeds by first identifying institutional
arrangements -whether a job is temporary or filled with a
temp worker- and only then considering the nature of the
task performed. When research has been conducted across
many industrial sectors, the variety of tasks performed
under irregular arrangements yields little generalizable
information and few answers to questions on the nature of
irregular employment.
Thus, (and secondly) by placing irregular employment
squarely in the context of two sectors with similar work
organizations and in the recent history of their evolution,
I can better grasp how the characteristics of irregular
employment, such as its pliability and its ability to
accommodate variability and uncertainty, play themselves out
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in interaction with the institutional context of legal,
collective bargaining and social constraints.
Third, banking and insurance are sectors with a history
of well developed internal labor markets. The firms
interviewed for this study are firms whose main activity
always has been in banking and insurance. They are solid
contexts within which to examine the presence of irregular
employment alongside regular employment in internal labor
markets. As already noted, it is this coexistence which
distinguishes irregular employment from the better-known
secondary employment occurring in periphery firms.
Fourth, banking and insurance activities cannot be
characterized by great flux and uncertainty in economic
activity. That irregular employment should be a steady
presence in these sectors runs counter to predictions
derived from the secondary employment model. Banks and
insurance companies want to change their employment system
as dictated by their response to altered market conditions
of the 1980s. The new competitive conditions for banking
and insurance, however, cannot be reduced to flux and
uncertainty, neither can the activity of the two sectors be
characterized by these two factors. Large firms in the two
sectors have experienced market saturation, threats to their
market share and product changes but these do not compare to
the flux and uncertainty experienced in some manufacturing
markets.
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Finally, the practices of two sectors not
characterized by flux and uncertainty provide a counterpoint
to cases in which irregular employment can easily be equated
with secondary employment. Following the strategy (laid out
in chapter 1) of setting up two polar cases that give
boundaries to the range of firm strategies and type of
markets associated with irregular arrangements, my study of
banking and insurance fleshes out the second polar case, the
"restructuring" or "transition" strategy.2
SUMMARY OF THIS AND NEXT CHAPTER
During the 1980s, French banks and insurance companies
used irregular employment to enable themselves to transform
their system of employment, and the structure and
composition of their workforce. Most visibly, they have
sought to reduce the size of their lowest hierarchical job
category (Employ6); primarily clerical workers employed in
central administrative services. They have used irregular
employment to manage and accelerate workforce flux at the
margins of systems of employment that, in their view, have
become stagnant, and include an aging workforce, low
turnover, and limited on-the-job skill enhancement over the
past twenty years for the existing workforce.
2 Another advantage of studying service-sector firms is
that it adds a dimension to research which tends to have
documented mostly employment restructuring in manufacturing.
Accounts of employment transformation during the 1980s have
been short on descriptions of service-sector employment
change.
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Banks and insurance companies want to have their system
of employment undergo a significant transformation in
workforce composition and recruiting practices. They have
devised these changes as adaptations to market changes
(described below). Broadly speaking, the change in
composition of the workforce is two-fold:
1./ a reduction (in relative and absolute terms) of the
clerical workforce in central administrative services which
has aged (average age in the late 30s), was recruited at low
education levels and has benefitted from little training and
job change over the years; and
2./ a general move away from administration tasks
(account and contract administration) and towards commercial
and customer service activities. Recruiting standards have
been radically upgraded (to at least two years of post-
secondary education) to hire "the workforce of tomorrow"
that will give each firm an edge in adaptation to the
market.
Essentially, banks and insurance companies want to get
rid of one type of workforce and replace it with another.
They have made these changes,however, within constraints.
First, they operate in a collective bargaining and national
policy context in which they are committed to avoiding large
scale layoffs. Second, these are two sectors that have a
tradition and reputation of stable employment and labor
force attachment. They are sectors that have been "cash
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rich" in terms of personnel budget. Thus, the rules of
personnel administration or workforce composition cannot
change quickly. Third, they have yet to fully change job
contents to attract and retain a workforce with higher
education levels. Banking and Insurance firms plan to
change their system of employment within these constraints.
During the phase of rapid employment expansion of the
1960s and 1970s, desired workforce changes were brought
about through changing hiring practices. In the early to
mid 1980s, the sectors' ready response to slow market growth
and tighter personnel budgets was a freeze in hiring and
early retirement for those workers close to age. During the
late 1980s, faced with the consequences of the hiring freeze
--a workforce which is primarily middle-aged with high
seniority and low turnover-- and having decided to effect
changes faster, banks and insurance companies have used
irregular employment for the following purposes (see next
chapter). They have used it: 1/ to give themselves
extensive control over the volume of hiring; 2/ to increase
flux at the margins of their employment systems and 3/ to
give themselves the leeway to reconsider and modify the
career paths of certain workforce categories. In other
words, their use of irregular employment is directly tied
to changes in regular employment.
They also use irregular arrangements in ways that
differ from other sectors. If we think of two different
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models for the use of irregular employment, retail trade
could exemplify the case in which irregular employment has
substituted for a growing share of regular employment
leading to a visible and probably lasting "tier-ing" of the
workforce. In insurance and banking, the use of irregular
employment is small and seems marginal to the bulk of
employment. It is, however, key to a transition of
employment but it remains unclear how lasting a feature of
employment systems it will be. The significance of the
presence of irregular employment in these two sectors may
lie less in its size and more in its use as a tool for
change.
PERSPECTIVE AND OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS USED IN THIS SECTOR
STUDY
Documenting employment strategies from the perspective of
firms, through their personnel department:
I present this story as seen through the eyes of
personnel officers and industry representatives; I have
confidence that it reflects firm perceptions of market
changes and of adaptations in personnel systems because
interview contents were consistent across firms and
individuals. There was concordance; views presented by
personnel departments were mirrored in interviews with
industry associations and parts of them were confirmed by
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union representatives. For our purposes, I need not assess
whether the changes in personnel systems which firms want to
implement are the most adequate response to market changes
(in terms of medium or long term efficiency). Rather, an
accurate account of firm perceptions and strategies provides
the logic which motivates changes in personnel policies and
the use of irregular employment. The purpose of case
interviews is to document this logic.
All interviewees in banks and insurance companies hold
a common diagnostic of the drawbacks of their existing
personnel structure and a shared image of the personnel
structure they would like to have. They share one solution
to what they see as one problem. The reason for such
consistency of views likely reflects the fact that each
sector has been dominated by a handful of large firms and
that the views of "industry leaders" have been adopted by
the rest of the industry. Again, for our purposes, this
consistency is relevant not as an indicator that the views
reported are the "best" assessment of market changes.
Rather, it has for consequence similar patterns of
adaptation across firms which can be documented.
I present the story of adaptation in personnel systems
in terms of how personnel officials see their problems, the
solutions to them and the concrete prescriptions for change
they want to enforce. These prescriptions for change are
not yet clearly reflected in aggregate statistics on
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employment in each sector, although broad tendencies are and
I present them. Patterns of change do begin to be reflected
in employment statistics provided by individual firms and I
will review these.
Operational concepts:
To describe firm practices, I used the notion of
employment systems as mix of several employment subsystems
within firms developed by Osterman (1989) (see chpt. 2).
The element most useful to this study is the contention that
firms make systematic choices among sub-systems and that,
over time, they alter by degree their mix of employment
subsystems. (This is not unlike employment practices
described by Freyssinet, 1982). This study documents how
significant change occurs by degree.
I also present employment systems and their
implications for the workforce as the results of the choices
made by firms in response to market changes as these are
mediated by institutions and social constraints. To argue
otherwise -that the transformations described in these two
sectors are entirely dictated by change in product mix and
by competitive conditions- would be tantamount to likening
the transformation of employment systems (and the use of
irregular employment) in Banking and Insurance to a
straightforward, and predictable, response to increased
variability and uncertainty in their activities.
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Adhering to the notion of choice in employment systems
entails presenting the workforce composition which firms
want to attain as a chosen objective, and conceiving of the
use of irregular employment as a lever for achieving their
objective of change in workforce composition. This is not
to say that firms do not have constraints on their choices,
some of which are market driven. This story takes
constraints into account as well.
DATA SOURCES FOR THE CASE STUDY
Resources
In this and the next two chapters, I draw on the
following resources:
a/ Sectoral statistics on the parts of the Banking and
Insurance sectors to which the firms interviewed belong.
For the insurance sector, these were obtained from the
primary industry association, FFSA (F6d6ration Frangaise des
Societes d'Assurance). The FFSA surveys cover its own
members, the bulk of for-profit insurance companies. A few
surveys also include the members of the cooperative
insurance sector, GEMA (Groupement des Societ6s A Charactere
Mutuel). For the banking sector, statistics come from
national series on financial institutions and from the
largest industry federation, AFB (Association Frangaise des
Banques) which groups together the three largest national
banks (partially nationalized) and many regional and local
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banks. It excludes cooperative banks and para-public
banks.3
b/ Firm level statistics, aggregated for each
corporation (not by establishment) on entries (hiring),
exits, type of contracts and schedules provided in the Bilan
Social. The latter is a mandatory annual report on the
workforce at the corporate level made to the government by
large employers.
c/ Interviews with 5 banks and 4 insurance companies
(in some cases, several interviews per firm) primarily with
their personnel departments.
d/ Interviews with temporary help service executives
and a major temp employer association.
e/ Interviews with employer (AFB and FFSA) and union
federations (CFDT) for each sector.
f/ An interview with a peer-managed (FFSA and unions)
clearing house for employment in insurance.
In total, 25 interviews were conducted in January 1990
(see appendix). This research is complemented by earlier
interviews on changes in employment regulation conducted
with members of policy making bodies,' government
statistics specialists and researchers in 1986 and 1988.
3 Banques Populaires and Credits Agricoles.
4 Commissariat Gen6ral au Plan, Ministere du Travail,
Ministere des Finances.
131
I use the information from these diverse sources in
complementary ways. The aggregate sectoral statistics
provide information about the state of each sector's
workforce through the late 1980s. They indicate in broad
outline the results of personnel practices of the past 20
years. Firm interviews and, to some extent, firm statistics
document the personnel policies that firms are currently
implementing and point to the likely future evolution of
employment in the two sectors.5 Sectoral statistics end in
1987 or 1988 (depending on the statistics reported); they
cannot reveal the impact of the changes in workforce
management, in particular hiring and promotion practices,
which were discussed in interviews. Those impacts will show
in statistics for future years. What sectoral statistics
do, however, is confirm some of the assessments discussed in
interviews.
Characteristics of the firms interviewed:
-Corporate level employment size is provided in tables IV-1
and IV-2.
Insurance Several interviews were conducted with two of the
largest insurance companies in the domestic market, with a
major firm which was newly restructured as the result of
5 The time series on employment in each firm
interviewed have varied length depending upon respondents'
willingness to provide the information.
132
mergers and acquisitions' and with a major firm from the
cooperative sector. All had two major types of activities:
life insurance and damage insurance for property, auto and
transportation. Most companies were also involved in the
re-insurance market. Two of the major insurance companies
had been nationalized and, following the privatization
policies of the 1980s, still had about 75 percent of shares
held by the French state.
I included a major firm from the cooperative sector
because, although small, the latter is a key player on some
markets. The cooperative sector controls 50 percent of the
auto insurance market, 40 percent of the individual home
insurance market and 16.7 percent of the damage insurance
market.7 The cooperative firm, like the entire cooperative
sector, has grown during the 1980s in terms of sales and
employment, unlike for profit firms.' This company is also
included in the study for contrast; it has traditions of
6 Because of extensive restructuring, this company did
not provide a Bilan Social.
7 The cooperative sector operates on three principles:
non-profit organization, no intermediary to take a
commission on sales of insurance contracts, and democratic
management. There are no shareholders and the members elect
officials. There are 14 insurance cooperatives and 10
million members nationwide. They employed 20,500 workers in
the late 1980s.
8 Major cooperative firms used computers earlier on
than others to develop methods of risk assessment and screen
out major risk liabilities among potential policy holders.
By reducing the volume of claims, they were able to keep
premium costs low.
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worforce management that differ in some ways from those of
the for-profit sector of the insurance business.
All insurance companies interviewed do not own the
majority of their sales network; sales outlets are separate
companies. The cooperative company, in contrast, sells all
of its products
through company-owned outlets whose workforce is on company
payroll.
Banks: I interviewed two of the three largest national
banks, a second-tier bank and two smaller regional banks,
one of which was primarily a business accounts bank. In the
two largest banks, the French state was the major
shareholder.
Most of the information gathered was at the corporate
level ("groupe") and concerned the main activity of each
corporation. For instance, interviews at the headquarters
of a corporation with main activity in banking but which
also owns services companies concerned the banking activity
only.
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EMPLOYMENT SETTING AND ITS EVOLUTION
Note on employment characteristics in the two sectors9
To understand the terms in which the transformation of
employment has taken place, a description of job
classifications is necessary. Banks and insurance companies
have a hierarchical job classification consisting of three
broad workforce categories: 1/Employ~s (Low cat.,
employee), Grad6s (banking) or Agent de Maltrise (insurance)
(Middle cat.) and Cadres (High cat., executive) Each job
category is broken into pay grades; for instance, for
Employ6s in insurance, PS, A, B, C, D. See the following
structure:
9 .Data on the insurance sector: General employment
data cover the whole sector. Some of the detailed
statistics come from a survey of members of the employer
federation (FFSA) which account for 84 percent of sector
employment in 1990. This survey covers between 35 and 45
percent of the administrative workforce in the sector. The
workforce under study is that employed in central services
involved in contract administration rather than contract
sales, the "Administrative" workforce. This workforce
accounts for 78-80% of the total workforce of firms in
survey. The FFSA survey tends to over-represent medium and
large employers, and Parisian firms. It does describe
adequately the part of the industry to which the firms
interviewed belong.
.Data on the banking sector: comes from several surveys and
sources mostly gathered by the employer federation (AFB).
There are problems with the definition of boundaries of the
sector over time in the National statistics (INSEE) which
concern financial institutions (broader definition than
banks). The AFB data concern their member banks, amounting
for about 65% of total bank employment. All banks
interviewed belonged to the AFB.
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JOB HIERARCHY
Insurance Banking
Employ6: PS Employ6: 8 pay
grades
A
B
C
D
AM: AMI Grad6: ClasseII
AMII ClasseIII
AMIII ClasseIV
Cadre: Sous-chef (SC) Cadre: ClasseV
Chef Adjoint (SA) ClasseVI
Chef de Service (CS) ClasseVII
Chef de Division (CD) ClasseVIII
Fond6 de Pouvoir (FP) ClasseIX
Hors
classe
This job classification system is set by national
collective bargaining agreement for banks and, for the
duration of the 1980s, by regional bargaining agreement for
insurance, although classifications are virtually identical
across regions. (The insurance sector in moving toward a
national system.)
For individuals, there is substantial promotion across
pay grades within a hierarchical category simply through
seniority and without necessarily any job change. Promotion
across pay grades through seniority can also lead to
movement from the Low (Employ6s) category into the lowest
Grade of the Middle category (in insurance, AMI). Large
numbers of workers were hired in the 1960s into the Employes
category; with seniority, the majority moved up grades
within the category and some moved into the Middle job
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category. Firms have no plan to promote them beyond that
point.
The two sectors have similar internal labor markets
with one major difference; banks own their retail outlets
("branches") whereas insurance companies for the most part
do not. Thus, the workforce of all bank branches is on
payroll and is part of the internal labor market. Insurance
companies operate in a more complicated world. They have a
workforce on the internal labor market, the Administrative
workforce, which deals with contract (policy)
administration.10 They have a commercial network workforce
on company payroll, the Sales workforce, which works on
product commercialization." It is on a system of
employment close to self-employment, with a large share of
compensation tied to commissions. It is a young workforce
with high turnover. Finally, for the sale to individual
customers (of policies other than life insurance) in
designated offices, insurance companies rely on outside
companies they do not own." In rare occurrences,
10 The cost of contract administration amounts to 20-40
percent of the premium in one company.
" 70 percent of these workers travel to represent and
sell insurance products, mostly life insurance. The
remaining 30 percent are managers of the sales network. 85
percent of this workforce is male. These workers cannot
sell damage insurance which remains the province of tied
agents. FFSA, (1991:15).
12 Insurance products are sold or represented by tied
agents; they work on commission and reimburse client claims.
Insurance brokers, who represent the customer, also sell
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insurance companies own a few sales outlets whose workforce
is part of the Administrative workforce. This organization
of sales networks by insurance companies is long standing;
it predates the trend toward externalization of operations
which took place in other industries during the 1980s.
As a result, the workforces under study here, because
they are part of the administered internal labor market, are
the entire workforce for banks and the Administrative
workforce for the insurance sector. Thus, when these
sectors consider reducing the size of the workforce employed
at administration tasks inside and outside central services,
the size of such workforce is much greater in banking than
insurance. Partly as a result, banks have pursued policies
for change earlier than insurance companies. However, the
problem of low education in Administrative services is
greater in insurance which has had even lower recruiting
standards historically. For instance, in 1990, only 52
percent of AMs and High category workers had a high school
degree or more.
This is not to say that changes have not affected the
Sales workforce in insurance during the 1980s. It has
needed extensive training in new products and computer use
because companies rely on it to gain a competitive edge.
products.
13 In banks, in 1987, 28.6 percent of Middle category
workers and 59.6 percent of High category workers had a high
school degree or more. (AFB, 1989).
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However, because it is a workforce for whom individual
tenure and wages are directly tied to set production
standards (yield), its cost to firms is less of an issue.
The employment system for the Sales workforce, because it is
extremely loose 4, has not been the focus of concerted
structural change. It has received attention in terms of
increased training for new recruits in marketing techniques
and attempts to reduce turnover in order to make the
training expenditure worthwhile.
Distinction between hierarchical lob categories and skill
levels
The three job categories used by both sectors to report
on their workforce are tools of personnel administration
rather than skill categories per se. Of course, the skill
and education level of the workforce rises with movement
from Low to High category. So does compensation, thus the
Employ6 category as a whole is the low wage category. But
this broad categorization of the workforce provides little
information about skill variation across jobs within each
category. Each category is broken down across several pay
grades but promotion across pay grades can take place with
seniority and in the absence of significant job change or
skill acquisition. Hence, pay grades within job category
4 Turnover used to reach 100 percent per year in some
companies.
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are not clear indicators of skill variation within job
category.
AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT LOSS AND THE RELATIVE DECLINE OF
THE Employ6 JOB CATEGORY IN THE 1980S
Changes in workforce management since the late 1970s
have had, as most visible and related consequences in the
two sectors: a significant decrease of the relative share
of the Employ6 (Low) category and a steady decline of total
aggregate employment.
In Insurance, the Employ6 category went from 60 percent
of the Administrative" workforce in 1976 to 43 percent in
1987. In Banking, it went from 41 percent of the total
workforce in 1980 to 23 percent in 1989 (table IV-1 and IV-
2).
This change in workforce composition took place in the
context of declining aggregate employment, and of reduced
workforce flux during the second half of the 1980s. In
insurance, the Administrative workforce went from 97,700 in
1984 to 96,600 in 1988. Banking employment declined from
250,973 in 1984 to 248,869 in 1987. These declines are
striking because the two sectors had experienced steady
employment growth from 1960 through the early 1980s. As
will be discussed below, this outcome was the result of:
is Workforce employed in contract and account
administration.
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-a hiring freeze throughout the 1980s;
-early retirement policies in 1982-84 that were
followed by a slowdown of quits and of turnover for the rest
of the 1980s;
-the systematic non-replacement of exits. (Details on
sectoral statistics are discussed below.)
The decline in the relative size of the Employ6 worker
category accompanied by stagnant aggregate employment is
precisely the change sought by firms in both sectors through
the 1980s. By the end of the decade, they want to
accelerate this change and renew the workforce per se. I
use firm interviews to understand how such a significant
change in workforce composition took place, what other
changes accompanied it and may follow it. In the context of
stagnant, even declining, aggregate employment, the Employ6s
workforce must have gone through a significant decrease in
absolute size in order to lose so much relative share of
employment. Many workers from the category were promoted
into the Middle category. Nevertheless, the Employ6s
category as a whole, and in both sectors, lost large numbers
of people during the 1980s.
Changes in workforce composition and changes in aqqregate
employment
It is not unusual for firms to undertake a change in
workforce composition, although the Banking and Insurance
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sectors have not undergone such a rapid and drastic change
in workforce composition previously. The consequences for a
workforce of a change in relative size of each workforce
group over time will differ depending upon the evolution of
aggregate employment. If aggregate employment grows rapidly
-as it did in both sectors throughout the 1960s-- then a
change in workforce composition can be achieved quickly by
recruiting large numbers of new workers with the
qualifications desired and for the workforce category
intended to grow. It is also faster to achieve a change in
workforce composition if large numbers of workers are laid
off or retired or otherwise "discarded", an option not
practiced in the two sectors as we will see later.
Thus, banks and insurance companies, at least the firms
whose main activity has traditionally been in these sectors,
have significantly reduced the Employ6 category while
simultaneously reducing the size of total employment. In
early 1990, when they were interviewed for the study, these
firms were contending with the consequences of their
policies of the 1980s -most notably the stagnant employment
structures that come from the hiring freeze- and with their
continued commitment to further reduction of the Employ6
category. Furthermore, they had made a priority of renewing
the workforce, for reasons discussed below. In other words,
numbers had to change but individual workers had to be
replaced by new ones. Such were their choice of priorities.
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It is in this context that I looked at their use of
irregular employment. The latter became an appealing tool
for pushing along the strategies of change which banks and
insurance companies had chosen.
An alternate path of adjustment could have been taken
had these banks and insurance companies had a different
workforce strategy over the past decades. Had their
practice been to train large segments of the workforce, a
majority of workers could now be taken through a change in
work organization rather than replaced. Retraining is
certainly an option being discussed and favored by unions in
particular. Although training budgets have expanded, no
commitment has been made in terms of numbers of workers and
little discussion has taken place with social partners,
indicating that no major retraining effort is being planned.
The cooperative insurance company went furthest with
foreseeing the need for training. Its personnel
representatives contend that company management had
anticipated its skill and workforce needs and understood
that the entire workforce --bottom to top and administrative
and sales-- needed to be trained and "up-skilled". This
company, and the whole cooperative sector, had experienced
growth during the 1980s. Expanding markets and workforce,
as well as a manageable workforce size (cooperative firms
are small), all contributed to make a favorable context for
workforce training.
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Table IV-10 provides the size of training budgets as
share of the total wage bill in the firms interviewed. In
all of them, the share of training has edged upward through
the 1980s. Training expenses in insurance have, however,
been geared more heavily to the Sales network workforce than
to the Administrative workforce. One insurance company
provides separate data for the two workforces, and the
training budget for sales is larger and has grown faster
than for the Administrative workforce.16
THE RATIONALE FOR TRANSFORMATION:
FIRMS' ASSESSMENT OF THEIR PROBLEMS AND OF THE SOLUTIONS
NEEDED
Before going into the strategies which firms adopted,
this account needs to backtrack and spell out firms'
rationale for transformation, namely:
-the changes in their economic environment and their
choice of strategies for adaptation;
-the history of their personnel practices through the
late 1970s;
-the consequences of the hiring freeze of the 1980s;
and
-the concrete goals for changing the workforce
composition to be implemented in the 1990s.
" Training expenditures for the entire financial
institutions sector (to which banks belong) grew slightly
from 2.95 percent of the wage bill in 1973 to 3.67 percent
in 1985. (Petit et Verniere, 1990:14)
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Why these changes in workforce management?
Before examining in greater detail the characteristics
of the workforce in the two sectors and the workforce
changes that occurred during the 1980s, we spell out the
assessment of the need for change provided in the
interviews. The changes to their employment systems which
banking and insurance firms want to affect fall out of their
interpretation of changes in the size and nature of their
markets.
Market changes and firm strategies for adaptation
First, traditional firms in both sectors have
experienced a "market saturation" of sorts during the 1980s.
There is no longer an easy way for national markets for
standardized banking and insurance products to expand.
During the 1960s and 1970s, "people used to come to us"
interviewees in both banking and insurance said. Prior to
the 1960s, insurance policies were primarily a middle class
consumer item and there was a substantial untapped market
for banks; large segments of the population did not have a
checking account.1 ? The markets for both sectors underwent
an explosive growth starting in the 1960s. As growing
numbers of households purchased, first, a car and, then,
homes, both banks and insurance companies started to cater
17 Among Europeans, French households had been
particularly slow at placing their money in checking and
saving accounts.
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to a mass market. The traditions of the sectors started to
change then. Similarly, banks pursued a policy of rapid
expansion, attempting to bring checking accounts and other
banking services to the overwhelming majority of the adult
population. Banks engaged in "la guerre des boulangeries"
(the war of bakeries) in which the largest banks took over
multiple street corner neighborhood bakeries as these went
out of business, and turned them into small bank branches.
By the late 1980s, however, most French households already
had checking accounts and (home, car and life) insurance
policies. It has become counter productive to attempt to
sell "multiple" checking accounts18 or insurance policies
to consumers. Additionally, consumers have become more
demanding and their needs more diversified. Business
customers first started to look for financial products
geared to money management (gestion de tr6sorerie) to raise
their profitability. Small businesses have hired more
educated executives with more specific demands regarding
financial products. Individual consumers followed suit with
more sophisticated expectations.
Second, deregulation" has been accompanied by
18 French banks also have the peculiarity of not
charging customers for check processing.
19 For instance, banking regulation entailed strict
definitions of products, segmentation of markets
(specialization of institutions) and controls over interest
rates for deposits and for loans. Deregulation can best be
described, according to Petit and Vernieres as an adaptation
of the broad frame of regulations dating prior to the 1950s
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intensified competition in domestic markets. During the
1980s, French markets have opened to foreign firms, a trend
expected to accentuate itself with European integration in
1993. Foreign banks and insurance companies have increased
their activities in French markets thus threatening the
market shares of traditional banks and insurance firms.(see
table IV-3 for employment growth in foreign banks) 20 The
oligopolistic pattern of market organization in both sectors
has begun to break down. For both sectors, competition in
domestic markets is a new phenomenon and one likely to
continue. As one bank executive pointed out:
"banks are discovering productivity. Before now,
they did not give a damn. Now they are
experiencing difficulty balancing their operating
accounts."
As a result, competition based on product quality has
intensified. So has competition based on cost control, thus
the search to streamline personnel budgets.
Third, firms' strategies to deal with threats to their
individual market have intensified the competition within
and between the two sectors, for a seemingly saturated
market. Firms in both sectors have enhanced their sales and
under the joint effect of a major de-structuration of the
international monetary system, the multiplying of exchanges
and capital movements, and the evolutions of commumication
technologies. (Petit et Vernieres, 1990:11).
20 Foreign banks expanded their activities during the
1980s. For instance, employment in metropolitan France
activities grew 26 percent from 1980 to 1987 for foreign
banks as compared to only 1.4 percent for all banks.
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marketing activities. They also have responded to the
saturation of markets for very standardized products by
tailoring new products to address the needs of increasingly
fine segments of the consumer population. In banking,
accounts have diversified away from the standard checking
and savings accounts; retirement accounts and a range of
other financial management products have been introduced.
This broader range of products also requires more
differentiated pricing practices. This has been particularly
true for the business customers. In insurance, standard
policies have been replaced by a broader range of life and
damage insurance products." Life insurance policies are
increasingly used for savings for retirement.
Capitalization insurance has also grown; it is equivalent to
a financial planning product."
Firms have become "more generalized", less identified
as part of a single industry, while they offer a broader
array of more specialized individual products. Banks have
started selling insurance products and insurance companies
have started to sell financial products; the separation
between the markets for both sectors has eroded and more
21 According to one executive, a worker if truly
polyvalent would need to know 40 to 50 products in order to
answer customer questions.
22 In capitalization insurance, individual savings
contracts are sold according to which the company ensures
that savings bear interest, and guarantees a capital amount
at the end of contract. See FFSA, (Paris, 1990: 12.)
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"generalized" firms now compete in the same markets. As a
result of aggressive sales efforts and of attempts to
"expand" the market through product differentiation and
enhanced quality, competition has intensified. Large
traditional banking and insurance firms have experienced a
stagnating and even shrinking market share. Both large and
small firms have become acutely aware of defending their
market position.
Fourth, the "technology of production", that is the way
in which products are conceived and delivered, has changed
in both sectors. Firms accelerated the process of "work
station" computerization during the second half of the
1980s. They have used new technologies to market their
products more aggressively, to increase productivity and to
decrease labor costs. Both sectors, particularly banks,
have moved from mainframe computer systems (innovation of
the 1970s), which had handled large scale routinized tasks
such as customer billing and account statements, to micro
computers and work station terminals in all offices and
branches. These changes allow employees to handle a great
variety of tasks directly in front of the customer. Also,
the dispersion of automated teller machines has meant that
customers use machines for routine services and tellers only
for more complex tasks. This has had two implications.
First, decentralized computer use has enabled firms to offer
the tailored products with which they attempt to expand
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their markets. "Work station" computerization has increased
the "commercial" and customer service component of worker
job contents; it permits on-line query of account status as
well as access to sufficient information about a customer's
account to anticipate need and offer specific financial and
insurance products. Second, a significant number of
routinized paper-processing, archival and query-handling
tasks have disappeared. As a result, some jobs have been
eliminated, and in a few instances entire departments have
to be phased out. The workers affected by these changes are
in low job classifications mostly in central administrative
services and in the "back office" of individual bank
branches."
As Adler (1984) already observed in his study of an
earlier process, the diffusion of on-line data entry
terminals to as many work stations as possible (during the
1970s in a large French bank) led to (1) a decline of
specialized routine jobs with low skill requirements
(widespread in the age of stable products and processes), as
demonstrated by the reduction of the
Employd category during the 1970s, the category the author
describes as "employees without supervisory responsibility"
(1984: 15). Additionally, the diffusion of on-line data
23 As one respondent noted, the advent of mainframes in
the 1970s affected only "back office" functions in central
administrative services while microcomputer use has also
affected "back office" functions in smaller branch offices.
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entry required, for efficient operation, the following
changes from the remaining lower level clerical jobs:
(2) more responsibility for results rather than only
effort because "in the new systems, there is no one further
down the processing chain to catch errors" (p.17) and thus a
greater risk of corrupted data bases and disrupted customer
service. This responsibility is limited in scope but
pervasive and thus critical to competitiveness (p.19)24
(3) more abstract reasoning, "with less back up to
their operations, clericals must have an understanding of
bank accounting imputation flows and of the computer system
operations" (p.20). Banks can gain a competitive edge with
competent front desk personnel and the latter will need more
developed general training than in the past.25
(4) more task interdependence, as work organizations
move away from an assembly-line like sequential organization
of discrete tasks toward the integration of previously
separate functions of operations, systems design and
24 The author argues that the need for motivated
workers is not a management wish but "an operational
imperative imposed on management by the nature of the
automatic system." (19)
25 Advocating for broader training for the workforce,
the author contends: "Some of the training requirements
associated with this abstraction, basic familiarity with
computer technology for example, will soon be assumed by the
general education system. But the functionally critical
understanding of the firm's system in both its operating
procedures and the processing steps these procedures
trigger, will call for a new and broader type of
training. (p.22)
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training. Of all predictions drawn from this earlier study,
this latter is the one least verifiable because a number of
work organizations have not completed the transition to more
integration.
Finally, Adler predicted an intensification of work as
efficiency improves and, ironically, potentially greater job
boredom as more broadly skilled, more responsible workers
are no longer the principal agents of (banking) production
but instead "stand along side it" (Adler, 1984: 29).
In the insurance sector, computerization of the network
of external tied agents (independent companies) has opened
the possibility of turning tasks of contract administration
over to them (e.g. by inserting pricing rules into the
computer system). This has for consequences employment
reductions in central administrative services and the
remaining tasks of coordination of the work of these tied
agents become more complex, demanding more skill of some
parts of the Administrative workforce. The alternative is
to centralize contract administration even more and have the
tied agents absorb the employment reductions.2 'It appears
that the first alternative was that chosen by the late
1980s.
A second change in "technology of production"
characteristic of the 1980s is that firms have gained access
26 Information provided by 0. Bertrand, CEREQ, Paris,
1990.
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to more sophisticated financial analysis and marketing
analysis tools which they use extensively in their efforts
to gain an edge in market competition. In other words, they
have used computerization first to cut costs but the latter
also opened the way for new product design and faster
communications 27 (Petit et Vernieres, 1990: 10.) These
tools have a financial or market analysis component and/or a
computer software component. As a consequence, firms make
more extensive use of financial and technical professionals
than in the past. In -banking, these professionals have
specializations that are very short-lived and tied to new
products. They specialize in financial markets, in specific
money management products, in specific industrial sectors,
or in corporate mergers. As markets and regulations change
rapidly, so does the value to firms of the skills of these
ad-hoc specialists. Thus, their expectations for
compensation are high. These occupations are joined in
their demands for compensation by workers with specialized
computer analysis skills. In insurance, the "new"
professionals are also needed for market analysis as
insurance companies look for new investment opportunities
for themselves and as they need to design financial
management products for their customers. Furthermore, the
27 Tied agents (in separate companies) have also been
encouraged to acquire and become familiar with market
analysis tools to target their efforts more effectively to
market segments. Insurance companies rely on these efforts
to bring in low risk clients.
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insurance sector has a chronic shortage of skilled actuaries
needed to design profitable premiums for their new
products.28
Banks and insurance companies are actively recruiting
these workers directly into Middle and High level positions,
rather than training them in-house, a practice which is
fairly new to the two industries. Bringing in these new
workers at the top of the job hierarchy has created havoc in
pay scales. Because they are in high demand on the outside
market, these professionals receive higher compensation than
is possible under the point system of the compensation
scheme. In both sectors, all job categories, except for a
few high level corporate directors, are on an administered
pay system. Namely, each pay grade within each job
category, and to which individual positions are assigned,
entails a maximum salary to be augmented by a seniority
premium. Thus, in order to be recruited on the very tight
outside market, these professional workers are paid more
than other workers whose position is on the same
hierarchical level. In recent years, professional workers
have received this pay differential in lump sum payments
(bonus) in many instances. As firms in both sectors, but
particularly banks, want to integrate these workers into the
28 Some tasks have become more technical and require
less job experience. The proper review of the veracity of
insurance claims used to involve painstaking investigations.
It now requires probability assessments. (remarks by Olivier
Bertrand, 1990).
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firm, they are planning to redesign job descriptions and
career ladders and to devise pay scales that take account of
these occupations. The number of workers in "new
professions" (nouveau metiers) is small. For example, in
large Parisian banks -the heaviest users of these specialty
workers- they amount to somewhere between 5 and 10 percent
of the workforce (AFB estimate). However, their presence,
their high turnover and continued bargaining for
compensation have disrupted established compensation schemes
and have generated a great deal of passionate debate among
personnel administrators in both sectors. (The assimilation
process through which personnel officers want to take the
new professionals is not unlike that undertaken to integrate
mainframe computer specialists in the early 1980s.)29
Banks and insurance companies use all these changes in
the "technology of production" to enable themselves to
engage in more aggressive competition in markets, to
increase productivity and to accelerate the changes in
personnel structure which they deem necessary. Some
observers contend that in banks, for example, the recent
wave of technological change has been perceived as a one-
time historical opportunity to redistribute the costs of
managing means of payment (e.g. charging for check
29 To keep the pay and administration of high paid
computer workers separate, some insurance companies have
split off their computer operation from the main divisions
of the company (Groupement d'Interet Economique).
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processing) and other financial intermediation activities.
It is seen as a unique opportunity to increase profits
(Simon, 1984: 102.)
A short history of employment systems in the two sectors
Several elements of the history of personnel management
in the two industries contribute to the current situation.
Banking and insurance firms work within a set of personnel
rules and with an existing workforce resulting from hiring
practices of the 1960s. First, from the turn of the century
through the 1950's, the prevailing ideology for organizing
internal labor markets and career paths in banking and
insurance firms held that workers entered at the bottom of
the job ladder and moved to the top; employment was very
stable and often lifelong ("people left feet first" one
respondent in insurance said.) Promotions entailed a change
of position and responsibilities. Management was recruited
mostly from within. A few corporate directors, some of whom
retired only a few years ago, indeed entered their firm as
errand boys. In individual firms, the workforce size was
small and the education level of those hired was fairly high
for the standards of the period. In banks even more than
insurance companies, the rules for governing the internal
labor market inherited from this period were modeled after
those of the civil service. They use the same terminology,
such as giving workers "tenure" (titularisation) after a set
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time period, and assign a heavy weight to seniority in
promotion and compensation. Promotion, which brings a pay
increase, occurs with seniority while additional pay accrues
with length of service as well.
Second, starting in the 1960's, when the banking and
insurance markets became mass markets, employment in the two
sectors increased dramatically in the lowest job
classification. Large numbers of workers, particularly
women workers, were hired with low educational levels -8th
grade ("brevet") or vocational degree (CAP; Certificat
d'Aptitude Professionelle) in unrelated field- in entry-
level positions; this period witnessed the feminization of
the workforce of the sector. The prevailing ideology on
stable career paths was retained but the reality was that
neither supervisors nor workers expected career mobility for
the bulk of personnel hired in entry level positions during
the period.30 With market expansion, firms subdivided work
tasks. The hires of this period were put to work in
routinized, some observers say, highly taylorized paper-
processing tasks. The size of central administrative
services grew rapidly. From the 1960's on, for this
personnel, whatever promotion did take place was based
primarily on seniority. Promotion was uncoupled from job
30 Shortened career paths also reflect management's
view that women workers would have a limited attachment to
work and were a groups which would be easy to keep in
shortened career tracks.
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change; workers could "slide" a few notches up along the job
ladder while staying essentially in the same position and
performing similar tasks for 15 to 20 years.
During this period, the policy of heavy reliance on
seniority for pay and promotion was particularly useful for
retaining workers and not overly costly; its implications
are different in the current period. During the 1960s,
firms used seniority rewards because turnover in entry-level
positions was very high and they needed to retain enough
employees to develop a pool of middle-level workers. The
practice was not expensive because only a few workers
stayed; many left. Moreover, markets expanded easily and
these sectors were "rich" in resources for personnel
management. By the early 1980s, however, turnover had
declined to low levels due to labor market contraction and
employment expansion halted by the mid 1980's. Thus, by the
late 1980's personnel department viewed large numbers of
workers as a liability. These workers have aged, have
accrued seniority and compensation, and have not been
trained or experienced significant job change. Many have
"slid up" from the Low job category to the lowest rung of
the Middle job category (Grad6 classeII and AMI) with no
possibility of further promotion. The size of this
workforce "promoted" with little skill change is hard to
assess. One estimate for banking puts the share of these
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workers somewhere between 15 and 25 percent of total
employment in 1983.3
In the current situation, personnel departments want to
get rid of this personnel liability and to change the
composition of the workforce. Because the current legacy is
brought about by practices of the 1960s, which are
themselves inscribed in a set of rules inherited from the
period prior to the 1960s, these two elements constitute the
ingredients with which personnel departments must work to
bring about change. In other words, they have an existing
workforce and a set of personnel rules. Changing personnel
composition is as problematic as changing the rules.
Firms are actively trying to change the rules that
govern personnel and the expectations of employment
stability and promotion. In the 1990 negotiations to revamp
the national collective bargaining agreement, the largest
banking federation asked to remove terms (such as tenure)
which "create" expectations, to use their language, that
firms no longer want to meet.3 During this negotiation,
the industry-wide job classification33 was to be
31 Study cited by Petit et Vernieres, 1990: 15.
32 Neither unions nor the employer federation expect
this attempt to succeed.
3 Industry-wide job classifications provide a
framework for pay scales. Each firm develops its own
detailed job classification based on it. Restructuring a
job classification entails re-assigning individual positions
to a new level in the job hierarchy and possibly a new pay
grade.
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restructured with concrete implications for future
compensation and reduced possibilities for seniority-based
promotion for the current workforce. In the plan under
consideration, an individual worker could see his position
re-assigned to a lower rung in the job hierarchy. In the
transition, while being guaranteed his existing base salary,
a "down graded" worker sees the potential for the future
growth of his salary lessened by altered formulas for future
increases.34 One of the major points of conflict with
unions was the employer federation request to reduce the
weight of seniority in compensation.35 In the existing
agreement for the banking sector, seniority adds a 2 percent
premium to the base salary for a position for the first
year, and a 1 percent premium for each year after that for
34 years. Thus seniority can add a 35 percent premium to
the base salary of a position. As a representative of the
Banking federation contended, the heavy role of seniority
was designed originally to attach workers to their firms and
to bring bank salaries up to par with those of other
sectors; their salaries had been known to be comparatively
34 Existing workers may find that, once re-assigned,
they have a long ladder ahead of them before achieving any
significant increase on their current pay through promotion.
In one savings bank where a re-classification took place
with union agreement, three fourths of workers were re
assigned to a different place in the classification.
31 Seniority-tied compensation was estimated to account
for 10 percent of the wage bill for the entire banking
sector in 1987 (Petit et Vernieres, 1990: 17.)
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low. In the 1990s, "there is no need to provide workers
with an incentive to stay" and salaries are at the level of
those in other sectors. Further, the employer federation
proposed to defer some pay increases to contribute more
heavily to the pension fund for the sector which they expect
to be in deficit by the years 2005-2010.
The insurance sector has the particular difficulty of
having to design and sign a nation-wide collective
bargaining agreement; it has only had regional agreements so
far although these are very similar. In 1990, it began
negotiations around a redesign of its industry-wide job
classification which must be agreed upon by management and
union representatives. In this agreement the employer
federation is also looking to weaken the role of seniority
in both promotion and compensation.36
Both in banking and insurance, the union federation (at
least the CFDT) and the employer federations have agreed on
principle to simplify job classification schemes. There is
little agreement on the criteria to use in the re-
classification, however, and on how to protect the salaries
and earnings potential of the current workforce as it goes
from old to new classification scheme.
36 By mid 1991, little progress had been made in these
negotiations and the employer association had vowed to
cancel the agreement in force were no new agreement signed
by June.
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Along with attempts to change rules, firms have
articulated concrete goals for changing the composition of
the workforce; I describe them below. These goals fall out
of the characteristics and constraints of the existing
situation. They do not represent an "ideal type" of future
employment structures as much as a set of concrete
prescriptions adopted, with few variations, by all personnel
departments interviewed.
What are the changes in personnel structure which the firms
deem necessary?
Banks and insurance companies see their adaptation to
market changes to require major modifications in overall
workforce size (the wage bill must remain constant or
decline) and in workforce composition. The context in which
they must effect these changes is one of strict limits on
the growth of the total wage bill because of their
commitment to cutting labor costs as one major way to
compete more effectively. Therefore they are restricted in
their ability to rely on hiring as a tool for modifying the
composition of their workforce, a strategy they have used in
the past.
First, firms want to further reduce the relative size
of the Employd job category and that of a similar workforce
which, through seniority and with little job change, reached
the lowest rungs of the Middle job category. Firms see
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themselves as saddled with low-education workers with high
seniority employed at paper-processing tasks which they will
not need performed in the future. Because the compensation
scheme rewards seniority heavily, firms want to reduce the
wage bill of this worker category by shrinking its size. To
achieve this reduction firms have considered retraining this
worker group towards sales activities although there is
doubt and controversy about firm commitment and interest in
doing so. Firms have had a sustained policy of enticing a
substantial number of workers to retire early (1982-84) or
to simply quit (see next chapter). By the late 1980s they
anticipated reaching the limits of these workforce reduction
policies. In terms of hiring, the implication is that
virtually no hiring of low education workers takes place for
these positions in the Employ6 category.
Second, the weight of the sales and technical
workforces must grow relative to that of the (mostly
clerical) workforce in central administrative services. As
a consequence, most new recruits must be of significantly
higher educational levels than in the 1970s and must be
trainable. They start in entry-level positions but are
expected to move into mid-level positions in a matter of a
few years. Firms plan to develop what one respondent termed
"viviers" ("pools of young fish") of educated workers to be
trained and promoted in middle-level sales and management
positions. Firms plan to provide greater salary growth over
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time to these workers as compared to previous generations of
recruits. Third, firm resources are also committed to go
toward recruiting highly paid specialized professionals in
investment banking, asset management for firms and
individuals, and other technical specialties. With these
workers, banks and insurance companies hope to give
themselves an edge in marketing and financial management.
Thus, banks and insurance companies plan to develop
financial rewards for these two types of recruits. They
must do so, however, while the total wage bill is to remain
constant as a share of total costs or even decline.
Although this is not an explicit goal expressed by most
interviewees, the total wage bill of the Employe and Middle
(AMI only) categories must be kept in check to allow for
salary growth of the other categories. One personnel
department staffer of a very large bank remarked:
"we function with an almost constant wage bill.
Yet we hire at increasingly higher hierarchical
levels. A greater share of the budget goes to a
smaller number of people. The financing of this
extra cost must come from the stock of workforce
in terms of reduced promotion and mobility."
Implications for workforce composition, hiring and promotion
"On veut des gens qui n'ont pas d'attentes de
carriere A satisfaire mais qui sont capables
d'etre form6s." (AFB) ("We want people with few
career expectations to satisfy but who have the
potential to be trained")
On hiring: Few workers should be hired into the
Employe category. They should have a minimal education
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level of two years of post secondary education. Those who
do not, and are hired anyway, should be put on short term
contracts so they do not have to be retained.
On compensation: To keep the wage bill constant (in
real FFrcs. and probably decline as share of total costs)
while also freeing monies for higher level recruits, firms
want to change the rules by which seniority plays a
significant role in compensation. While they wait for rules
to change, they try to shed as many high seniority workers
as possible.
On work station computerization: Firms are enabled by
the availability of microcomputers and of computer terminals
both to cut labor costs and to increase productivity. In
the current context of employment reduction or stagnation
for clerical workers in central administrative services, the
rapid pace of computerization has generated the problem it
was meant to create. In other words, it has allowed firms
to speed up the elimination of tasks previously performed by
workers in low job classifications. Since the solution to
the need for cost reduction has been to reduce the workforce
and render those remaining more productive, the pace at
which a significant share of clerical workers in central
administrative services are made redundant has increased.
Before moving on to The Tactics of Transition (next
chapter), that is, the ways firms have found to implement
the changes outlined above, we must return to sectoral
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statistics to provide an aggregate picture both of the
assessments made by firms and of the early results of some
of the practices they pursued in the second half of the
1980s.
THE AGGREGATE EVOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE TWO SECTORS
SECTORAL AND FIRM STATISTICS
The rapid decline of the Employ6 category during the
1980s in both sectors, which we described above, is the most
salient feature of employment changes in both sectors. The
context in which this decline has taken place must be
spelled out for both sectors.
I. Insurance sector (Data source is employer federation
(FFSA). Employment levels accurate for 1960, 1967, and
1983-88; percentage distributions for intervening years are
accurate; see table IV-1.)
a. The decline in the relative share of the Employ6
category has taken place in a context of stagnant
employment.
Total employment in the insurance sector doubled
between 1960 and 1975; its growth slowed down during the
1980s. The index for total employment was 100 in 1960, 203
in 1976 and has hovered around 210 since 1983. Total
employment consists of the Administrative workforce and the
Sales workforce. The former accounts for about 77-79
percent of the total workforce depending on the year. Its
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size doubled between 1960 and 1980 but it has declined
slightly from 97,000 in 1983 to 96,600 in 1988. While total
employment growth slowed down during the 1980s, the
employment of Administrative workers actually declined. The
statistics I report from now on for the insurance sector
concern only the Administrative workforce because it is that
undergoing a transformation of employment and thus was the
focus of all firm interviews.
b. While the Employ6 category lost 17 percentage points
as share of the Administrative workforce from 1983 to 1987,
the Middle job category gained 10 points and the High
category 6 points.
c. Women are the workforce most affected by the
decline in relative share of employment of the Employ6s
category.37 Their concentration in the category is high and
grew slightly; women accounted for 70 percent of Employ~s in
1976 and 72 percent in 1987. Women are increasingly
concentrated in a job category which has declined as share
of the Administrative workforce and, moreover, as share of
total industry employment. Women Employ6s as share of the
total workforce (both Administrative and Sales), the largest
single group of workers in the industry, declined from 42
37 It is difficult to say how many have moved up to the
Middle category and how many left the insurance sector. As
discussed in this and next chapter, Employ6s have not been
replaced when they quit or retire. Thus, if few individuals
have experienced job loss, the pool of women who have been
potential workers for the sector is that likely to be
affected by the relative decline of the Employ6 category.
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percent in 1976 to 31 percent in 1987. (For a longer,
related trend, women as share of the Administrative
workforce went from 55.3 percent in 1963 to 62 percent in
1983 and have stayed at that level since. Thus women have
remained a constant share of the Administrative workforce
throughout the 1980s)
d. The Employes workforce has aged and accrued
seniority during the 1980s, a reflection of restricted
hiring and limited turnover over the period. The average
age grew from 31 in 1976 to 34 in 1987 (table IV-1).
Average seniority went from 5 years in 1976 to 9 years in
1987.
Interviewees in personnel departments pointed to the
rise in age and seniority as worrisome developments because
these indicate the lack of "renewal" of the workforce, the
fact that, in their eyes, an aging workforce is not fertile
ground for retraining for new skills. Moreover, growing
seniority results in promotion and pay increases.
e. An estimate of worker turnover in the industry,
"taux de rotation", shows significant decline from 16.4
percent in 1980 to 11.4 percent in 1985. This slowdown in
turnover accounts partly for the aging and increased
seniority of the existing workforce.
f. A contention made by firms interviewed is that,
through accruing seniority, the stable workforce has "slid
up" the job ladder in each job category and moved up and
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across pay grades. The percent of Employ6s in D level, the
highest pay grade within a job category, went from 9.6
percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1987. For the Middle
category (AMs), the percentage in D level were 28 and 37
percent for AMI, 38 and 46 for AMII and 55 and 62 for AMIII
respectively. In the 1990 sector collective bargaining
negotiations, the employer federation sought a re-vamping of
job classifications precisely to eliminate this
concentration of workers in top pay grades.
II. Banking Sector: (Data concern the 1980s; unless
otherwise specified, all data are AFB member data which
represent 64.7 percent of total banking employment; see
table IV-2.)
As with insurance, the decline of the Employ6 category
in Banking took place against a backdrop of stagnant growth
in aggregate employment.
a. Since 1980, employment in banking has grown very
slowly. It has grown faster in banks outside of the AFB
than among AFB member banks. Furthermore, it has grown more
slowly in the three largest banks (BNP, CRLY, St6 Gle; all
are AFB members) than among others. The index of employment
for all banks was 100 in 1980 and 107.5 in 1987; for the
latter year, it was only 102.3 for AFB banks. From another
source, data on all financial institutions, a broader
category than banks, indicate slower growth for the period
1980-85 (-1.3 percent yearly) than for the period 1975-80
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(2.3 percent yearly) (Bertrand and Noyelle, 1987). b. Of
the 17 percentage point decline of the Employ6 category
share of AFB member workforce between 1980 and 1989 (from
40.7 percent to 23.4 percent), the Middle job category
(Grad6s) made the greater relative gain with 13 percentage
points over the period. The High category gained 4
percentage points. From these aggregate data, the relative
weights of attrition (Employ6s leaving) and that of
promotion (to Grad6 classeII) are unclear. The relative
weight of Employ6s in the total workforce is slated for
further reduction and, in a context of limited job growth,
this reduction in share means a decrease in aggregate
numbers as well.
c. Workers most affected by the relative decline of
the Employ6 category are women because they concentrate in
this job category. They grew as share of Employ6s from 62
percent in 1980 to 67.3 percent in 1989. They also
constitute a majority of the sector's total workforce; 50.2
percent in 1980 and 52.1 percent in 1989.
d. The banking sector workforce aged during the 1980s.
As with Insurance, this aging is due to restricted hiring
from the early to mid 1980s, and decreased turnover; the
bulk of the workforce was hired through the 1960s and early
1970s. Data on all financial institutions (INSEE data; we
do not have age data for AFB banks specifically) indicate
that the 25-49 year old group grew as share of the total
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workforce from 74.2 percent in 1980 to 81.9 percent in 1988.
Meanwhile, 15-24 year olds declined from 9.6 percent of the
workforce in 1980 to 5.3 percent in 1988. For comparison,
in 1988 only 71.2 percent of the workforce in the economy
as a whole fell in the 25-49 age group (up from 64.1 percent
in 1980) and 12.1 percent were in the 15-24 age group (down
from 16.1 percent).38
e. The existing workforce was recruited at a level much
lower than current recruits. In the late 1980s, banks
raised the educational level required at hiring time; they
did so to raise the trainability of their workforce. As a
result, the existing workforce has a substantially lower
educational level than recent recruits. Thus, in 1987,
70.63 percent of the existing Employ6s workforce had less
than a High School degree while only 21.6 percent of new
hires did so. In the Middle category, 28.7 percent of the
existing workforce had at least a high school degree as
compared to 90.5 percent of new recruits.39 This rise in
recruiting requirements may reflect only "skill" needs or
also labor market slackness. Employment conditions during
38 In financial institutions, workers over 50 declined
from 16.2 percent of the workforce in 1980 to 12.8 percent
in 1988 because of early retirements. In the economy at
large, they declined from 16.2 percent of employment to 12.8
percent over the same time period.
39 Corresponding numbers for the High category in 1987
were 59.6 percent and 93 percent of new recruits. In fact,
over half of these, 49.3 percent, of new recruits in the
High category had 4 years of post secondary education (AFB,
Rbsume de l'Enqu6te Emploi 1987, Paris, 1989: 6-7).
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the 1980s were such that firms had a great deal of choice as
to whom to recruit.
III. Firm level statistics for banks and insurance companies
Tables with firm level data include:
-employment trends over time: the span of years
covered varies with firms dependent upon data released in
each firm. All firms interviewed display stagnant, if not
declining, aggregate employment in the 1980s (table IV-4).
-workforce composition by the three major job
categories and by sub categories for the Middle category.
These also reflect the decline of the Employ6 category
(table IV-5). One insurance company provides information on
the high and growing rate of workers who are in the low rung
(AM I) of the Middle category through seniority and without
job change (table IV-9). This table presents interesting
findings. For this single insurance firm, the share of AMI
promoted into the category through seniority in the total
AMI (lowest rung of the Middle cat.) rose steadily from 45
percent in 1978 to 73.6 percent in 1988. The share of these
"seniority-AMI" in the total AM (Middle) category went from
15.6 percent to 34.5 percent over the same period.
-tables providing, where available, average age and
seniority (tables IV-7 and 8) and their distribution (tables
IV-6A to 6C). Both mean and distribution show a steady
upward slide.
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In the next chapter, I cover the means that banks and
insurance companies have given themselves to make changes in
workforce composition given the existing workforce, the
rules of personnel administration, the social and
institutional constraints in which they operate and the
characteristics of the pool of workers from which they
recruit.
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
Firm interviews: (Code names are those used in tables
providing employment information)
I. BANKS
BKl: (Among the largest three French banks)
Head of Research, Personnel department
BK2: (Mid size national bank)
Careers Department representative, Personnel department
BK3: (Among the largest three French banks)
Assistant Director of Personnel
Director of a large branch
BUS: (commercial bank)
Personnel Director
REG: (regional bank)
Personnel Director
II. INSURANCE COMPANIES:
IN1 (Major national insurance company)
Personnel Director
Personnel Department (workforce composition)
Personnel Department, head of training
Personnel Department, head of recruiting
IN2: (Major national insurance company)
Personnel Director
IN3 (restructured insurance company)
Personnel department, head of recruiting
COO: (cooperative sector company)
Personnel Director
Plus 4 staff members
III. Temporary Help Services: (Are identified by name
because they did not provide internal documents or
statistics nor did they request anonymity.)
Ecco (office temporaries)
Director for Europe (previously director for Paris)
Plus Interim, Plus Formation
President
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Professional Associations:
Association Francaise des Banques
Director
Federation Francaise des Societes d'Assurances
head of research
Head of research on training
PROMATT- Temporary Help Services federation
Chief Delegate
Fond d'Assistance Formation pour le Travail Temporaire
(training fund)
Director
Bourse des Emplois de l'Assurance (peer representation labor
exchange)
director (telephone interview)
Unions:
CFDT, Federation Banques
CFDT, Federation Assurances
175
CHAPTER 5
STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION: THE ROLE OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
Starting in the late 1970s, employment in Banking and
Insurance has undergone a transformation with for most
striking manifestation the decline of the Employ6 job
category as share of employment. As described in the
preceding chapter, this change has taken place in stages.
In the first stage, until the early 1980s, it was
facilitated by continued, if moderate, employment growth,
and by workforce turnover. In the middle period, the mid
1980s, banks and insurance companies used government-
subsidized early retirement programs (Contrats de
Solidarite) to reduce their workforce and also instituted a
hiring freeze. By the late eighties, firms in the two
sectors faced significantly reduced workforce turnover, and
rising age and seniority in the existig workforce due to
restricted hiring. In addition to the Employ6 category,
they also want to reduce the number of workers who, over the
years, moved into the low rungs of the Middle job category.
Banks and insurance companies created "incentives to quit"
and early retirement programs because government subsidies
for these policies had expired, but these company sponsored
programs were more limited in scope than their public
equivalent.
By 1990, firms in banking and insurance had decided to
accelerate the process of workforce change by continuing
176
their employment reduction efforts and by renewing the
workforce. They wanted to replace part of the existing
workforce with new hires with higher education levels. The
latter are to be put to work in positions different from
those of the workers who leave. It is in this context that
I place the use of irregular employment.
Irregular employment and early quit policies are the
main tools, used by banks and insurance companies, for
amplifying workforce flux at the margins of employment
systems that have been rendered stagnant by practices of the
previous two decades. To make room for new hires with the
desired qualifications, personnel departments work to
increase turnover and are very selective about hiring on
long term contracts.
In these two sectors, irregular arrangements are tools
used sometimes opportunistically, sometimes pro-actively, to
take a system of employment and an existing workforce
through a transformation. The key to understanding the use
of irregular employment is in its interaction with regular
employment as the latter undergoes significant change in
terms of the rules that govern it, the contents of tasks and
the kinds of workers who perform it.
Banks and insurance companies, as represented by their
respective personnel departments, hold an image of the
workforce composition and type they want to achieve. They
operate within constraints, however. They must effect this
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workforce reduction in a societal context and within the
framework of an existing national collective bargaining
agreement in which they are commited to avoiding large scale
layoffs. They plan to implement qualitative changes in
workforce composition while having severe restrictions on
hiring. In the following sections, I elaborate on the
concrete process of transition in employment structure given
these constraints. Banks and insurance companies used early
retirement and quit policies to reduce the workforce mostly
during the early 1980s. They used all forms of irregular
employment throughout the decade as strategic tools for
effecting the transition in employment systems. Retirement
policies are documented by other researchers (see
Guillemard, 1990) so I discuss them briefly. This study
focuses primarily on irregular employment.
Throughout this chapter, I use sectoral data and firm-
level statistics to describe the pattern of use of each form
of irregular employment. I then use firm interview contents
to describe how each type of irregular employment fits into
firm strategies for transition.
STRAIGHTFORWARD EXIT POLICIES
All banks and insurance companies interviewed reported
that they no longer systematically replace workers lost
through natural attrition. Before replacement, they first
establish what part of the former worker's tasks is still
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needed and whether it can be reassigned to other workers or
another department.
A. Early retirement policies.
During the early 1980s, banks and insurance firms
sought to reduce their workforce size with early retirement
policies which affected Employ6s and Middle category
workers. From 1982 to 1984, they used Solidarity Contracts
(Contrat de Solidarit6), a national government-sponsored and
subsidized early retirement program. This program allowed
workers to retire voluntarily and receive 70 percent of
their earnings from contributions from the unemployment
insurance fund (50 percent) and from the state (20
percent).' (Following official retirement at age 60,
workers received the same pension as if they had worked with
no interruption until retirement age.) The program also
mandated employers to hire one job seeker for each person 55
years old and over who left on early retirement. By
participating in the program, the employer was also
committed to maintaining the existing size of the work force
in full-time equivalents for one year following these exits
(see Guillemard, 1990 for institutional detail).
The appeal of the program for firms was 1/ in reducing
the numbers of workers near retirement age, their aged
1 This program opened early retirement to workers as
young as age 55 following the lowering of the retirement age
from 65 to 60 in 1983.
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workforce; 2/ in being able to hire a new worker for a task
or department different from that left by the early retirees
and 3/ in bringing someone in with a higher education level.
Most of all, for these two sectors which had always
transformed their workforce by hiring new workers in times
of employment growth, the program allowed for employment
creation in a time when hiring budgets were severely
restricted.
In addition to Solidarity Contracts, firms also used
their own early retirement policies. Both combined to raise
the relative weight of retirement in exits from firms. Data
trends for the insurance sector show the "bulge" in
retirement in 1982-83 (table V-2).
When the bulk of the Solidarity Contracts program
terminated in 1983, large banks and insurance companies
established firm financed early retirement programs. These,
however, are expensive and are geared toward "surplus"
workers in the Middle and High level categories. Personnel
staff consider that they have reached the limits of
usefulness of company early retirement policies. They deem
the latter too expensive, in the absence of government
subsidy, and too small in scope to make them an effective
tool for personnel reduction.
There is still another option for "subsidized" early
retirement benefits but it is not easily accessible to banks
and insurance companies. Workers who have a long spell of
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unemployment past age 55 can receive long-term allowances
from the unemployment fund (Fond National de l'Emploi) until
they reach 60. Firms throughout the economy have used this
mechanism to get rid of older workers (Guillemard, 1990).
Workers must be laid off, however, rather than be given
incentives to quit and both banks and insurance companies
have pledged to avoid layoffs. They would have to break
this pledge to use this subsidy on a large scale.
B. Incentives to quit
Banks and Insurance companies also have created
incentives to quit, or "early quit", policies. Workers
employed in positions where reductions are desired and who
have higher seniority (and compensation) are offered a lump
sum payment to leave their company a substantial number of
years before retirement. These programs are entirely
employer initiated and are voluntary. They are not
negotiated with social partners (institutions for worker
representation and unions) and do not entail any employer
obligation to offer retraining to the workers who leave.
Lump sum payments are sometimes accompanied by workshops on
setting up one's small business establishment or franchise.
As one personnel official noted: "we are not talking big
business here; it is more like knitting wool retail
franchising."
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One of the largest banks has a leave policy which
provides financial incentives for workers to set up their
own small scale business enterprise and, as an added
incentive, allows them to return if their business fails
within a set delay after leaving the bank. Another bank, a
smaller commercial bank, had one program for people under 55
(costing about 275,000 FF/person on average). For those
over 55 years of age (but under 60, the retirement age),
people collect a "pre-retirement" benefit from a government
pension fund (UNEDIC) and the bank pays them the shortfall
between benefit and previous pay.2
Unions often object to "incentives to quit" policies
because they entail no employer obligation to pay for
retraining. Unions particularly object to the fact that
"incentives to quit" are often implemented quietly and are
not announced officially. Were they, the policies would
become the subject of negotiations with social partners. As
an added consequence, there are no official reports of the
numbers involved and no sectoral statistics to document the
evolution of these programs.
Bank and insurance executives think they have reached
the limits of direct workforce reduction strategies because
these are very costly and are not particularly successful
with Employ6s, and with low level workers in the Middle
2 This incentive program is akin to an early retirement
program.
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category who know their chances of reemployment on the
outside market -let alone their chances of succeeding in
independent business- to be limited. Banks plan to
continue to use these incentive strategies to the extent
that they can afford them. They will resort to them to a
greater degree than insurance companies because they have a
much larger workforce to reduce.3
C. The possibility of large scale layoffs
Large scale economic layoffs are not a tradition in
these two sectors. They have been avoided by all but one of
the large banks and by all insurance companies. Smaller
regional banks have had limited layoffs. Tradition, union
presence and government priorities all contribute to make
economic layoffs a workforce reduction tool of last resort.
Large parisian-based insurance companies signed an Agreement
on Employment Guarantees (Accord sur les Guaranties de
l'Emploi) in 1973 in which they pledged to avoid layoffs.
The national agreement for the banking sector (members of
the Association Frangaise des Banques) mandates the strict
enforcement of the seniority principle in economic layoffs,
a requirement which makes layoffs unappealing to banks which
want to get rid of high seniority workers. The employer
3 They own their own sales network, unlike insurance
companies, and all the personnel of branch banks are on
payroll. These bank workers, however, are on average better
educated than insurance workers and stand a better chance of
being retained. Not all of these workers will be pushed
out.
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association sought to weaken this seniority requirement in
the 1990 collective bargaining talks (AFB, 1988: 22).
In addition to collective bargaining restrictions, the
state presence in the sector also restricts the use of
layoffs. The French state plays an important role as major
stockholder; all large banks and insurance companies are
partially nationalized. They are under government pressure
to avoid mass layoffs so as not to contribute to the
national unemployment problem.
The Credit du Nord is the only major bank which carried
out a large scale layoff during the late 1980s (not
interviewed for this study). According to an observer from
the industry association, the layoff was to be expected.
The bank had acquired another financial institution 10 years
prior to the layoff and, according to this account, did not
address the problem of worker duplication that resulted from
the acquisition. In the 1980s, faced with the same
competitive conditions as other banks, the Credit du Nord
also sought to increase productivity by introducing
microcomputers in work stations at a more rapid pace than
other banks. In 1990, whereas many banks had one
microcomputer for five workers, Cr6dit du Nord had one for
two workers. It thus made redundant a very large worker
group in a shorter time span than other banks.
Because I did not interview this bank, it is difficult
to say for certain whether computerization.was speeded up
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deliberately to force the issue of workforce "surplus" and
address it with a single drastic layoff rather than resort
to the progressive methods used by other banks.
Both insurance and banking are "cash rich" sectors, not
expected to undergo mass layoffs. There remain questions in
all observers' minds, however, as to the ability of some of
these organizations to avoid layoffs. One large insurance
company, the product of a series of mergers, has only
promised to "do its best" to avoid layoffs. Some banks
contend, officiously, that about 50 percent of their
workforce is "not trainable" and will need to be replaced by
a smaller number of new recruits. Whether they can reduce
their workforce by the means discussed in this study and
without resorting to economic layoffs remains an open
question.
IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
or how to introduce flux at the margin of employment systems
"CDDs fit well with the general philosophy (of
management). They need other workers but do not
need more workers" (CFDT union representative in
banking) 4
In the process of taking their employment systems
through a transition, Banks and Insurance companies use
irregular employment arrangements to operate between 1/
legal an contractual constraints on the use of large scale
4v "On a besoin d'autres emplois mais pas besoin de plus
d'emplois."
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layoffs, 2/ the restrictions they have put on the growth of
their personnel budgets, and 3/ the limitations due to the
characteristics of the existing employment system and
workforce. Their use of irregular employment concentrates
almost exclusively in the Employ6 (Low) category and in the
lowest rungs of the Middle category, the job categories
whose size all personnel departments are trying to reduce.
Banks and insurance companies convert full-time (FT)
workers to part-time (PT) as a "piecemeal" strategy to
reduce the number of Emloy6s at work in some departments,
thus freeing funds in otherwise constricted personnel
budgets. Simultaneously, they provide a valued job benefit
by offering hours reduction to previously FT workers. They
use workers on Temporary help contracts and workers on CDD
(Contrat A Dur6e Determinee, limited duration contracts) to
meet several goals, primarily to ensure that existing tasks
are performed while a commitment of long-term employment is
made to as few workers in the Employ6 job category as
possible. By using Temp workers firms attempt to solve
their recruitment difficulties with some occupations, in
particular secretarial workers, whose skill transformation
few personnel departments had anticipated and planned for
with internal training (see section B below for further
discussion). By using workers on CDD, firms try to keep a
handle on the volume of hiring for both Employes and the low
rungs of the Middle category.
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A. PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT
Part-time has been in existence since the early 1980s
but it has grown very fast in the latter half of the decade
because firms have pushed for its use by making it more
easily available. Collective bargaining agreements in the
two sectors prohibit the recruiting of part-time workers.
Part-time in insurance companies and banks is a job benefit
established by the collective bargaining agreement. All
part-time takes place when full-time workers elect to work
part-time; it is voluntary. Thus, part-time can only occur
by conversion of a regular worker's schedule, if offered by
the employer and accepted by the worker. Workers lose
compensation commensurate with their hours reduction but
remain eligible for benefits. (This ability to retain
benefits is also due to the fact that health insurance is
national, thus universal, and not employer based.) Part-
timers continue to benefit from all collective bargaining
provisions and from employer contributions to other social
insurance funds. They keep the same eligibility for
vacation time (for more detail, see chapter 3 on
institutional history).
Part-time in these sectors is any schedule whose
monthly hours are shorter by at least one fifth of the
monthly FT hours. 5 In practice, most part-timers work four
' For instance, in insurance, monthly hours were based
on average full-time weekly hours of 38Hrs 18mns.
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days a week. In the next chapter, I discuss why firms do
not try to use PT employment at recruiting time and on a
large scale for some position, as they do in the United
States.
Sector-wide statistics on part-time6
In this chapter, I use sector-wide and firm level
statistics to picture broad characteristics of PT workers
and to establish that PT is used selectively for some worker
groups only. In the next chapter, I discuss why firms use
PT and why workers chose it. Part-time workers are
predominantly female; women workers, who have responsibility
for child or elder care, chose PT schedules more frequently
than men.
Also, PT workers concentrate in the Employe and Middle
categories for several reasons. First, firms offer PT more
readily, and accommodate it more easily, among Employe and
Middle workers in positions that are slated for numbers
reduction. PT is also offered to workers with higher
seniority and rarely to recent permanent recruits whom
companies aim to train and keep. PT, which is a job
benefit, is formally available to most other workers but is
not so readily accommodated and sometimes refused on grounds
of infeasibility.
6 For both sectors, the data sources used are the same
as those used in the previous chapter. They are provided by
the employer federations in both sectors.
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Second, PT schedules are more feasible in central
administrative services where issues of "coverage" for
customer service are less important. These services employ
many workers in the Employ6 and the low rungs of the Middle
job categories; thus, they are the services where workforce
reductions are planned.
Third, these administrative services employ large
numbers of women who are the workers most likely to elect PT
schedules as can be seen in sectoral statistics below.
Insurance sector (Statistics reported here are for the
Administrative workforce and for the period 1984 to 1987.
See table V-lA)
Part-time grew from 4 percent of the total
Administrative workforce in 1984 to 6.7 percent in 1987.
Its incidence is much greater in the female workforce than
among males. Part-time workers amount to 6.1 percent of the
female workforce in 1984 and 10.2 percent in 1987. The
incidence of PT is minimal in the male workforce; it amounts
to 0.6 percent of male workers in 1984 and 1.1 percent in
1987.
A more detailed 1986 industry survey finds that most
part-timers (65.5 percent) cluster in the Employe category;
27.5 percent are in the Middle category and 6.7 percent in
the High category. This distribution, when compared to that
of the total workforce for a year close in time (1987, that
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for which statistics are reported), underscores the over-
representation of Employ6 among part-timers. In the total
1987 workforce, Employe account for only 42.5 percent of the
total workforce. Middle and High workers account for 36.4
percent and 21 percent respectively.7
In insurance, few part-timers are young workers; new
hires are not likely to go on part-time. In 1986, workers
under 25 years of age account for 0.6 percent of part-
timers. Prime age workers, 25 to 55, account for 91 percent
of part-timers. Those over 55 account for the remainder,
8.4 percent of part-timers.8
Survey results for 1986 confirm the voluntary nature of
conversion to part-time in insurance. For 1986, 91.3
percent of part-timers cite "personal convenience" as their
main reason for choosing part-time. The rest cite health
reasons (7.3 percent), and parental leave which is another
form of legal worktime reduction (1.4 percent).9
Part-time for "personal convenience" is open to all
workers in 56.8 percent of companies surveyed, to workers
? This survey gathered schedule information for about
70 percent of the Administrative workforce in the entire
insurance sector. See FFSA-GEMA, 1989: 3.
8 FFSA-GEMA, 1989: 3.
9 The availability of PT for "personal convenience"
results from an enterprise-level agreement with the union
federations in 57.6 percent of insurance companies surveyed,
from a unilateral employer decision in 33.3 percent of firms
and from an agreement with representative bodies (plant
committee or worker representatives) in 8 percent of cases
(FFSA-GEMA, 1989:3)
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who meet a pre-set seniority level in 8.1 percent of cases,
and to workers who demonstrate a specific need (family
responsibilities, health, age) in 24.3 percent of firms in
the 1986 survey.10
Banking sector (data source for part-time is the 1980 and
1988 Enquete Emploi of INSEE for Banks and financial
institutions as reported by Association Frangaise des
Banques; see table V-1B)11
Part-time employment grew fast during the 1980s; the
share of the banking total workforce who works part-time
schedules went from 3.2 percent in 1980 to 9.2 percent in
1988. Part-time concentrates among women workers as is true
in insurance. The share of the female workforce on part-
time went from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 17.6 percent in 1988.
The incidence of part-time in the male workforce is much
lower; it was 0.4 percent in 1980 and 0.9 percent in 1988.
The use of part-time in the late 1980s in the two sectors:
interview reports
"On fait de la place pour les autres." ("We make
room for others", head of recruiting for a major
insurance company.)
10 The rest of firms did not answer the question. (See
FFSA-GEMA, 1989: 4).
1 This survey covers a broader group of financial
services institutions than the banking sector to which all
banks interviewed belong. Statistics on this broader group
are still relevant to banks.
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In the latter half of the 1980s, banks and insurance
companies used part-time, a job benefit, to reduce the hours
worked by, and wages paid to, categories of workers whose
numbers they want to reduce. The use of part-time has grown
even more rapidly since 1987, faster in banks than insurance
companies because, as discussed in the previous chapter,
banks own their sales networks and thus have a much larger
clerical workforce whose size they plan to shrink.
Additionally, large banks are much bigger organizations than
large insurance companies and thus any proportional
reduction in the workforce is a massive undertaking.
In both sectors, part-time has grown fast in recent
years because firms have actively pushed for its use. Its
attraction as a tool for workforce management is that it
allows firms to free up some of the wage bill for hiring new
workers with a higher education level and in different
positions from those of the workers who go on part-time
schedules. Personnel departments proceed in a "piecemeal"
fashion. With several workers going to 4/5th schedules,
personnel departments save on their wages and make room in
their stagnant budgets for new hires." For this reason we
" Average compensation figures from one insurance
company provide a rough example of how savings are made.
Gross average monthly compensation for Employ6s in 1988 was
7391FFrcs, amounting with benefit costs to about 11,087FF
(150%). If one worker goes on 4/5th schedule, the firm
saves 1478FF. If total compensation for an AM is 10,019 *
150% = 15,029FF, it will take 10 Employ6s on 4/5th time to
fund one AM. It will take 7.5 Employds on 4/5th time to
fund a new Employ6. It is easy to see how these ratios come
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find part-time not only among Employ6s but in large numbers
in the low rungs of the Middle categories (ClasseII Grades
in banking and AMI in insurance) where workers have been
promoted through seniority and with little change in job
contents. Workers with little possibility for career
mobility and whose job tasks are candidate for elimination
are those most likely to be offered the option to work part-
time and to be encouraged to take it.
Part-time has also spread rapidly because there is a
desire for shorter work hours in the workforce. Women with
children or those close to retirement (and whose older
husband has already retired) make use of the PT option. The
most prevalent schedule in central administrative services
is a 4/5th schedule with Wednesday off, the school mid-week
break, although other arrangements are theoretically
possible. Bank branches, in contrast, use part-day
schedules because they cannot ensure customer service with
four-day schedules. Most often they make part-time
available to those worker in the branch engaged in
administrative tasks. Branch managers do not offer PT to
commercial (marketing) workers; these often are recent hires
being "groomed" for new tasks in marketing and customer
relations and PT is considered antithetical to their career
development.
down if schedules turn to half-time (50%).
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The particular incentive of saving on wages of workers
who are considered redundant accounts for the greater
availability of part-time to banking and insurance workers
in the late 1980s and for its concentration in the Employ6
and Middle categories in central administrative services.
However, it is also true that these work settings lend
themselves easily to part-time schedules whereas customer
service, marketing and others do not. Perhaps it is to be
expected that, in sectors with long traditions of FT
employment, part-time would be more easily implemented in
jobs that are low skilled and more routine. Nevertheless,
the sharp rise of part-time availability in the late 1980s,
combined with explicit statements from personnel
representatives in firms in both sectors, tie the use of
part-time to a selective strategy of progressive workforce
reduction and transformation. In the next chapter, I
discuss more specifically the evidence on why firms use PT
and on workforce preference for PT.
Lest it appear that the selective and systematic use of
part-time by banks and insurance companies as a tool to
manage employment restructuring is an idiosyncratic
practice, large manufacturers have started to consider part-
time in the same light. In December 1991, the auto
manufacturer Renault unveiled an employment restructuring
program which included 1/ a forecast of 3,746 positions
reduction in 1992 (a number actually smaller than in
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previous years) and 2/ the establishment of a direct link
between the extension of part-time employment and the hiring
of new workers."
Renault plans to achieve this smaller, though
significant, job reduction by now-stardard exit policies of
early retirement (1800 planned, which is 500 less than in
1991), sabbatical leaves to transfer to another occupation
and incentives for voluntary quits. However, Renault is
reaching the limits of early retirement and wants to renew
the workforce which, as in banking and insurance, has aged
because of reduced turnover and a virtual hiring freeze
(mean age of 43). The solution devised to achieve a renewal
of the workforce while keeping employment rolls in check is
an agreement between management and unions to promote part-
time so that one new worker will be hired for each current
worker converting to half-time. Each half-time worker will
receive 80 percent of full-time pay.14 This policy also
necessitates government participation and subsidy because
part-timers nearing age 55 will likely need a guarantee of
an early retirement subsidy from age 55 to 60, the age of
full pension. This subsidy is to be provided by a special
allocation from the national unemployment fund (Fond
13 Le Monde S6lection Hebdomadaire, Dec. 12-18, 1991:
9.
4 The three unions which participate in this agreement
are the Socialist CFDT, FO and CFE-CGC (technical workers
union).
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National de l'Emploi) and its availability to formerly part-
time Renault workers will be contingent upon employment
creation.
The difference between Renault and the banks and
insurance companies studied is that the car manufacturer has
a Plan Social, an explicit policy of using part-time in this
manner and an agreement with unions and worker
representation institutions to do so. Banks and insurance
companies do not, because they do not have a negotiated
agreement on workforce reduction.
Firm level statistics on part-time
Firm level statistics from the Bilan Social document
the rapid growth of part-time among Employes from 1983
onward; those firms providing long data trends illustrate
the virtual absence of part-time in the two sectors prior to
1983 (table V-3). In one large insurance company, part-time
went from 0.4 percent of Employ6s in 1982 to 14.7 percent in
1988; corresponding figures for the total workforce were 0.3
percent and 11 percent. One large bank reports rates of
part-time of 0.7 percent in 1982 and 11 percent in 1988;
and for the total workforce, 0.5 and 7.5 percent
respectively.
In all firms interviewed, the incidence of part-time is
much greater for Employes than for the Middle category. One
large bank provided statistics on part-time for sub-groups
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within hierarchical job category. These statistics show
that workers in the low rung of the Middle category (Grades
classe II) have a higher incidence of part-time than the
Middle category as a whole; 13 percent for classe II and 9.1
percent for the total Middle category in 1988.15 This
pattern confirms the observation that part-time concentrates
in the job categories slated for reduction which are also
those in which part-time schedules are most easily
accomodated.
For those firms which reported part-time statistics by
sex, women workers constitute the overwhelming maj ority of
part-timers, over 90 percent. This massive concentration
results from the preponderence of women in the Employ6
category and the greater incidence of part-time among
Employ6.
Some firms show a rise of part-time slightly later than
others but all report a very rapid growth of part-time in
the later 1980s. This growth affected all job categories
including the High category although incidence in this
category never reached more than 3.5 percent.
15 Part-time rates for the other classes in the Middle
category are 7.4 percent for classeIII and 3.0 percent for
classIV. In this comparison, differentials rather than
levels of part-time are significant. Levels are inflated
because this particular bank pro-rated total employment in
full-time equivalents. Thus the rate of part-time is
computed over a total workforce which is lower than in
actuality.
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Finally, the share of Employes part-timers account for
the bulk of part-timers although, toward the end of the
1980s, Middle level workers come to constitute the majority
of part-timers in some banks.
B. TEMPORARY HELP SERVICE CONTRACTS
Banks and insurance companies use temp contracts for a
few tasks only and for skills which are either "new" or
specific to their industry. Both sectors have also relied
heavily on temp service contracts for diffusing micro-
computer based technologies in their work places and for
screening and training secretarial workers with these
skills.
Temporary Help Service ("temp") contracts and CDDs (see
section C) look like alternatives to each other because they
both are contracts for a limited duration. They turn out to
be used in different ways both because of the needs of the
banking and insurance sectors and because of the particular
marketing strategies of the temp industry. Temp contracts
have peculiar institutional characteristics. They involve a
third party, the temporary help service agency which charges
a fee to the user firm, whereas a CDD is a direct contract
between worker and firm. This peculiarity has meant that
another economic actor plays a significant role in the use
to which temp contracts are put in insurance and banking.
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Additionally, the use of temp contracts was restricted
in 1982 through legislation that was stricter than that for
CDDs; motives for use were relaxed in 1986 and 1989 (see
institutional chapter). As a result, in the late 1980s,
temp contracts were somewhat freeer of administrative
constraints than CDDs. They have remained, however, more
expensive since 1982 because legislation mandates: 1/ a
lump sum severance payment at the end of each assignment
amounting to 10-15 percent of total compensation16 and a
payment for vacation time (pro-rated) and 2/ wage and
benefit parity with regular workers in a similar position.
Additional protection was added with the conclusion of a
national collective bargaining agreement in 1985 for the
Temp help industry. CDDs have a lower lump sum payment (5
percent of total compensation). They also entail wage
parity but their total cost per hour is relatively lower
because they do not involve the added costs (training, other
benefits) provided to temp workers and which the temp
services pass along to user firms.
As seen below, the use intensity of temps fluctuated
over the 1980s, declining after 1982 (because of regulatory
restraints) and showing a slight upward trend after 1986.
The significance of temp employment to this study lies less
in its volume, which is small, than in the specific ways in
16 "Indemanite de precarite de l'emploi" or
compensation for unstable employment.
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which it has been used to meet the needs born out of the
transformation of employment systems. These ways are not
directly apparent in sector-wide or even firm level
statistics which are too aggregate. They were discussed in
interviews, however.
Sector-wide statistics on temp contracts
There is no good measure of use intensity of temporary
help service workers. Different sectors, and sometimes each
firm, use diverse measures. The number of temp workers used
is measured by the tally of contracts over a set given
period, but that number is sometimes weighted by the average
duration of assignment to obtain a measure of use intensity.
Insurance data (table V-lA)
. According to one industry survey, the use intensity
of temp help workers declined during the 1980s. The number
of temp workers as percent of average end-of-month
employment went from 12.2 percent in 1980 to 10.2 percent in
1985. This percent fluctuated in the intervening years,
however, and reached 15.1 percent in 1981. Temp workers
counted as Full-time Equivalents as percent of total
employment declined from 1.5 percent in 1980 to 0.8 percent
in 1985."
17 A later survey reports that this latter measure went
down to 0.6 percent by 1987 (FFSA-GEMA, 1989:6).
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. The duration of assignments also declined over the
period, pointing to a reduced use-intensity for temps. The
number of hours worked per temp worker (total number of temp
hours divided by number of temp workers hired over the year)
declined from 249 hours in 1980 to 139 hours in 1985, or
from 33.2 to 18.5 workdays at 7.5 hours per day.
Banking sector data (table V-1B)
There are no reliable sector-wide data on the use
intensity of temporary help service contracts in banking. A
limited one-time survey of 37 members of the industry
association (AFB) which includes major employers was
conducted in 1989. Survey results indicate that 92 percent
of all banks interviewed use temporary help service
contracts. Additionally, in over half of them, the use of
temp contracts increased between 1986 and 1989. Actual use
intensity measures are not available in this survey.18 All
measures on use intensity come from individual firm data
(see below).
A note on sectoral trends
The use of Temp workers grew in the late 1970s and
until 1982, declined until the late 1980s, and grew slightly
in the last year of the decade. This overall decline is due
both to economic conditions" and to the jump in the cost
18 Survey conducted by a private consulting firm for
the AFB and released in early 1990.
19 On aggregate, temp use is sensitive to short-term
changes in economic conditions.
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of temp contracts following the enactment of benefits in
1982 and 1985 as mentioned above. Data provided by one
large insurance firm is indicative of this sudden rise in
cost. While the average hourly (nominal) cost to that firm
of a temp worker grew yearly by about 12 percent in the
1970s, it jumped by 40 percent between 1981 and 1982 and by
22 percent between 1982 and 1983. Most of this increase is
not attributed to general inflation, and comes instead from
the change in regulation. Legislative changes in 1986 and
later in 1989 (see chapter on institutional context), have
made recourse to temp workers easier, though not cheaper,
than that to CDDs. As a result, in late 1989 and early
1990, the use of temp workers was again on the rise as
reported in interviews, a phenomenon not yet captured by
statistics.
The use of Temporary Help Service contracts in the two
sectors during the 1980s: interview reports
During the 1980s, banks and insurance companies
centralized their budget and decision making for the use of
temp workers. They did so to control their temp budget
which had grown because of extensive use during the late
1970s and increased hourly costs. The effect of this
management control was to narrow the recourse to temp
contracts to specific uses.
Banks and insurance companies pay a premium for using
temps for specific tasks and occupations. First, they rely
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on the temp industry for the permanent recruiting of
secretaries and other clerical workers and for training them
in microcomputer use. Temp services have become an
important institution for recruiting, screening and training
workers with these skills and banks and insurance companies
have come to rely on them for these functions rather than
establishing their own recruiting and training programs for
these worker categories. For the tasks performed by
secretarial and clerical workers, office technology had
changed little over the years so that firms had little
concern with skill training and availability until the late
1980s.
Second, banks and insurance companies use temp
contracts for middle level jobs that are specific to
insurance and banking. Third, they use temp contracts for
general clerical tasks, a use which belies the
characterization of temp use as primarily by filling
specific skill needs derived from change in transformation
in technology and systems of employment in the two sectors.
These uses are described below.
The temp industry has become a successful institution
for the diffusion of new technology and skills. The fact
that it is a separate industry that looks to protect and
adapt its own market niches has played a significant role in
the specific uses to which firms have put temp contracts.
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History of the Temporary Help Service industry
The temp industry is a key actor in the process of
transformation of employment in banking and insurance.
Elements of its history and its organization give the
context for the use made of temp workers by banks and
insurance companies.20 In part because the operations of
the temp industry have been regulated since 1972 and because
temp workers are "expensive" as compared to workers on CDDs,
the industry has become concentrated with a few large firms
which have tried to shed the image of "sweat" merchants.
The government scrutiny of the industry in the 1980s has
also helped push out marginal operations from the industry.
Smaller and medium size temp services have become
specialized in providing workers in specific occupations to
a few sectors. They try to compete on quality and
specificity while large firms provide a broad array of
workers.
As temp contracts became relatively expensive, temp
services looked for ways to target their services to market
segments. During the 1980s, their market strategy
benefitted from the rapid introduction of micro computers in
office environments and from the slack condition of the
20 In contrast to the U.S., most French temp service
industry employment is in manufacturing and construction,
not in clerical employment. Temp service firms interviewed
for this study specialized in office activities.
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labor market which provided them with a large pool of
workers from which to draw.
When word and data processing software packages started
to be marketed aggressively in France, few firms or training
institutions were ready to handle the particular type of
rapid training which they required. All training had to be
short-term and its contents had to adapt frequently to
adjust to software changes. Small, innovative, temp
services took the lead of recruiting, screening and training
workers on micro computers and large firms followed suit. A
particular feature of French institutions provided temp
services an added incentive for setting up extensive
training programs. A 1975 legislation mandates all
employers to allocate 0.8% of the wage bill to workforce
training. The wage bill accounts for a large share of
receipts in this industry and even a small percentage
represents significant cash resources. If these resources
are not administered and spent by the employer, they are
collected by a general government administered fund and may
not benefit the industry.2 1
In the early 1980s, innovative temp services took note
of the new interest in productivity gains and cost control
among user firms as well as the aggressive marketing of
2
'The industry has also set up a training institute and
fund for educational leaves for long-term temps. Few
workers stay in the industry long enough to benefit from a
training leave, however.
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microcomputer manufacturers. They saw their market niche as
providing workers skilled in several word processing and
spreadsheet software and who would have adequate
communication skills. The first temp service to set up a
satellite training institute in the late 1970s did so as a
cost-saving strategy. It realized that in order to train
the temp workers it recruited, it should set up a separate
company, specialized in training, whose main customer would
be the original temp service but which would realize some
scale economies by training workers from other firms.
Originally, 70 percent of the receipts from the training
institute came from the temp service. Over time, and as
software and hardware changes became very frequent, training
costs rose. The Temp/training institute responded by
increasing its investment in teachers, materials, course
development and equipment. Training expenditures reached 3
percent of the wage bill of the original temp service, which
is higher than the legal requirement. This "temp training
company" also broadened the type of training offered and, to
finance all of it, expanded its customer base to other temp
services and to any other firm needing clerical workers with
micro computer literacy. By 1984, 80 percent of receipts of
the training institute came from outside companies and 20
percent from the original temp service. This institute
trains workers from other temp services but also workers
from user firms in all sectors of the economy.
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Following the lead of this highly successful example,
larger established clerical temp services created their own
training institute and strived to obtain an external client
base as well. One of the largest clerical temp services
reported trying to achieve a goal of 40 percent trainees
from outside companies for 1990. This large clerical temp
service reported that word processing knowledge (of several
packages) was a requirement for 3 percent of daily
assignments in 1985 and 12 percent in 1989, thus the need
for training resources. Even if they do not target outside
clients, most clerical temp services have spun off a
satellite training institute with more or less strong
financial ties to the original temp service. By training
workers so actively the temp service industry also
contributed to the rapid pace of introduction of micro
computer technologies in office environments.
Starting in the late 1980s, leaders in the temp help
service industry located a new market niche in mid-level
occupations in the banking and insurance sectors. They
anticipated that a number of tasks would emerge from
employment restructuring in the two sectors during the 1990s
and that they could recruit, screen and train workers for
these tasks. They also figured that both sectors are "cash
rich" and have sufficient resources to pay for temp
contracts. One large company recently created a branch
specialized in banking and insurance only. One of its
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executives argued that, until recently, the banking and
insurance sectors never had needed to practice workforce
management, that is, recruiting and selecting. All their
personnel departments have traditionally had to do is to
hire "bodies" indiscriminately, "de l'embauche" (a term used
for hiring for assembly line jobs). As a result, this temp
service and others plan to move into a new market niche.
Three broad categories of temp contract use in insurance and
banking:
a/ Banks and insurance companies report that they use
temp contracts as their primary means of recruiting
secretarial workers who have both traditional secretarial
skills (oral and written communication) and the "new"
computer skills. Instead of screening, recruiting and
training secretaries on their own, they hire them at the end
of their temp contract. They do so because the temp
industry trains numerous workers successfully in word
processing and spreadsheet software, a task which neither
banks nor insurance companies have wanted to undertake in-
house. Also, the two sectors traditionally have not
invested in the recruiting and training of secretaries and
thus have little experience doing so for hiring workers with
knowledge of new office technologies. During the 1980s,
firms needed to select more carefully the few secretaries to
keep in regular employment because of restricted hiring
budgets and of the need for more broadly trained workers.
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Banks and insurance companies thus used the specialization
of temp services in screening and training secretarial
workers. A temp executive reported that his firm hires five
persons out of 100 interviewed. In clerical employment, one
out of five temp assignments ends in an offer by the user
firm. It is accepted practice for user firms to hire on
payroll a temp worker at the end of contract; offers of
assignment from temp services usually specify whether the
assignment is in view of recruiting by the user firm. This
is done so that the temp service knows whether to send a
"career temp" or a worker who is in the industry to look for
a steady job. "One's recruiting efforts are destined to be
thwarted" one temp executive noted.
b/ The temp industry has started to provide specialized
workers to banks and insurance companies. These workers are
hired in positions that are middle level, non secretarial,
and located in central administrative services. These
positions, created from the recombination of tasks of
existing and destroyed positions, entail skills that are
specific to the two sectors (such as "redacteur juriste",
legal document writer). The number of these positions will
grow as both sectors deepen their restructuring efforts
during the 1990s. There is great heterogeneity across the
sub-sectors of insurance in particular; positions appear in
new forms of insurance (other than life and damages and such
as reinsurance) while others disappear in the wave of
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corporate mergers and concentrations. In this case, the
marketing strategy of temp services, which have anticipated
the effects of restructuring, has meshed with firm needs
quite well.
c/ Finally banks and insurance firms use temp
contracts for a large number of general clerical tasks
("employes de bureau"), for short-duration tasks or for
positions slated to disappear. In this case, temps are
used, not in view of recruiting, but simply to get work
done. Following the pattern of specialization in the temp
industry itself, general clerical workers are provided by
large temp services which provide all types of workers and
not by the leading specialized firms that specialize in
computer training.
This particular use of temp contracts -for all purpose,
unspecific, clerical tasks- contradicts the notion developed
above that firms pay a wage premium for specific services
and skills. The same type of worker could be hired on CDD,
but is not, because temp contracts though more expensive
have been somewhat easier to use than CDDs since 1986, as
discussed above. The grounds for use of CDDs remain more
restrictive (replacement and fixed duration tasks); temp
contracts are comparatively more flexible in terms of
grounds for use. Banks and insurance companies trade off
the added cost of worker protections that come with temp
contracts for the total ease of use and lack of regulatory
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control which they provide. Additionally,for very short-
term tasks, temp contracts are more appealing because they
entail little processing by a firm's personnel department,
unlike CDDs. In fact, some temp service executives contend
that CDDs only are a substitute for temps because personnel
departments prefer them. They do so because, with CDDs,
they retain internal administrative control.
Firm level statistics on temp contracts
Measuring use intensity, as already mentionned, is
problematic because it depends both upon the number of temp
workers used and the duration of each contract. For our
purposes, use intensity, although useful, does not capture
the strategic way in which temp contracts are used.
Firms report both the estimated average monthly number
of temps22 and the average duration of contracts in work
days. The incidence of temp use, as measured by the ratio
of average monthly number of temp contracts to average
monthly total employment, varies across firms and fluctuates
over time although it stays below two percents. The
disparity across firms is striking and attests to different
internal administration of temp use. When we observe
jointly the incidence and the average duration of contracts,
firms still vary with some having low incidence and long
12 Estimated from billing as follows: (total number of
contracts) (number of effective work hours* average hourly
cost)
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contracts, while others have both higher incidence and long
contracts. As reported in some interviews, 1987 and 1988
saw a renewed growth of temp use with a number of firms
using longer contracts (see table V-4).
C: CDD or LIMITED DURATION CONTRACTS (CDD: contrat A dur~e
determin6e)
We would expect firms to use limited duration contracts
(CDDs) for quantitative variations in workload and for
idiosyncratic tasks and skills (qualitative variation). In
other words, firms would use a CDD for tasks limited either
in duration or scope. In fact, banks and insurance
companies use CDDs to meet qualitative requirements that are
themselves derived from their perceived need to change the
composition of the workforce. CDDs are the most amorphous
of any irregular employment arrangement; firms use them to
meet a range of goals, making it hard to characterize their
use. In the following I regroup into broad categories the
varied uses which banks and insurance companies have made of
them in order to show that, while using them to meet the
"daily" requirements of workforce management (variations in
activity), firms in the two sectors have used CDDs to
facilitate the transition in their workforce composition.
CDDs, unlike temp contracts, are an all purpose
arrangement. Firms can use them for any position within the
legal guidelines which restrict the motive for use and their
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duration (see earlier institutional history chapter). In
short, since 1986, all CDDs are restricted to a maximum
duration of 24 months, all renewals included. In other
words, one worker can have up to 3 CDDs with the same firm
for a maximum of 24 months. Most CDDs last longer than temp
assignments. Mainly, the legislation allows CDD use in
three cases: 1/ replacement of an absent worker, 2/ an
unusual excess workload (surcroit exceptionnel d'activite)
such as special sales, or new accounts and 3/ seasonnal
activities. Replacement CDDs are particularly attractive to
firms because their end date can be left open (return of the
absent worker) and they have almost no restrictions on
maximum duration and number of renewals.
Even though CDDs theoretically are all purpose, banks
and insurance companies use them primarily in the Employ6
(Low) category. They hire workers on CDD to: 1/ control
the hiring and thus the size of the Employ6 category; 2/ to
gain longer probationary periods than those allowed under
legislation and collective bargaining and 3/ to find workers
to perform work in positions that are slated for
elimination.
When asked if they used CDDs, almost all personnel
officials interviewed responded that they use them little
because they do little hiring. In other words, most hiring
of workers other than those in the High category takes place
on a CDD first even if a worker's contract may be turned
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into a permanent contract later on. The implication to be
drawn from interviewees' statements is that, were hiring to
increase, so would the use of CDDs. Volume-wise, banks and
insurance companies use CDDs little relative to other
sectors such as retail trade, hotels and restaurants. The
argument being made here, however, is that the use of CDD in
insurance and banking is for qualitative purposes primarily,
that is, to enable firms to keep a handle, on the workforce
flux, that is sufficient to achieve a change in workforce
composition. Firm use of CDDs in hiring plays a key role in
the transition of employment structures in the two sectors.
Unlike in retail trade which makes systematic use of CDDs
for a growing segment of jobs, the two sectors likely will
not make it their common practice to create large numbers of
jobs to be filled by CDDs only.
Sector-wide statistics
Sector-wide statistics are available for the 1980s only
and, for each sector, the available information covers
separate aspects of the use of CDDS. In other words, the
data for the sector do not parallel each other.
Insurance sector data (The following data refer to the
Administrative workforce only; the sales workforce is
excluded. Additionally statistics provided by the employer
federation cover different data points so that some
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workforce characteristics are documented for some years and
not others)2 (table V-1A)
.Firms limit their use of CDDs to the lower
hierarchical job categories. In insurance, for the period
1980-85, over 99 percent of the CDD use (measured as workers
on CDD) concentrated in the Employ6 category and in the
lowest rung of the Middle job category (AM I).
. Because women predominate in the low job categories,
they also constitute the majority of workers on CDDs,
although they are slightly under represented. Women workers
accounted for 55.8 percent of workers on CDDs in 1980 and
61.3 percent in 1985. In close years, women accounted for
71.6 percent of Employ~s in 1981 and 72.1 percent of
Employds in 1984. They also accounted for 68.1 percent of
AMI in 1981 and 67.9 percent in 1984. (Note: the years
used for comparison do not overlap because of the
constraints of published statistics.)
. CDDs account for a small share of employment stocks
in the insurance sector but, as seen below, they account for
a significant share of employment flux. The share of CDDs
in the total work force of the sector was 1.8 percent in
1984 and 2.8 percent in 1988. For the female workforce,
CDDs accounted for 2.1 percent and 3.2 percent in 1984 and
1988 respectively. They account for a smaller share of the
male workforce; 1.3 percent in 1984 and 2.1 percent in 1987.
23 Data source is FFSA, 1989.
215
. CDDs account for a large share of employment flux,
in particular, a large portion of exits from firms in the
sector. The share of CDD expiration as share of exits grew
during the 1980s, from 48.7 percent in 1980 to 61.1 percent
in 1985. In other words, expirations of CDDs constituted
most of the exits from firms. As will be demonstrated later
from firm data, CDDs also constitute a significant share of
entries into firms.
Another source, a one-time 1986 survey of the insurance
sector, provides a description of the workforces affected by
CDDs.24 According to the survey results:
The Employe category accounts for 98 percent of CDDs
in 1986, a level which concurs with the 1980-85 results
reported above.
. Workers on CDDs are young workers: 65.4 percent of
CDD holders are under 25 years of age; 24.3 percent are 25
to 35; and 10.3 percent are aged over 35.
. The bulk of CDDs, 60 percent, range from 3 to 12
months; they last longer than temp assignments. The
distribution of CDDs by duration is as follows: 8.2 percent
are for 0 to 3 months; 25.4 percent are for 3 to 6 months;
34.7 percent are for 6 to 12 months and 9.3 percent are for
24 This survey covers 50 percent of the Administrative
workforces of the insurance sector. It does not include
insurance companies which belong to the employer association
for the cooperative sector, GEMA, nor the for-profit
companies that are not members of the FFSA. See FFSA-GEMA,
20 Sept.,1989.
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over 12 months. The remainder of CDDs, 22.4 percent, are
for durations that are not stated in advance, an option
available under the law. These likely are replacement
contracts whose end is determined by the return of the
absent worker or contracts for seasonnal activities.
Banking sector data
Most of the data on the banking sector is for the year
1987 (survey of 98 AFB member banks). (table V-1B)
In the banking sector, CDD use concentrates in the
Low and Middle job categories: 53.8 percent of CDDs are in
the Employe job category and 28.3 percent are in the Middle
(Grad6s) job category. Note that the concentration is less
skewed toward Employds than in insurance. This is due to
the fact that the workforce to be reduced has slid up into
the Middle category (Grad6 classII) through seniority.
. CDDs account for a significant share of employment
flux in the banking sector. For 1987, they account for 28.1
percent of entries for the total workforce. They are used
extensively in the hiring of Employes; 43.8 percent of
Employe entries are done on CDDs. By contrast, 15 percent
of entries in the Middle category and 1.6 percent of entries
in the High job category are done on CDDs.
. A larger share of women workers are hired on CDDs
than male workers. In 1987, 37.2 percent of total female
entries took place on CDD; compared to 16.8 percent for male
workers.
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. There is great variation across banks in the use of
CDDs in hiring (entries). The three largest banks use CDDs
comparatively less than other banks. For 1987, CDDs account
for 13.3 percent of entries in the three largest banks.
(These three banks account for the bulk, 59.7 percent, of
employment in the sector surveyed.) Regional and local
banks, usually smaller, rely extensively on CDDs for hiring;
the latter account for 47.1 percent of entries in this part
of the sector. Parisian banks (other than the three
largest) use 35.6 percent of CDDs in their entries. Foreign
banks use 20.9 percent of CDDs in their entries.
The use of CDDs in the 1980s: interview reports
1./ Hiring workers on CDD for maternity and sick leave
replacement
Since the late 1970s, banks and insurance companies
have systematically hired workers on CDDs to replace regular
workers who are on maternity leave or extended sick leave.
"Replacement" of a permanent worker is the use most easily
accomodated by legislation and constitutes the majority of
reported use. Firms in the two sectors use replacement-CDDs
to manage the turnover of workers to whom they have a
commitment of continued employment. The two sectors have a
high concentration of women and frequent maternity leaves.
Even if this workforce has aged, significant numbers are in
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their child bearing years. Maternity leave policy is
widespread (in contrast to the U.S.) and fairly long; it
can last up to 6 months and entails the possibility of
unpaid leave after that.
The systematic use of CDDs for replacements
characterizes the 1980s only and represents a departure from
previous practices. During the period of employment
expansion (late 1950s through the 1970s), banks and
insurance companies usually hired a replacement worker on a
regular contract and kept the worker on beyond the
replacement period. With workforce rolls growing,
replacement workers were natural additions to the workforce.
In contrast, replacement workers on CDDs benefit from
some unstated priority of access to a permanent job, that
is, they may be hired over an outside candidate with similar
qualifications, but only if a position opens, a rare
occurrence in the Employd category and the low rungs of the
Middle category. A number of personnel officers reported
cases in which it was convenient to use the same worker for
a series of replacements (several maternity leaves) over two
years and even more. A personnel official remarked that
this practice borders on illegality. Regulations allows the
same worker to replace several absent workers (a major
25 In insurance, maternity leave accounts for 12.9
percent of total absences for the total workforce (vacations
included). If vacations are excluded, then maternity leaves
are 28 percent of absences. (Tableau de Bord, FFSA, 1987:
3-4).
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exception to restrictions) but prohibits the serial use of
CDDS with the same worker for an indefinite period of time
(Delamotte, 1987: 74-76). This practice is ambiguous
enough, however, that it goes undetected in departments in
which there are large numbers of workers on leave.
Hiring replacement workers on CDDs gives banks and
insurance companies a handle on the size of the regular
workforce in the Employ6 positions in central administrative
services in particular. By hiring workers on CDDs, firms
keep the option to reduce progressively the workforce each
time a regular worker does not return from maternity or sick
leave; they do not renew the contract of the worker on CDD.
In the late 1980s, they systematically did not replace
workers who left.
Clearly, the task of reducing the workforce would be
easier were firms not to hire replacement workers. They
must hire stand-ins for absent workers because they are
mandated to do so by the collective bargaining agreement.
More importantly, they cannot handle the excess workload
created by maternity leaves by resorting to "informal work
reassignment" practices such as overtime or doubling up,
because the number of maternity and sick leaves is too high.
Women workers dominate the Employs job category. In
Banking, women constituted 62 percent of Employ6s in 1980
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and 67 percent in 1989.26 In insurance, they hovered
around 70 percent of Employ6s from 1976 to 1985. The
systematic and extensive use of overtime to avoid hiring
replacement workers is not an option. In both sectors,
major employers are committed under the national collective
bargaining agreement to work toward a gradual reduction of
weekly hours.
There is some evidence to the contrary, however,
indicating that some firms attempt to use overtime
systematically to handle excess workload due to absences but
also to work reorganization. Two respondents, a bank
personnel staff27 and a bank unionist, reported a rapid
increase of overtime in 1989. The example provided by the
unionist concerned unreported overtime; it was the case of a
large data processing center in which bank management hoped
to phase out a large share of tasks and of the workforce.
Workers who left were not replaced. With a reduced
workforce, peak loads in work were faced with unreported
overtime, that is, overtime compensated with promises of
compensatory time for workers. Because the contract calls
for premium pay for overtime hours and because there was
little monitoring of compensatory time, the union enlisted
26 In banks, women accounted for 50.0 percent of the
Middle job category in 1980 and 55.4 percent in 1989.
27 Who had overtime statistics but would not release
them.
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the help of a labor inspector28 to document overtime use.
They did not succeed in proving the excessive use of
unreported overtime.
2./ The use of CDDs for screening "the workers to keep", or
planning for skill change
Banks and insurance companies use CDDs
"opportunistically" as well; they avail themselves of CDDs
to gain longer probationary periods than that allowed under
collective bargaining. In the two sectors, the probation
period usually amounts to 3 months whereas a CDD can last up
to 24 months. Ostensibly, the motive for use must fit under
those allowed by regulation. The use of CDDs for
replacement described in the previous section can also serve
as a tool for screening; a worker hired under a "replacement
CDD" can also be screened for long term hiring so that these
two uses complement each other.
Firms in the two sectors use workers on CDDs to get
work done; these workers have an education level lower then
the "optimal" (to use the firms' term) level for permanent
hires. It is surprising that banks and insurance companies
should do so given the slackness of French labor markets
during the 1980s; one would expect them to find the workers
they want. In fact, workers on CDD have an education level
28 Representative of the Ministry of Labor who verify
enforcement of labor legislation in the workplace.
222
which is higher than previous cohorts in the same position,
in keeping with the general increase in education for the
whole workforce, but it is still lower than the desired
level for permanent recruits. The problem which the use of
CDDs remedies, however, is that for some clerical and
secretarial positions banks and insurance companies have yet
to reorganize work tasks sufficiently to attract and retain
the workers with the "optimal" education levels. In this
transition period, they need work done and use workers on
CDDs to that end. These workers are not likely to be
retained and, if they are, only after a lengthy screening
period, a succession of CDDs. With this screening period,
extended beyond the standard probation period thanks to
CDDs, firms can hire some permanent workers who have "sub-
optimal" education and insufficient experience but who have
proven to have a "potential for professional growth" during
their extended probationary stay with the company. The use
of CDDs affords firms a tool for filling their personnel
needs for positions whose redesign, to accommodate a better
educated workforce, has not been fully conceived and
implemented.
Because so little permanent recruiting takes place and
because personnel departments are committed to enforcing a
higher quality of recruits, firms use CDDs for screening
recruits to the Middle category as well. For instance,
Middle level recruits who are put on in-house training
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tracks for supervisory positions often get hired on CDD
first. This is true even for those workers who meet the
industry-wide new standard of two years of post-secondary
education. A member of a peer-managed (employer/union)
clearing house for hiring in insurance29 noted that she
advises young recruits to only accept CDDs that last a
minimum of six months; anything shorter does not constitute
a good opportunity for future employment.
3./ The use of CDDs to facilitate a transformation and the
elimination of some tasks, or "planning for job destruction"
Banks and insurance companies use CDDs for tasks that
arise during the period of transformation of work
organizations. The example most often cited, by personnel
departments and unions, is that in which entire groups of
tasks go through a rapid transfer to a computerized process;
some positions are destined to be eliminated and the others
to change in contents. The firm has anticipated the
employment reduction by not replacing losses from workforce
attrition and by encouraging early retirement and quits.
When the firm runs into difficulties of any kind with the
new computerized process, it hires large number of workers
on CDDs to ensure continuity of operation in the traditional
"paper handling" way. Conflicts with the union arise when
difficulties with the computerization process are not
29 "Commission Paritaire de l'Emploi."
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resolved quickly and these workers are kept on extended
CDDs. At that point, unions start pushing for the
conversion of these workers to regular contracts with the
option for transfer to another operation later on.
Firms use CDDs to effect a rapid and drastic employment
restructuring; the case of a large insurer provides a
measure of how extensively CDDs can be used as a tool for
transformation. In late 1989, following a long spell of
acquisitions and mergers of several companies, one insurance
company had some departments which operated with 50 to 60
percent of CDDs. This company came to rely so extensively
on CDDs because it is being restructured. To make the
"reconstituted" firm financially viable, the company's
management has decided to reduce significantly the workforce
and, partly to facilitate the reduction, to regionalize3
and rationalize the whole corporate structure. Central
administrative services in Paris are to be drastically
reduced in size and function; the firm has acquired the
administrative operations of several insurance companies
that need to be consolidated. In addition, new regions are
to be created with administration as well as sales
functions. In such situation, the easiest way for
management to restructure is to layoff workers in the Paris
central services and to hire workers in the regions with a
30 Regionalization also satisfied other important goals
of corporate strategy.
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predominance of marketing and customer service workers.
This "layoff and hire" strategy theoretically would allow
for getting rid of workers with high seniority and low
education levels and for hiring workers with the higher
education levels which the insurance firm wants. However,
the insurance company must effect its restructuring without
layoffs or at least with an official commitment to avoiding
mass layoffs.
As a result, this insurance company wants to meet
divergent objectives concurrently and does so by relying
heavily on CDDs. The objectives are as follows: a/ to
downscale the aggregate workforce; b/ to change the firm
structure and build the new regions; c/ to ensure that new
insurance products are developed; and d/ to ensure that
existing insurance contracts sold by acquired firms are
serviced.
This company finds itself needing large numbers of
workers on CDDs because it has successfully reassigned
workers and reduced its workforce through attrition,
incentives to leave, early retirements and quits (workers
when asked to relocate outside the Paris area quit in
droves). Until the process of regionalization is complete,
tasks such as servicing existing contracts, must be
maintained in a number of departments of central services in
Paris and there is a shortage of workers to do them.
Because the company does not want to retain workers in
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Paris, it does almost all of its hiring on CDDs. Conflicts
arise between administrators of the restructuring and
existing department heads who lack the experienced and
qualified personnel to keep their departments operating.
Conflicts also arise with unions which object to the
systematic and lengthy use of CDDs.
Firm-level statistics (from Bilan Social)
Firm-level statistics establish that CDDs indeed
contribute importantly to flux in and out of banks and
insurance companies, the more so to the movement of Employ6s
in and out of employment.
. The ratio of CDD hring over CDI (Contrat A Durke
Indeterminee, the standard contract) hiring is a measure of
relative concentration. It equals 1 when there is an equal
number of CDD and CDI in hiring." I report it for the
total workforce and for Employ~s only, because the numbers
of hires in the Middle category were very low throughout the
period, making any proportional measure meaningless (table
V-5). For Employes, the CDD/CDI ratio is high for most
firms throughout the period, ranging from a low of 0.10 (1
worker on CDD for 10 workers hired on CDI) to a high of 3
" I chose this relative measure rather than the share
of CDDs in total hiring because of ambiguities and
discrepancies accross firms in reported figures on total
number of hirings.
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workers on CDD for each worker hired on CDI; confirming that
most hiring for Employ6s takes the form of a CDD. The ratio
is lower in years when total numbers hired are higher and
very high in years of limited hiring. In other words, when
total hiring is restricted, the weight of CDDs in total
hiring increases. This seems to contradict an earlier
observation that CDD use would increase were hiring to
increase. The volume of CDDs obviously increases with total
hiring but its weight relative to standard contracst (CDI)
decreases.
. In most years, CDD expirations contribute from 25 to
50 percent of exits from firm total employment (table V-6).
Total exits include: retirement, quits, firings, CDD
expirations and deaths. In years in which the number of
exits was inflated by early retirement policies (1982-83),
CDD expirations do not contribute a large share of exits.
For most firms, however, and for most years, they do account
for a substantial share of exits. Moreover, they account
for a much greater share of exits for Employds than for the
total workforce; two to three times the size depending on
the year.
A note on "false CDDs"
Firms in the two sectors also make use of other forms
of short-term contracts in addition to CDDs. Some observers
32 As already noted, these firms do not layoff.
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call these "false CDDs." Banks and insurance companies use
young workers hired under government-subsidized internships
in similar ways to their use of workers on CDDs. These
internship programs include Contrats de Formation-
Qualification (training contracts) and Stages d'Initiation A
la Vie Professionelle (SIVP; government subsidized
employment program for labor market entrants who are under
25 and have experienced unemployment). A table with numbers
of these workers for the nation is in chapter 1.
Thus, these internships are short contracts which firms
use to handle short-term needs, to screen potential
permanent workers and to select workers with limited
education and work experience who prove themselves on the
job. Officially, these internships should have a high
training content but in practice many turn into short
assignments with, as CDDs, the potential for "getting one's
foot in the door." Some observers contend these are
indistinguishable from CDDs from the firm's standpoint and
from the experience of the worker concerned.
Finally, if firms hire a worker on CDD but in the
context of a government subsidized employment preservation
or job training program, then they derive some benefit. The
legal limit on maximum duration for a single contract does
not apply, altough this type of CDD can only be renewed
once.
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TRADITIONAL CASUAL WORKERS AND CONTRACTING OUT
Under pressure from unions over the past 15 years,
banks and insurance companies have virtually eliminated
their seasonal, casual, worker categories; these were hired
for excess workloads, for instance, in resort areas. Banks
in particular have been under pressure, in collective
bargaining, not to create positions that, at the outset, are
short-lived and seasonal. This type of hiring has since been
funneled into specific irregular employment contracts,
mostly CDDs. Smaller regional offices and bank branches
report a heavy use of CDD during seasonal vacations.
Finally, the use of part-time, CDDs and temps for
activities central to the business of banking and insurance
has not precluded the use of contracting out. Since the
1960s, banks and insurance companies have contracted out
most tasks that are peripheral to their main activites such
as cleaning, maintenance, and food services. These workers
are not covered by the national or regional collective
bargaining agreements. They remain "outside the
(banking/insurance) status" (hors statut) in large firms.
Small banks acted later, in the 1980s, to push these workers
out; they have used contracting firms or temp services.
For instance, in a major insurance company, the
"outside contractor" workers engaged in support activities
amount to the equivalent of less than 5 percent of the
workforce that is covered by the collective bargaining
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agreement. The size of outside workers is not negligible.
Contracting out, however, dates back to the 1960s and 1970s
and is not so immediately tied to the transformation of
employment systems of the 1980s that is documented in this
study. As worker protection and wage growth increased under
collective bargaining, large banks and insurance companies
put these workers out of the reach of the internal labor
market through contracting out.
CONCLUSION
First, observations based on evidence at the corporate
level may be mitigated by establishment data had these been
made available to me. It is likely that I would have found
more concentrated uses of CDD in some processing centers
than is evident in corporate level statistics. Smaller
regional offices outside of Paris are also heavier users of
CDDs. These distinctions were gleaned from comments during
interviews but cannot be confirmed in the absence of
establishment statistics.
Second, I have argued that banks and insurance
companies have formulated clear goals of workforce
transformation and that they use irregular arrangements to
implement their strategies for change. What remained
unclear at the time of interviews, however, is whether firms
in both sectors will achieve the transformation they seek.
They have been hiring new workers with levels of skill that
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are higher than the requirements of the tasks assigned to
them at the outset. They are having difficulty retaining
these workers because the organization of work has not
changed enough to provide them with sufficient access to
tasks commensurate to their skill and to possibilities for
career advancement. Furthermore, these new recruits find
themselves supervised by hierarchical superiors with
significantly less education and have not blended in easily
in numerous work settings. Hence the dilemma of a number of
firms which were able to hire workers with high education
levels in a period of labor market slackness but which, in
the short to medium term, are having difficulty retaining
them. Quits among these workers are frequent. As quoted in
the previous chapter, a representative from the banking
federation noted that banks are looking for individuals who
can be trained as work organization changes but who have few
career expectations for firms to fulfill; a rather tall
order.
Third, it is also likely that firm commitment to
training the existing workforce, or lack thereof, will
become apparent in the mid 1990s. If little investment is
put into training, then growing numbers of workers will be
given incentives to leave. Banks and insurance companies
with significant resources will have incentive programs.
Other less financially stable organizations may afterall
resort to layoffs.
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Fourth, there is no dramatic job destruction taking
place in the implementation of the transition described
here. There is also no clear pattern of growing
substitution of irregular arrangements for regular
employment. Once the transition is complete, however, a
certain type of job will no longer be available to female
workers with limited education. Since the 1960s, insurance
and banking have provided opportunities for stable
employment with prospects for a modicum of pay increases to
large numbers of low skilled clerical workers. The next
cohort of entry-level clerical workers will either have
enhanced education levels or find employment outside the two
sectors.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF DEMAND IN SHAPING IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN
BANKING AND INSURANCE
Introduction
Banks and insurance companies have tailored the use of
irregular employment to their specific needs to affect a
transition in system of employment given, first, an existing
workforce composition and, second, a set of rules for
governing the internal labor market. In this chapter, I
discuss how labor demand and the characteristics of the
workforce affect the use of irregular employment economy-
wide and in these two sectors in particular. In discussing
labor demand, I focus not on whether labor demand plays a
role at all but primarily on how it has shaped the ways
irregular employment is used in the two sectors. In
examining the role of labor supply, I ask to what extent
there has been an overlap between firm needs and worker
preferences and characteristics. Looking for such an
overlap assumes a milder version of the role of labor supply
than one which would have workforce preferences unilaterally
drive all use of irregular employment.
This discussion of the relative effects of labor demand
and labor supply factors starts first with the national
context for irregular employment and then moves on to the
experience of the banking and insurance sectors. Needless
to say, patterns that are at play in the national economy
may not apply to the two sectors. All the same, the
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national evidence on workforce characteristics and
preferences provides the context for understanding workforce
behavior in these two sectors.
What it means for irregular employment to be driven by labor
supply as opposed to labor demand.
To argue, on one hand, that irregular employment is
driven primarily by the labor supply is to contend that the
workforce in these arrangements has characteristics distinct
from those of the regular workforce in terms of preferences
and availability for certain schedules and types of work
attachment. The workforce in irregular arrangements is
expected to have a distinct pattern of labor market
participation and irregular arrangements fit its needs.
On the other hand, irregular employment if demand
driven is tailored to fit firm needs. Firms structure job
opportunities that include irregular arrangements and
workers take these for lack of better employment options.
The premise of the case study of banking and insurance
is to document how firms use irregular employment. My
starting point is to develop an account based on how
employers view their use. By definition, this project is
bound to provide more information on the ways in which firm
demand drives the use of irregular employment than it does
on labor supply characteristics.
235
Before discussing evidence from the banking and
insurance cases, I discuss briefly the evidence from the
national economy.
The aggregate picture for irregular employment- the context
for research on irregular employment
The terms of the national debate on irregular
employment help us understand how research questions were
cast and have structured the available results discussed
below. In the French contexts for policy, industrial
relations and research, irregular employment is usually
depicted as a group of arrangements that arose to fit firm
needs rather than workforce preferences. This view prevails
for CDDs (limited duration contracts) and for temp help
contracts. It is more mixed for part-time.
CDDs in particular are pictured as employment contracts
designed to fit firm needs for an attachment of lesser
degree than the standard, implicit, contract of
indeterminate duration (CDI) .1 In the section outlining
the history of regulation on CDDs, we saw that the need to
legislate CDDs arose in response to their growing use in
sectors with a norm of long term employment and as a
consequence of the growth of worker rights under the
standard contract. In the latter half of the 1970s, as the
terms of standard employment contracts granted more codified
protection against layoff and discharge, then CDDs with
Contrat A Dur6e Indeterminee.
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their explicitly limited duration of employment grew in
their appeal to, and use by, firms.
Much of the research on CDDs and temp employment has
focused on the movement of workforces between unemployment
and these arrangements. The national context of high rates
of unemployment and of low job creation has given emphasis
to studies of workforce flux and of employer hiring
practices (see Audibert, 1980; Audier, 1983,1985; Corbel,
Guergoat and Laulh6, 1986; INSEE, 1980; Voisin, 1989.)
Temp employment is viewed, even by temp help service
business associations, as a transitory situation on the way
to employment either under a regular contract or a CDD.
Temp recruitment advertisements usually specify whether or
not an assignment is in view of possible future hiring so as
to send the appropriate worker. Unlike in the U.S., temp
services do not apply a penalty when a user firm recruits a
temp worker. Temp services see their mission mostly as
facilitating access to (any) employment and only partly as
meeting the needs of segments of the workforce for
intermittent employment.
A survey commissioned by PROMATT, the leading temp help
service business association, emphasized workforce movement
into stable employment rather than worker preferences or
characteristics. In survey results, about three fourths of
people who worked as temps in January 1989 responded
affirmatively to having entered temp employment "in hopes of
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finding permanent employment during an assignment" (73
percent) and/or because they "could not find anything else."
(77 percent) 2 In the same sample, 39 percent reported
looking for work experience. Only 18 percent answered
affirmatively that they had entered temp employment because
they wanted intermittent employment. Of those workers who
were still temps in July 1989 (57 percent of the January
sample), 66 percent were still temps because they had not
found other employment and 32 percent because temp
employment suited their needs.
In an earlier survey, temp wQrkers demonstrated a
similar lack of interest in temp employment. In a 1980
national labor force survey supplement, 17 percent of temp
workers declared that temp employment suited them whereas 60
percent were looking for stable employment. Younger women
were less inclined toward temp employment than older women
temp workers; 11 percent of those under 25 reported
satisfaction versus 32 percent of those over 25. 3
Perspectives on part time arrangements, however, are
more mixed. In some sectors part-time is a job benefit for
2 Survey conducted by Institut Frangais de l'Opinion
Publique (IFOP) for PROMATT in July 1989. A representative
sample of 10,000 persons who were temp workers in January 1989
were interviewed in July 1989 as to their motivations for having
entered temp employment and their employment situation 6 months
prior to temp employment and at the time of survey (PROMATT,
1989).
3 INSEE, Enquete Emploi of October 1980 reported in Huet and
Schmitz, 1984, p. 54.
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the existing workforce: firms do not hire on part-time and
only convert existing full-time workers to part-time (banks,
insurance, national and local governments). In other
sectors, it has become the prevailing form of hiring during
the 1980s (retail trade). Moreover, government policy
since the early 1980s has sought to encourage the
availability of part-time schedules to workers who prefer
them both as a social benefit and as part of a national
policy to "share" (spread around) employment. 4 Observers
have pointed out, however, that the rapid growth of part-
time in the economy as a whole started as early as 1975 thus
preceding the implementation of these policies (Letablier,
1986). Research on part-time arrangements has looked both
at worker preferences and choices (Kergoat, 1984) and the
structure of job opportunities (Maruani and Nicole, 1988).
To give less weight to labor supply effects and,
correspondingly, more weight to labor demand effects, we
only need argue that the workforce in irregular employment
does not bear the characteristics expected of such
workforce. Even if it does, however, aggregate statistics
do not evaluate the extent of choice and availability of
alternatives per se.
4 Since 1970, government employees have benefitted from a
relative ease of access to half-time employment. For private
wage and salary workers (includes workers in nationalized firms),
a law of 1981, reinforced in the 1982 ordinances, removed all
relative over charges for part-time in terms of social benefits
and legal obligations.
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If irregular employment is a phenomenon that is
primarily supply-driven, its workforce should have labor
market characteristics such as weak attachment to work,
limited employment experience (lower job skills), and
restricted availability for year round, long term
employment. It is also expected to prefer non standard
schedules (part-time, part-year) because of involvement in
other activities. Women, particularly women with young
children, youths and older workers are likely candidates for
irregular arrangements. These are the workforces often
associated with irregular employment in industrial
societies. Foreign-stock workers, recent immigrants or
guest workers, are also expected to concentrate in irregular
employment. The situation of foreign-stock workers is
covered only slightly in this study because they concentrate
in Manufacturing and Construction and are not well
represented in clerical employment in banking and insurance,
the two sectors studied in detail here.
YOUTHS AND LABOR FORCE ENTRANTS
One characteristic singles out workers in irregular
employment, particularly in CDDs and temp contracts; many
are labor force entrants or re-entrants. Economy-wide,
irregular arrangements constitute the first form of
employment for a broad segment of labor force entrants.
Also, the unemployed tend to become re-employed via
irregular employment, particularly young workers. Voisin
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(1989) points out that young workers are more likely to
leave unemployment than older workers but are also more
likely, if hired, to end up in irregular employment. In
August 1986, 8,238 persons registered with the national
unemployment service (Agence Nationale pour l'Emploi) were
randomly selected for repeated interviews.5 Of workers
under 25 years of age, 58 percent of males and 48 percent of
females were employed in November 1987 (18 mos later).
Corresponding numbers for the age group 25-49 were 51 and 35
percent respectively. For persons over 50, only 12 percent
of males and the same amount of females had found any form
of employment. However, for those persons under 25 who had
found employment, a minority had found regular full-time
employment (CDI); 45 percent of males and 33 percent of
females. The majority had been rehired in non-standard
employment; 23 percent of males and 17 percent of females
were hired on CDD or temp assignments. The balance was
recruited into a broad range of government sponsored
internships and apprenticeships programs designed for
youths; many of these are part-time(see Voisin, 1989).
Evidence from an earlier survey also shows the
concentration of youths in CDDs and temp assignments. Of
149,600 males with CDDs in an October 1980 national survey,
55 percent were aged 15-24. Of the 150,200 females with
5 They were interviewed then and three times over an 18
months period.
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CDDs in the survey, 59 percent were in the same age
category. The incidence of CDDs (share of employment) in
total wage and salary employment for this age group was 5.9
percent for males, as compared to 1.9 percent for males as a
whole. The incidence for females in this age group was 8.2
percent as opposed to 3.3. percent for females as a whole.
--CDDs: 1980 --
Age distribution Share of group's
employment
% %
Males 100 1.9
15-24 55 5.9
25-39 32 1.5
40+ 13 0.7
Females 100 3.3
15-24 59 8.2
25-39 30 2.5
40+ 11 1.0
Total 100 2.5
15-24 57 6.9
25-39 31 1.8
40+ 12 0.8
Source: Private non-agricultural wage and salary employment,
Supplement to Enquete Emploi, October 1980 (1/300 sampling)
from Huet et Schmitz, 1984: 53.
For temps, the age distribution was less skewed for
males than females. Forty-two percent of the 103,300 male
temps in the same survey were under 24 years old; another 42
percent were aged 25-39. For female temps, 54 percent were
under 24; another 35 percent were aged from 25 to 39. Temp
assignments may be used with greater frequency by males with
labor market experience (older) than by females.
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--TEMPS: 1980--
Age distribution Share of group's
employment
Males 100 1.3
15-24 42 3.1
25-39 42 1.3
40+ 16 0.6
Females 100 1.1
15-24 54 2.5
25-39 35 1.0
40+ 11 0.3
Total 100 1.2
15-24 46 2.8
25-39 39 1.2
40+ 15 0.5
Source: Huet-Schmitz, 1984:53
Among recent recruits in 1980, the incidence of CDDs
and temps was all the greater (recent recruits are defined
as wage and salary workers at work for under 12 months
preceding the survey). For males, CDDs accounted for 12
percent of new hires under 25, and 8 percent of those 25 and
over. Temps accounted for 5 percent of male recent hires
under 25, and 6 percent of those over 25. For female recent
hires, 19 percent of those under 25 were hired under CDD,
and 10 percent of those 25 and over. Corresponding figures
for the incidence of temp employment for female recruits are
5 percent and 3 percent respectively.'
This pattern of concentration of youths in irregular
employment may be interpreted either as driven by labor
demand, irregular employment being the prevalent form of
6 Huet et Schmitz, 1984: 54. Data source is same as above.
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hiring (the first step out of unemployment), or by labor
supply, young workers entering the market with steadily
lower job skills and constituting a higher risk for firms,
thus the use of temporary assignments. Boths arguments have
been advanced and aggregate statistics do not effectively
confirm either explanation. Studies of how the structure of
employment opportunities has changed and those which survey
workforce preference allow us to assess each claim and are
reviewed below.
GENDER BREAKDOWN OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
1.National evidence on part-time:
Part-time (PT) is overwhelmingly a female phenomenon
although it grew faster among male workers during the 1980s.
Because of the peculiarities of French published statistics,
I present two part-time statistics: one for workers working
under 40 hours (usually around 32 to 35 hours) and one for
those working under 30 hours. Before 1982, only those
reporting under 30 hours per week of usual employment were
counted as part-time (table VI-i). After 1982, the national
labor forced survey counted as part-time any one reporting
under 40 weekly hours and all workers who self-report as
part-timers without question (work less than the regularly
scheduled hours in their work place).
Neither of these definitions fits the U.S. definition
of 35 hours or less, although most part-timers included in
the post 1982 definition likely work under 35 hours. For
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instance, 11.6 percent of the total private and public wage
and salary workforce worked under 40 hours in 1987 and the
bulk, 9.3 percent of the total workforce, worked under 30
hours. I discuss primarily statistics which use the broader
1982 definition of part-time, the earlier definition being
useful only- because it allows documentation of longer time
trends .7
Women are the bulk of PT workers; in 1987, they account
for 83.9 percent of part-timers as opposed to 43.2 percent
of total private and public wage and salary employment.'
This concentration of women in PT jobs is even greater than
in the U.S. where they constitute about 60 percent of part-
timers and share these jobs with significant numbers of
youths and retirees.
In 1987, the incidence of PT is 11.6 percent for women
and 3.3 percent for men. Over time, however, the share of
PT in male employment grew from 2.0 percent in 1982 to 3.3
percent in 1987. Male PT employment, while considerably
smaller than female part-time, has grown faster during the
1980s, a 55 percent total growth from 1982 to 1987, as
7 The rate of part-time employment is reported here for both
private and public sector employment. Unlike CDDs and temp
contracts which were not reported for the public sector (which
has a separate employment classification), part-time is. I
report both private and public figures partly because of the
constraints of published data but also because part-time
developed first in the public sector.
8 Because women's jobs concentrate heavily in national and
local government, they constitute a greater share of the total
workforce than they do of private employment.
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compared to a 36 percent growth for females over the same
period.
Women are more likely to work part-time if they combine
family responsibilities with paid employment. Duvernet
(1987: 19) notes that 27 percent of PT wage and salary
workers never work on Wednesday, the weekly school break.
For 1980, Huet and Schmitz (1984: 51) report that the
incidence of PT among women wage and salary workers
increases with the number of children: 13 percent of part-
timers among women workers with one child, 20 percent for
those with two children, and 30 percent for those with more
than 2 children. 9 Women workers over 40, however, have
higher rates of PT than younger women either because they
work in sectors and occupations with high prevalence of PT
schedules (personal services, child care, housekeeping,
cleaning) or because they are close to retirement age and
want light schedules.
Part-time, among all forms of irregular employment, is
that whose growth is most likely to be driven by the
scheduling needs and preferences of the workforce.
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that even the growth of
part-time through the 1980s, has components driven primarily
by labor demand. Letablier (1986) draws a distinction
between two types of part-time. "Social part-time", that is
9 Authors' analysis based on statistics from Enquete Emploi,
March 1980.
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part-time promoted by policy to "share the work" only takes
place through transformation of full-time (FT) workers into
part-timers and almost exclusively in establishments with
200+ workers. "Economic part-time" jobs are created mostly
through recruiting workers on PT schedules, in the trade and
services sectors with small establishments being the most
intensive users (p.24). The author further notes that PT
jobs "created" through transformation usually are more
qualified than those created through recruiting.10
It is easier to argue that PT jobs of the "social"
type, created on a formally voluntary basis, by converting
the schedule of incumbent workers is at least in part a
phenomenon driven by the characteristics of the labor
supply. It is more problematic to argue with a high degree
of certainty that all the PT recruiting, "economic part-
time", has taken place to meet workforce needs. For
instance, from 1975 to 1981, the rates of PT employment for
women wage and salary workers under 25 were lower (2-5
percentage points) than those of women aged 25 to 39,
supporting notions that child rearing affects women's
likelihood of being in PT employment (Letablier, 1986).
However, the situation changed by 1986. Duvernet (1987)
points out that in 1986 (Enquete Emploi) the share of part-
1 This distinction resembles that drawn by Tilly (1989)
between retention and secondary part-time. However, "social
part-time" has not been used to retain valuable workers so much
as to phase out progressively some workers until full retirement.
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timers was greater among women under 25 than among their 25
to 49 year old counterparts. This was true even after
excluding from the count young women in government
subsidized internship programs for youths (mostly PT jobs).
Additionally, the 25-49 age bracket includes women who are
older than those included in the earlier study, and whose
rates of PT are even higher, thus making the increased
incidence of PT among those under 25 all the more striking.
In the 1986 survey, of women part-timers under 25, 30.8
percent reported searching for full-time work as compared to
9.3 percent of those 25-39 and 10.4 percent of part-timers
of all ages. At least in 1986, the incidence of PT is
higher among very young women than among middle-aged ones
even though the younger women are more likely to want full-
time employment than the older cohort.
2. National evidence on temps: The demographic composition
of the workforce in the temporary help supply industry
mainly represents the industry composition of the pool of
user firms. Workers in the January 1989 survey sample
discussed earlier (PROMATT, 1989) are predominantly male (71
percent) because the temp industry caters to demand from the
Construction and Manufacturing sectors which accounted for
68 percent of all temp assignments in 1987.11 Temp workers
" Statistics from Ministere du Travail, cited in PROMATT,
1989a. Detailed statistics from an earlier survey provide
similar statistics. Construction accounted for 21.6 percent of
temp work-years in 1982 and 23.8 percent in 1986. In the same
years, Manufacturing accounted for 45.9 percent and 49.8 percent
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in these sectors are usually on full-time, if intermittent,
assignments. If preference for part-time or intermittent
work schedules were an overriding factor, we would have
expected temp employment to locate primarily in sectors with
heavy female workforce representation.
The national labor force survey, Enquete Emploi, also
underscores the disproportionate representation of males in
temp employment (table VI-2). Male workers accounted for
61.2 percent of temp workers in 1982 and 69.5 percent in
1988. These proportions are greater than the male share of
the workforce which declined from 63.2 percent in 1982 to
61.2 percent in 1988. As a result, the incidence of temp
employment for males grew steadily from 0.9 percent of male
employment in 1982 to 1.4 percent in 1988 whereas it
remained around 0.99 percent of the female workforce in
these years ( it even declined in between these two end
years to a low of 0.75 percent).
The concentration of males in temp employment in France
differs dramatically from that for the United States. The
fact that temps are overwhelmingly male in France and female
in the United States says more about the nature of demand by
user firms and about the history of the temp help service
sector in each country than it does about workforce
preferences. In order for workforce characteristics to be
respectively. Note that work-year is a full time equivalent
measure which is different from a count of individual assignments
regardless of duration. See Henry et Guergoat, 1989.
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an overriding factor, we would have to find significant
similarities between the scheduling needs of female temp
workers in the U.S. and male temp workers in France. In
fact, temp workers are primarily male in France because the
two largest customers are sectors with predominantly male
workforces; construction and manufacturing." These two
sectors are small but fast growing users of male temp
workers in the United States as well. 3
The French temp workforce was not always predominantly
male, however. Rather, the gender composition of the
industry's workforce has evolved to follow the industry
composition and needs of user firms. As Huet and Schmitz
(1984) recount, women were the majority of the temp
workforce in 1962. They were slightly over represented in
1968, accounting for 40 percent of the temp industry's
workforce as compared to 34 percent of the total wage and
salary workforce. Later on, most of the industry's growth
came from unskilled jobs in manufacturing thus leading to
the decline of female employment in the industry. The share
of women in temp employment declined from 38 percent on
January 1, 1970 to 30 percent on January 1,1975 to 28
12 Earlier studies also confirmed the use of temp workers
in these two sectors. See Germe et Michon, 1978; Tallard, 1983;
Centre d'Etude de l'Emploi, 1979.
13 Plewes, 1987; Carr6, forthcoming 1992.
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percent on January 1, 1981."4 The under representation of
women comes from their concentration outside of
manufacturing jobs (three fourths of women work outside blue
collar jobs) and the fact that women in manufacturing work
in sectors that are light users of temp workers (Huet et
Schmitz, 1984: 45).
An anecdote told by a PROMATT representative
illustrates the role of user firm demand in construction.
In the early 1980s, the Paris construction sector went
through a major economic downturn; major employers cut their
workforce permanently only to find themselves short of
specific workers (such as site foremen) in the late 1980s,
hence the heavy demand for construction workers in specific
trades from the temp industry.
The industry composition of user firms drives the
concentration of male workers in temp employment. In
banking and insurance, however, most temp workers are female
because both sectors hire women primarily in the clerical
positions in which they hire temps as well.
Foreign-stock workers are over-represented in temp
employment as compared to their share of the workforce. In
one report, all foreign workers accounted for 11.6 percent
of temps in 1984 but accounted for only 9.4 percent of the
14 Data source used by the authors is the establishment file
of the UNEDIC, the unemployment insurance fund run jointly by
employer and union representatives.
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regular permanent workforce during the same year.'5 These
workers concentrate on low-skill occupations in construction
and manufacturing.
3. National evidence on CDDs:
The incidence of CDDs in total employment grew steadily
from 1982 through 1988 from 2.2 to 4.1 percent of total
private wage and salary employment (excludes salaried
workers of national and local government but not those of
nationalized enterprises) (Enquete Emploi; table VI-2).16
Throughout the period, males account for the majority of
workers on CDDs but are under-represented as compared to
their share of the private wage workforce. Correspondingly,
females are over-represented in the CDD workforce relative
to their share of the total workforce. The incidence of CDD
employment is thus greater among women workers (2.7 percent
in 1982; almost 5 percent in 1988). For males, CDDs
accounted for almost 2 percent of employment in 1982 and
grew to 3.6 percent in 1988.
Women are indeed more likely to find themselves hired
under CDDs. So are young workers as demonstrated by the
survey discussed above (Voisin, 1989).
15 In earlier years, they accounted for an even larger share
of temps; 17.7 percent in 1982 and 15.7 percent in 1983.
(Statistics from Ministbre du Travail and Enquete Emploi reported
in table 6, p. 203 in Tableaux Economiques, 1986.)
16 Data on CDDs and temps concern only the private wage and
salary workforce. The national and local governments have a
different way of classifying workers because of the civil service
system.
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THE PREFERENCE FOR REGULAR, FULL-TIME, EMPLOYMENT AMONG
WORKERS IN IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT
Aggregate statistics on irregular employment paint an
ambiguous picture of the relative role of labor supply and
labor demand effects in the growth of irregular employment.
Evidence presented in published research weighs rather
heavily in favor of labor demand explanations of the growth
of irregular arrangements. If these arrangements fit the
needs of segments of the workforce, it may be in being a
gateway from inactivity to employment, particularly for
young workers with limited job skills. For these young
workers, irregular arrangements add themselves to a long
list of government sponsored internships and apprenticeships
as means of potential access to stable employment.
Statistics from the March 1986 national employment
survey indicate worker preferences for regular, FT,
employment. Worker reports of job search indicate that 28.2
percent of those under CDDs and 44.8 percent of those in
temp employment were looking for another permanent job.
These proportions compare to a 5.9 percent rate of job
search for the total employment workforce in the survey.
Rates of job search are even higher for those under 25 years
of age. For these, 32.1 percent of young workers under CDD
and 49.4 percent of young temp workers were looking for
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permanent employment." Rates of job search were higher
for women than for men, especially for women under 25.
Part-time workers in the same survey have high rates of
search for full-time employment. Men of all ages and young
women have higher rates. Rates of job search are
particularly high for part-time workers (excluding those on
govenment subsidized internships) working less than 30 hours
per week. Heller (1986) notes that, overall, the rate of
job search of those working under 30 hours is twice as high
as that for those working 30 or more hours (11.6 percent
versus 5.6 percent). Women who work 30 hours or more have
rates of job search no different from those of women working
full-time (4.8 percent versus 4.4 percent). Women working
under 30 hours, particularly women under 25 among whom this
type of schedule is relatively widespread, have
significantly higher rates of job search (35.9 percent for
young women) (Heller, 1986:33).
" Table from Duvernet, 1987 who used data from Enquete
Emploi and Heller (1986).
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RATE OF JOB SEARCH: 1986
(%)
Total Under 25 25-49
Search for another permanent job
Employed workforce 5.9 17.8 5.2
M 5.1 14.5 4.9
F 6.9 21.6 5.6
Temps 44.8 49.4 43.9
M 43.5 45.9 43.7
F 48.1 57.8 44.3
Under CDD 28.2 32.1 26.4
M 23.8 26.6 22.6
F 32.7 38.7 29.7
Search for another full-time salaried job
PT employed workforce 13.6 41.3 9.5
M 23.5 38.9 23.8
F 11.6 42.6 9.5
-excl.internships*/ 10.4 30.8 9.3
M 17.9 26.5 23.5
F 9.1 32.8 7.7
FT employed workforce 4.5 12.7 4.3
M 4.6 12.0 4.6
F 4.4 13.6 3.7
Note: This category excludes workers in government
subsidized internships which are usually part-time.
Source: Heller, 1986: 33. Data from Enquete Emploi, March
1986.
Analyses of survey results on the reasons why employed
workers are looking for another job provides more
information on worker preferences for steadier employment.
In 1986, 39 percent of all those who look for work do so to
find "less precarious" employment and 37 percent to find
"better" employment. In the survey question, looking for
"less precarious" employment simply means that there is a
fear or a certainty that the current job will end. Looking
for "better" employment means better paid, or more suited to
one's skill level. (The balance of job searchers fall under
the "diverse reasons" category.) Overall, 36 percent of
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male and 42 percent of female job searchers report "less
precarity" as the reason for their job search. Job
searchers working in irregular employment cite looking for
less precarity more frequently as the reason for their
search: 72 percent of those under CDD, 76 percent of temps,
and 41 percent of part-timers (internships excluded) do so.
From 1983 to 1986, the desire for "less precarious"
employment grew as motive for job search in all categories
of workers except for temps for whom it stayed level.'8
THE ROLE OF FIRM DEMAND AND OF LABOR SUPPLY PREFERENCES
IN THE USE OF IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN INSURANCE AND BANKING:
EVIDENCE FROM THE CASES
Earlier, I argued that the use of irregular employment
in banks and insurance companies does not readily fit
predictions derived from the dual labor market model. The
latter's adoption by researchers has led them to equate
irregular employment with secondary employment, to associate
its use with increased uncertainty and instability in
product markets, and to predict a growing share of secondary
employment in the economy. Instead, I tie the use of
irregular employment by French banks and insurance companies
to the transformation of their system of employment;
irregular employment being a strategic tool in this
18 Analysis of Enquete Emploi for March 1983 and 1986
conducted by Heller, 1986:31.
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transition, without its use generating a large number of
secondary jobs.
The dual labor market model portrays the use of
irregular employment as driven primarily, though not
exclusively, by firm demand. In the case of Banking and
Insurance, I also argue that the use of irregular employment
is shaped by firms' needs, even if the character of labor
demand in these two sectors differs from that depicted by
current predictions from the dual model. Common predictions
would point to a growing "secondary" portion of employment
in the two sectors.
In the following, I describe how firm demand for labor
has shaped the ways in which irregular arrangements are used
in the two sectors. Firms offer irregular arrangements to
the workforce in ways that shape the broad outlines of their
use.
The ways in which irregular employment is driven by firm
demand.
First, irregular employment is demand driven in a
simple way. Personnel departments did not go out and survey
workers, existing and potential, to find out their
preferences for particular schedules, or employment
arrangement.
Second, while irregular arrangements per se have not
been created by firms in the sector, the timing and form of
their introduction has been tailored by firm needs. For
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instance, as will be discussed below, the option to convert
to a part-time schedule is desired by broad segments of the
workforce but has spread rapidly, starting in the mid 1980s,
only among workers whose presence in the workplace firms
want to reduce.
Third, firm requirements regarding the education levels
of their new permanent recruits has driven their demand for
irregular employment, as we will see below. They have
raised their recruiting standards for all entry-level
positions and contend that, for some tasks, they cannot find
the entry-level workers they would want to keep. As a
result, they fill-in positions with workers on short-term
assignments in view of either screening or simply getting
the work done until a suitable candidate is hired. These
high recruiting requirements drive firm recourse to CDDs and
temps in particular.
The hiring requirements adopted by banks and insurance
companies during the 1980s are very high by French standards
and as compared to the history of both sectors. The
slackness of the national labor market has enabled firms to
raise their standards this high. Some observers, union and
non union, argue that recruiting standards are also
exceedingly high given the salaries and opportunities for
training, promotion and advancement which even permanent
hires will obtain in the middle run. As a result, irregular
arrangements provide an avenue for firms to maintain
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exceedingly high recruiting standards while getting the job
done in the medium term.
Fourth, irregular employment is driven by the character
of labor demand in yet another simple way. Banks and
insurance companies would not rely upon irregular employment
in these ways during the current period had they managed
their workforce over the past 15 to 20 years to facilitate
training and job change. While this assessment can only be
made in hindsight, it nevertheless underscores the weight of
past firm practices in current uses of irregular
arrangements.
PART-TIME
Of the three forms of irregular employment discussed
here, part-time is the one where there is has been the
greatest overlap between workers preferences and firms
needs. This because, in these two sectors, part-time is a
job benefit promoted by government and unions. Part-time
employment is created only through the conversion of the
schedules of existing workers from full-time to part-time.
This conversion is voluntary, at least formally. The
collective bargaining agreements in each sector prohibit
hiring on part-time schedules. Employers have not sought to
change this restriction in recent bargaining rounds because,
unlike the retail trade sector, they do not plan to create
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large numbers of part-time shifts for reasons we will
discuss below.
Part-time is a job benefit
Before becoming a tool for phased workforce reduction,
part-time was, and continues to be, a job benefit encouraged
by government policies of 1981-82 for increased hours
variability and total hours reduction (Amenagement et
R6duction du Temps de Travail). These worktime management
policies were also pursued by unions in the two sectors as
part of their general goal of achieving a shorter workweek.
Insurance sector unions, in particular the socialist led
CFDT, have made worktime management and reduction one of
their priorities. The availability of part-time, along with
flexitime, is a source of sense of achievement.
As discussed in the previous chapter, part-time
consists of the voluntary conversion of workers' schedules.
Workers incur a reduction of their wage income but not of
benefits when they switch to part-time. Some but not all
firms guarantee the right to return to full-time schedules.
Firms' discovery of part-time
In the mid 1980s banks and insurance companies made an
opportunistic use of part-time schedules to facilitate
movement in their otherwise stagnant system of employment
and workforce composition. In so doing, they tapped into
long-standing desires for shorter schedules by parts of
their workforce.
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Banks, in particular, and insurance companies seized
upon part-time to meet several goals. By offering and
encouraging its use by categories of workers slated for
reduction, firms could: 1/ save on wage costs though not on
benefits; 2/ free up a fragment of their personnel budgets
for hiring new workers in other positions; 3/ reduce the
presence of workers in some work settings where task
reorganization was being undertaken and 4/ greate jobs, an
implicit obligation to the government which large
nationalized banks and insurance companies have.
This approach to creating new positions by saving on
the wages of existing workers is piecemeal because it takes
several workers to go on part-time to free up enough budget
monies to cover the wage and employer contribution to social
benefit programs for one full-time worker. Not to mention
that the position to be created usually occurs at a higher
wage rate than that of workers whose wage cost is saved.
Nevertheless, the fact that a piecemeal approach to funding
hiring appeals to recruiting officers is a testimonial to
how constricted hiring budgets have been in the 1980s.
The rapid growth of part-time use as a tool to "free up"
budget monies to create new positions is more widespread
among banks than insurance companies although recruiting
officers in some insurance companies talked explicitly about
this practice as well.
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The clearest statement of opportunistic use of part-
time to solve firm difficulties with funding recruiting
comes from one of the three largest (formally fully
nationalized) banks. Part-time grew faster in this bank in
the late 1980s than in the other large banks (from 0 percent
in 1983 to 8 percent in 1986.) In 1989, in the face of
reaching the limits of worker demand for part-time, as other
banks have, the bank instituted a policy of offering workers
to pay them 60 percent of their wage for 50 percent
attendance. As an added incentive, the bank offered to
maintain the same rate of seniority-based promotion among
part-timers as among full-timers. This policy was
instituted for the sole purpose of reducing the numbers of
workers at work at a given point in time and was aimed at
those workers the bank considers a liability because of
their low education level and high seniority. Reducing
their presence in the workforce not only cuts wage costs but
allows for faster and smoother work reorganization.
Evidence that firms use part-time as a workforce
management tool, and with greater eagerness than workers, is
reinforced by the following observations:
. by the late 1980s, banks and insurance companies
bumped into the limits of voluntary worker demand for part-
time schedules, at least of the kind made available. When
confronted with this limit, some firms instituted incentives
to increase the use of part-time by Employes in jobs slated
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for reductions and by Middle level workers with high
seniority.
. Banks and insurance companies have offered part-time
schedules almost exclusively to workers in the departments
slated for job reduction and where task reorganization is
underway.
. Workers in the crop of young recruits who are
currently training for future job advancement are
discouraged (although not prohibited) from asking to go
part-time or even face outright refusal because their job
are deemed too important to turn part-time. This is also
true of the High (cadres) category.
. Some firms prohibit return to full-time so as to have
a certainty of reduced costs. Unions are fighting to make
the option to return full-time to a job of equal pay grade a
guaranteed right under the collective bargaining agreement
in both sectors.
Overall, firms use part-time as a simple way to reduce
workforce size (measured in full-time equivalent), the wage
bill, and worker presence. They also see it as a way to
phase workers into progressive early retirement and thus
further reduce the size of the workforce.
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At least for now, firms have little interest in hiring
workers on part-time schedules as a way to save on labor
costs.
It would be a lot cheaper for these firms to hire
workers on part-time schedules, such as half time, if they
were allowed under collective bargaining and were they not
compelled by legislation to provide benefits to their part-
time workforce. Part-time shifts have been used extensively
by North American banks and insurance companies to save on
labor costs and provide extended business hours.
There is little interest in the systematic use of part-
time of this kind among French firms in both sectors.
First, there are restrictions on business hours extension
both in legislation and in collective bargaining which
reduce the need for short shifts." Unless practices
change deeply as they have begun to in retail trade, there
will be no great need for short shifts for a long while.
Second, as already noted, collective bargaining and the
personnel practices of the sectors preclude savings on
benefits by the conversion of full-time jobs into part-time
ones. Firms can save on wages but cannot eliminate all
benefits as they can in the United States. Third, the
organization of production and the socio-institutional
19 Banking, particularly the networks of large banks, is
affected by a March 31, 1937 law on opening hours for tellers
which mandates the uniform distribution of weekly hours across
five days with two consecutive days off (one must be Sunday). See
AFB, Rapport Annuel, 1988: 22.
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setting being what they are, there is a profound lack of
interest in the systematic and wholescale use of part-time
jobs for back office or paper processing tasks. The lack
of interest may also be due to the perceived difficulties
with reorganizing work in ways that accomodate part-day
schedules. When asked whether he would hire people on part-
day, or part-week, schedules if allowed, a personnel
official of a large bank responded: "why would I want to do
that? It would not help our work." This is not to say that
the social and technological context could not change
sufficiently in several years' time for firm attitudes
toward part-time to change. Also, in the current
circumstances, part-time is most feasible for workers in
large centralized administrative services in Paris. These
workers have long commutes which make part-day options
unattractive.
Summary
Part-time did not come into existence because of firm
needs but it has grown and expanded in specific segments of
the two sectors because of firm strategies for employment
transformation. Part-time came into existence first as a
benefit promoted by government and unions; it became visible
in the early 1980s in the two sectors. It grew in the
latter part of the decade because firms in banking and
insurance seized upon it as a tool to reduce the workforce
size. It turned out to be an effective, if piecemeal tool,
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because workers wanted part-time schedules and because firms
provided incentives to make part-time more palatable. There
was an overlap of labor supply and demand characteristics in
,this case.
Given the opportunistic use of part-time which banks
and insurance companies have made, it is hard to predict the
incidence of it in the future once personnel departments
determine that they have downsized and recomposed their
workforce as planned.
TEMPORARY HELP SERVICE EMPLOYMENT
Temp contracts meet worker needs primarily in providing
them with access to some form of clerical employment, an
access which they might not gain otherwise given the office
skills they receive in the public education system. In
particular, temp service firms recruit, screen and train
secretarial workers in the new micro computer based office
technologies.
Banks and insurance companies use both temp contracts
and CDDs to keep a handle on the volume and permanency of
recruiting. In the next section, I discuss how these goals
play themselves out in the case of CDDs. Firm recourse to
temps, however, is geared to specific occupation and skill
needs and responds to the marketing strategies of temp help
service firms. It is more skill specific than the use of
CDDs.
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The novelty of micro computer skills and the use of temp
contracts
"The role of temp services is to make user firms
digest the progress in office technologies." (temp
service executive)
Temp contracts, and temp help services as institutions,
have played a significant role in the diffusion of new micro
computer based office technologies. These technologies
penetrated the banking and insurance sectors in the early
1980s. These two office environments had not witnessed any
significant technological innovation since the electric
typewriter. The introduction of mainframe computers during
the seventies had altered some paper processing jobs, but
for the most part office workers -secretaries, accountants,
filing and archive clerks- had experienced little change in
their day to day tasks.
The diffusion of new micro computer skills, primarily
familiarity with wordprocessing and spreadsheet software,
created a problem for firms, workers and the educational
system in the 1980s. It is not the fact that these skills
were more complex but the mere fact that they were new that
created difficulties of adjustment. For firms, which
latched onto these new technologies as a way to gain a
competitive edge, it was a matter of finding workers with
the needed skills in the labor market. Traditional in-house
training programs were ill-adapated to disseminating fast
changing technologies. For workers, it was a matter of
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gaining computer literacy and thus a job in a slack labor
market. For the educational system, it was a problem of
adjusting a curriculum of long courses to a fast changing
and varied software environment. In the gap created by the
slow adjustment of these actors, innovative office temp help
services developed a specialty in recruiting, screening and
training office workers (see the previous chapter).
The characteristics of the labor supply which contribute to
the use of temp contracts by banks and insurance companies
During the 1980s, young workers coming out of the
educational system faced an economic climate of low job
creation and few employment opportunities. They used temp
help service assignments to find employment and to gain
access to the few permanent clerical positions open in the
two sectors. They also used temp assigments to gain
computer literacy.
No interviewed personnel official mentionned that
workers they hired took temp assignments because they liked
intermittent work and moving around office settings. Had I
interviewed temp workers, I would have found some reporting
that they liked intermittent assignments; some report
satisfaction in temp industry surveys. I also would have
found workers who drew the full benefit of having software
literacy in high demand and preferred temporary assignments.
However, no personnel representative reported that they
could not retain temps once they offered them a permanent
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position as part of the regular workforce of a bank or
insurance company.
Firm needs which shape the use of temp contracts
Banks and insurance companies use temp contracts even
though their hourly costs are higher than those for CDDs.
Banks and insurance companies pay a premium for temp help
contracts for secretarial workers, office clerks and
specialized banking and insurance occupations. They do so
because temp contracts enable them to keep a handle on the
volume of permanent hiring and also because, through these
contracts, they can recruit workers with a set of skills
which cannot easily be acquired in the school system or
inside the firm. The use of temp contracts in the two
sectors results from the meshing of firm demand for new
skills and from the market strategies of the temp help
service industry.
1.Recruiting secretaries with temp contracts
Banks and insurance companies rely on temp help service
contracts to recruit secretaries with micro compter skills.
They do so for several reasons.
First, the two sectors have little history of investing
in the screening and further in-house training of low and
middle level clerical workers. These occupations have
traditionally had low priority in personnel policy because
tasks were simple enough to be performed by graduates of the
269
public vocational and regular school system at levels below
the 12th grade and with a modicum of on-the-job training.
Additionally, firms expected high turnover in this workforce
and got it; they saw little need to invest in these
occupations. During the 1980s, firms' reluctance to invest
in recruiting and training these workers was different.
Even if they were willing and posessed the know-how to
develop in-house training programs, they saw micro computer
skills as highly transferrable across firms and thus not
worthwhile of firm investment.
Second, banks and insurance companies do not want to
establish recruiting and training programs for secretarial
occupations when they have yet to decide on the occupations'
place in their future organization. The occupation of
"secretary" has been in transition through the 1980s and
firms have not decided upon its future within their
organization. Some contend that they expect to eliminate
secretarial positions altogether ("everyone will do their
own typing") and it is true that for the most part large
scale typing pools no longer exist. Others contend that
secretaries will be needed for all tasks they do other than
straight typing.
Third, banks and insurance companies have high
recruiting standards for the permanent hiring of
secretaries. They want secretaries with, enhanced,
traditional secretarial skills, such as writing and oral
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communication skills, but also versed in more than one word
processing and spreadsheet software packages. Few workers
with these skills came out of public education during the
1980s.20 Additionally, because of their indecision
regarding the future of secretaries, firms have not
redesigned secretarial positions sufficiently to retain
workers, with these skills and with work experience, who are
in high demand.
2. Using temp contracts for new middle level positions
"(Firms) come to us for what they cannot find." (temp
service executive)
Similarly, firms in the two sectors started in the late
1980s, and will continue in the 1990s, to create large
numbers of "new" middle level positions as they go through
employment restructuring and recombine tasks from existing
and eliminated jobs. These positions are middle-level non-
secretarial positions in administrative services and entail
skills that are specific to the two sectors. As firms lose,
through exit programs and attrition, workers they consider
obsolete and as they create positions that recombine tasks,
they encounter some difficulty finding workers with the
appropriate skills and professional experience. In addition
firms have decided to hire on the external market, something
with which they have little experience. Until the 1980s,
20 The entry-level secretaries coming out of the public
education system are at the level of "dactylo d6butante niveau
BTS" (Brevet de Technicien Superieur, a secondary vocational
degree).
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they generated recruits for middle level positions by
promoting workers through the ranks. For these reasons,
banks and insurance companies will increasingly need workers
recruited and screened by temp services, a service the temp
industry is eager to provide. For "hard to find" workers,
the temp help service usually works out a compromise with
the user firm to extend the temp contract duration so as to
recoup some of its recruiting costs.
3. Using temp contracts for all purpose clerical help
Banks and insurance companies also use temp contracts
for a number of general clerical tasks ("employes de
bureau") which are either of short duration or in positions
slated to disappear. In this case, the character of firm
demand is shaped by specific aspects of regulation. With
regulatory changes in 1986 and 1989, most restrictions on
the grounds for using temp contracts have been dropped;
these contracts are easier to use and administer than CDDs.
Thus, paying a premium in order to obtain full control of
the use of some clerical workforces, is still a worthwhile
option for personnel management.
Summary
Temp contracts in insurance and banking enable firms to
control their hiring levels and to gain access to workers
with needed micro computer based office skills. The
particular use they have made of temp contracts has resulted
from the meshing of their need for transition workers and of
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the services (screening and training) which the temp service
industry developed as its market niche in the eighties.
Labor supply characteristics enter into this picture through
the oversupply of workers from which temp services can do
extensive screening and through the limits of skills
provided by the public vocational education system. Out of
temp employment, workers stand to gain access to a permanent
position. For many in secretarial positions in particular,
it is the most common avenue to a permanent job.
CDDs (LIMITED DURATION CONTRACTS)
Perhaps even more than of part-time or temp contracts,
the use of CDDs is primarily driven by firm needs. CDDs
meet the needs of the workforce to the extent that they are,
in some cases, the only way to gain access to permanent
employment. Banks and insurance companies use CDDs in many
situations because they are a form of employment contract
that can fit any task. However, firms in both sectors
concentrate their use of CDDs on the hiring of workers in
the Employ6 and the Middle job categories as they do for the
other two forms of irregular employment.
It is difficult, almost impossible, to argue for labor
supply effects in the use of CDDs in the two sectors
Workers who are hired on CDDs would prefer to be hired
into permanent employment. It is difficult to argue
otherwise because the work performed by workers on CDDs does
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not differ from that of other workers in the same
department, most of the time. It also does not present some
of the advantages of temp employment such as employer
hopping21 or the access to training for computer use.
Worker preference for intermittent or unstable work probably
does not play a role in the presence of CDDs in the two
sectors; firms did not start using CDDs because of the
existence of a supply of workers only willing to work on
CDDs. Workers work on CDDs because it is the form in which
hiring takes place in many instances and because it might
lead to permanent employment. Thus, CDDs mesh with worker
preferences because the latter need jobs, the more so in a
slack labor market. As reported in the previous chapter,
hiring for Employ6 positions is usually on CDDs.
For workers, a CDD is a "foot in the door", potential
access to permanent employment. It is an opportunity to
prove themselves on the job for those workers who do not
meet the educational level required by firm hiring policies
and to obtain conversion to permanent employment. This is
the extent to which labor supply characteristics, the lack
of education in this instance, play any role in the use of
CDDs, albeit a relatively small one.
21 Although, as discussed above, even temp workers take
permanent positions when these are offered to them.
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The role of firm demand in the uses of CDDs.
As described in the previous chapter, firms use CDDs to
control the size of the workforce in the Employe category
and in the low rungs of the Middle category. In summary,
they use CDDs in three ways:
-for the systematic replacement of workers on maternity
and on sick leave whereas, during the period of employment
growth, they would have hired replacement workers on
permanent contracts and would have kept them as part of
their growing workforce;
-for screening potential permanent workers;
-for getting work done during a period of planning for
job destruction.
According to the terms of legislation, CDDs are meant
to be for short duration or idiosyncratic tasks, or for
replacement of absent workers. Banks and insurance
companies use them in this way but they have applied them to
uses which reflect qualitative needs derived from their plan
for transformation of their system of employment.
For replacements, CDD have become systematic in a
period of planned reduction of the Employ6 workforce in
administrative services. Firms can cancel the contract of
the replacement worker on CDD if the original worker does
not return. In effect, a position is cancelled. Because
the numbers of workers on maternity leave is large and quite
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a few do not return, the use of CDD is a "soft" way to
reduce workforce size in a targeted way.
When banks and insurance companies use CDDs for
screening, their practice is primarily opportunistics; they
use CDDs to extend the effective probationary period from
the legal limit of 3 months to a possible 24 months with a
CDD. In this case, they only avail themselves of CDDs
because they hesitate to hire permanent employees and
because CDDs are an easy way to buy time for their decision.
They also use CDDs because they are planning for skill
upgrading and change, do not want to hire workers with less
than "optimal" education level but need work done until
tasks are reorganized to retain "optimal" workers. During
the 1980s, banks and insurance companies could find the
workers with the preferred level of education in the labor
market so they were not driven to use workers on CDDs
because of a skill bottleneck. Rather, it is because they
have not reorganized tasks sufficiently to employ fully and
satisfactorily the preferred workforce of the future that
they hire workers with lower education levels essentially to
"get the job done" until deeper changes in work organization
are accomplished.
Lastly, the use of CDDs to keep a company's operating
while it is undergoing a radical and rapid restructuration
accompanied by massive, planned, job destruction cannot be
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described analytically in any other way than as being driven
by firm demand (see previous chapter).
CONCLUSION
In national surveys, the workforces in part-time, temp
or CDD employment exhibit a marked preference for employment
that is more stable and/or full-time. Most of these workers
see and use temp and CDD assignments as a means of access to
permanent employment. It is only in this way that temp and
CDD employment can be said to meet worker needs. Whether
workers are young and without employment experience, or
simply faced with the consequences of a slack labor market,
they benefit from irregular employment if the latter leads
to permanent employment. The evidence paints a more mixed
picture of part-time because it is, on one hand, a job
benefit for the regular workforce in some sectors and, on
the other, a primary form of hiring in other sectors.
The national evidence does not point to a clear pattern
of labor market participation by some workforces that would
compel firms to generate part-time, temp or CDD
arrangements. The evidence on the temp industry presents
unambiguously the case of an idiosyncratic form of
employment, which on the face of it could be a response to
worker needs for intermittent employment, and turns out to
have diffused primarily because of the needs of user firms
and the marketing strategies of temp services.
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Irregular employment in banking and insurance, its
characteristics and pace of introduction, have been governed
primarily by firm qualitative needs for easily recruited
workers with micro-computer skills and for workers to get
work done while waiting for full task reorganization. Its
use has also been driven by firms' need to make as few
committments of regular employment to low-skill workers as
possible and by the desire to cut employment rolls and total
labor costs. This study has for focus the characteristics
of firm demand and thus emphasizes the role for firm
practices. Nevertheless, the tenor of all interviews was
not one in which personnel officials portrayed their work as
a response to worker characteristics. Rather, they
described the work of their department as actively engaged
with a broad task of product and employment transformation
with the fall-out for the existing workforce, and for the
pool of potential hires, being conceived as a residual
category.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
The following conclusions have two main objectives.
One is to discuss what the next "steady state" of employment
would look like for insurance and banking and for the macro
labor market if "restruturing" strategies are a significant
component of firm practices in the 1990s.
The second objective is to discuss essential features
of the restructuring polar case and to ask whether the
banking and insurance cases are specific to France. These
essential features fall into two categories: organizational
features of the two sectors that have steered firms away
from core-periphery strategies; and socio-institutional
features that have mediated their adaptation strategies and
use of irregular employment. The issue of the role of
institutions in this case stands out because of obvious
contrasts between the French and American contexts for
employment. Both of these discussions have implications for
policy making as I first discussed in Chapter 1.
Before addressing these two broad issues, I first
consider the ways in which the French banking and insurance
cases are consistent with other accounts of transformation
of internal labor markets in the 1980s.
CONSISTENCIES WITH OTHER ACCOUNTS
First, the French banking and insurance cases confirm
the pervasiveness of irregular arrangements as a tool for
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workforce management. They permit the addition of a demand-
side explanation, other than the creation of a core-
periphery workforce structure, without invalidating the
presence of the latter strategy in other sectors. Irregular
arrangements, at least in the French economy, cover a range
of work experiences, jobs and demand-side strategies.
Second, the nature of market changes that have prompted
firms in the two sectors to alter their employment systems
are of the type described in the U.S. and French literature.
They differ in intensity, and not nature, from the market
changes affecting firms that have adopted core-periphery
strategies. The fact that these French firms operate in a
frame of regulation of financial and insurance products that
is distinct from the U.S. one (our point of reference) does
not seem to have rendered different their diagnostic of how
their markets have been impacted by the competitive
conditions of the 1980s. This context does affect, however,
the terms in which banks and insurance companies consider
possible alternatives for adapting their organizations.
Third, so far, banks and insurance companies intend to
implement the new computer technologies in ways that broaden
the range of tasks -decentralized access to account and
policy information, more developed customer service
functions-- and increase the responsibilities of Middle
level, and some Low category, clerical workers. The rapid
transition of the economic environment of these two sectors,
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from easy growth, to more difficult access to customers, was
accompanied by foreign companies' inroads in the domestic
market but also by the potential to move into other
countries' markets. This choice of planning to move into
other European markets may have pushed major French banks
and insurance companies to concentrate their use of computer
technologies on enhancing product, and service, quality and
on making sales efforts more aggressive; this is the account
that officials gave during interviews. It may have rendered
insufficient the option of looking to compete on simple cost
reduction achieved through deeper work fragmentation and
routinization and through a shift of the burden of risk onto
secondary workforces.
Fourth, these firms have certainly considered how to
reduce their labor cost as an adaptation strategy but not to
the degree that firms engaged in core-periphery strategies
seem to have. For the firms interviewed, labor cost
reductions do not need to be drastic and for the short term.
Rather, personnel officials are more concerned about long
term personnel cost "control." In this way, they have
articulated a workforce goal with an avowedly contradictory
nature. They need "new" educated workers who are trainable
and flexible but whose expectations of promotion and
compensation growth over the course of a career are not so
high as to constitute a financial burden to the firm.
Additionally, "not so high" for most workers likely means a
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lower rate of compensation growth over their career than
current Middle and High workers have experienced. As I
mentionned in previous chapters, it definitely means less
pay improvement for workers who stay in the Low category for
most of their career.
Fifth, the diffusion of post-secondary education has
also affected career ladders for Middle and High level
positions by making feasible recruiting from the outside and
lateral mobility. One aspect of the role of rising
education levels is particularly French; it is the emphasis
of diplomas as screening mechanisms. Banks and insurance
companies raised their recruiting standards as high as they
could, given a slack labor market (to at least two years of
post secondary education in most instances). They did so in
hopes of guaranteeing themselves a competitive edge in the
future. It is somewhat unclear, even to the companies
themselves, however, how they will use these educated
workers fully. These possibly "over educated" workers may
be easier to train than workers recruited in the 1960s with
an 8th grade education but they will probably be more
difficult to retain in the firm and even in each sector, and
some industry representatives have already expressed
concerns to that effect.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE EMPLOYMENT
What the next "steady state" of employment systems may
entail in insurance and banking
Before going on to the future steady state of
employment in insurance and banking, I must step back and
underscore historical aspects of employment in the two
sectors that may have steered them away from the core-
periphery strategy. The state of employment systems in the
two sectors in the late 1970s and early 1980s cannot easily
be described as a mix of "salaried" and "secondary"
arrangements to use the typologies developed by Osterman
(1989.) Instead, in French banking and insurance, low skill
clerical workers were integrated into firms' internal labor
markets even though they performed fragmented tasks,
experienced little job change, were expected by firms to
have high turnover and were in fact excluded from
significant job change. Moreover, they were covered by
internal labor market rules, not because of administrative
simplicity, but because bank and insurance management had
needed to attach these workers to the firm and had wanted to
generate in-house their pools of middle and high level
workers. Thus, by 1980, these firms had not fostered weak
institutional ties with their clerical workforces.
If banks and insurance companies indeed succeed in
transforming their employment systems and workforce
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composition as they plan to, then employment systems will
have the following features:
- A "salaried-type" employment system for professionals
and technical workers. These workers will be recruited from
the outside more frequently than in the past. Neverthless,
banks and insurance companies have great hopes of "grooming"
these workers in-house as cutting-edge knowledge of
technologies for marketing, data processing, and
communications becomes less scarce. In fact, personnel
departments in both sectors are working fast to find ways to
integrate all the new competencies into firm career ladders
so that they can better control their supply of such
workers.
-Middle level workers will also be in salaried-type
employment. They are the group whose jobs will have
experienced the greatest qualitative change. Their numbers
relative to clericals will have increased substantially.
Instead, they will operate in a work environment in which
they will be less responsible for direct hierarchical
supervision of large numbers of clericals. They will have
more responsibility for product quality, customer service,
and marketing that is, the direct generation of business for
either the bank or insurance company. Firms will recruit
these workers with the intent of retaining them. However,
many will have been recruited at fairly high levels of
education given the tasks they are expected to perform.
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Thus, retaining them may be more problematic than
previously. Providing them with career mobility will also
depend on each firm's ability to dispense with specialists
recruited from the outside. There probably will be more
lateral mobility (accross firms and outside each sector) of
these workforces than in the past.
-Low level clericals are the neglected category of the
transformation of employment systems planned by banks and
insurance companies. They have been recruited sparingly
throughout the 1980s. The main thrust of firm strategies,
and their main reason for using irregular employment, is to
reduce the size of this group and to renew the workers in
it, replacing high seniority workers, schooled in old work
practices and deemed untrainable, with younger more flexible
ones. Nevertheless, and because so much of firms strategies
has focused on numbers reduction, the relative neglect of
the design of the tasks and career ladders of this category
(as compared to the other two categories) will have
consequences for work effort and quality. One bank official
noted that all secretarial-type occupations are overdue for
career redesign as are a number of other teller-type
occupations. Firms have already experienced difficulties
retaining better educated workers in these positions.
Overall, however, menial tasks will not be completely
eliminated either by productivity-enhancing technologies or
by task recombination. One insurance personnel executive
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echoed comments made by several others: "we will still need
lots of little hands."' Who will be hired for these
positions and whether or not they will be encouraged to
turnover rapidly (or put another way, be given very few
incentives to stay) is very much an open question; personnel
departments have not given much thought to this worker
category. Their single strategy has been to raise the
education level at recruiting time. However, as of 1990,
they did not plan to design ways to push these workers on
the periphery of the firm either by subcontracting for
services or by expanding their use of irregular
arrangements. Nor did they plan to recruit "secondary
workforces" prone to high quit rates. If anything, they
plan to stabilize this workforce but keep it very small.
The question of whether this approach is feasible into the
1990s has no clear answer yet. It may turn out that, if the
two sectors are studied ten years hence, the employment
pattern for this workforce will be one of growing
"secondarization" but there were no clear sign of this in
1990.
Implications for the future structure of labor markets
As I discussed in the introduction, explanations of
irregular employment which subsume it under secondary
employment and tie its use to firm "core-periphery"
1"On aura toujours besoin de petites mains."
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strategies have a very clear prediction for the future of
labor markets. The latter will display a growing share of
secondary employment loosely attached to primary sector
firms as well as increased employment in periphery firms and
subcontractors. Models of the core-periphery strategy
predict a greater degree of labor market segmentation and
widened income distributions at the macro level.
Predictions are altered, however, if we accept that not
all use of irregular employment is part of core-periphery
strategies. The use of irregular employment for
"restructuring" prefigures reduced total employment in
primary firms once they have fully completed their
transition. Firms which follow restructuring strategies,
however, will not generate large numbers of low wage,
secondary jobs. They will stop providing numerous "average
pay" jobs to low education workers, however, and this will
have consequences for future workforces. (They will also
in the short term generate a significant number of early
retirees whose need for income replacement will be an issue
for firms and governments.)
Economy-wide, the presence of both core-periphery and
restructuring strategies, modifies the straightforward
prediction of quantitative change in the mix of primary and
secondary employment. (It also manifests the difffusion of
irregular employment across sectors with high flux and
uncertainty, as well as those with more limited variability
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in activity.) The relative preponderance of each strategy
across sectors and across firms will affect the degree of
changes to employment in primary sector firms and the nature
and volume of irregular arrangements. The predictions
derived from a characterization of firm practices across the
economy as spanning both polar strategies are less clear to
delineate than if only the core-periphery strategy were at
play. There is greater ambiguity in predictions precisely
because the restructuring strategy entails changes to what
has been understood to be primary employment and a revision
of acquired notions of irregular employment.
One straightforward prediction, however, is that the
more firms are steered away from the Core-Periphery
strategy, the lower the likelihood of growing
secondary/periphery employment economy-wide.
Another prediction is that it will be more difficult to
steer firms away from core-periphery strategies in sectors
and firms that, prior to the 1980s, had already developed
patterns of reliance on partially externalized workforce
with loose institutional attachments to the firm's internal
labor market. Additionally, firms in sectors with high
flux and uncertainty prior to the 1980s are more likely
candidates for adopting core-periphery strategies. For
example, low wage service sector firms such as food
retailers accentuated strategies of reliance on peripheral
workers, in the 1980s, that they had adopted in the 1970s.
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One study of French food retailing (CEREQ-ADEP, 1990)
indicates the presence of a growing part-time, high
turnover, female workforce with very limited promotion
options. For example, among large scale retailers, part-
time grew from 13.5 percent of the workforce in 1983 to 25.4
percent in 1988, the heaviest users being the
"hypermarkets."2 In this sector, part-time is not a
benefit (for originally full-time workers) but a
characteristic of job offers.
Thus, the pool of economic sectors and of firms more
likely to use irregular employment for restructuring, and be
steered away from core-periphery strategies, are those which
until the 1980s had strong internal labor markets in the
limited sense of having strong institutional ties between
worker and firm. These firms have not fully questionned
these ties in the 1980s even if they have reconsidered
hiring volume, career paths and rewards to seniority.
The limits of predictions for the structure of the macro
labor market
In this general research area --in which authors have
looked at the change in internal labor markets and the
growing use of irregular employment for activities central
to production-- predictions about the structure of the macro
labor market are hard to come by. This is due to that fact
2 CEREQ-ADEP, 1990, v.2, p.61
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that the area's very subject of study is the increasing
difficulty, during the 1980s, (even more so than before) of
assigning firms to a macro market segment (such as core or
periphery) and to tie specific industrial sectors to an
employment strategy in a straightforward way.
For the purposes of this study, the units of analysis
were large, coherent, internal labor markets in sectors
dominated by a few large firms. Implications, then, can
only be drawn for the evolution of firms with large internal
labor markets. Prior to the 1980s, it was customary to
assign these firms to a core segment of the economy. That
concept has evolved since; there has been more heterogeneity
in employment systems across firms within industrial sector
and/or market segment. Noyelle (1987) observed that, in the
1980s, firms (and the sector to which they belong) had lost
their determining role as the locus of the origin of market
segmentation. Instead, the author argued, the skill
contents of job would have that function (and thus generate
the distinction between skilled and unskilled contingent
work.) Another way to draw the same conclusion is to say
that the characteristics of work organizations, their
history, and the way their current choice of technology
implementation are affected by past decisions, all shape
employment strategies but also that the industrial sector is
no longer a straightforward predictor of types of work
organizations. The literature on the organization of
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production and subcontrating patterns has made a strong
claim to growing heterogeneity within conventionally defined
industrial sectors.
Thus, restructuring strategies (as a motive for the use
of irregular employment) may not characterize an entire
industrial sector, and neither will core-periphery
strategies. However, there is still insufficient evidence
to abandon the expectation that industries with past
practices of low-wage/cost-cutting strategies will have a
greater representation of core-periphery structures while
other sectors, with less of these habits, will not.
Aggregate evidence on the concentration of irregular
employment in each sector misses the heterogeneity of
irregular employment in terms of its function in firm
strategies. It does capture the incidence of irregular
arrangements, however, and sectors with high incidence are
those whose firms tend to have core-periphery strategies.
(They also include, however, those sectors which, in the
past, had casual employment or less developed internal labor
markets with few career ladders. In the 1980s, these
sectors have even more reduced internal labor markets. 3)
3 In some of the sectors that are heavy users of
irregular employment in the 1980s, the arrangements
themselves -the bundle of regulation that they entail- seem
to have "gathered or codified" existing casual employment,
for example in Restaurants and fast foods.
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ARE THE BANKING AND INSURANCE CASES SPECIFIC TO FRANCE ?
The concerns which give rise to the above question
relate to the boundaries between firm and national
institutional context. If firm practices are entirely
shaped by national legislation, then the cases are indeed
unique; I think not. The appropriate way to address these
concerns, then, is to point out essential elements of the
French banking and insurance cases as they relate to their
use of irregular employment. In this way, observers may
decide whether these elements are, in and of themselves,
never to be found in other firms, other economic sectors,
and, importantly, other countries. This approach has
another benefit which is to draw lessons from these cases
that may be applicable to other contexts.
Essential features of the two cases fall into two
categories: a/ organizational characteristics and historical
elements specific to the two sectors; and b/ aspects of the
French socio-institutional context which have mediated these
firms' use of irregular employment.
Organizational characteristics and historical elements
I have referred to these in the introduction and,
partially, in the preceding section. First, major French
banks and insurance companies behaved as if they had "time"
to transform their systems of employment. In the 1980s,
they were coming out of a twenty year period of easy market
expansion which had left them with financial reserves. The
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strategies described in this study are those they devised in
anticipation of further growth in their personnel budgets
and only a couple of years into the realization that their
future ability to compete would depend partially upon
stricter control over their operating budgts.
Second, as mentionned above, these banks and insurance
companies had not had practices of pushing clerical workers
in deskilled clerical jobs into part-time shifts or other
tenuous arrangement prior to the 1980s. They had, however,
large processing centers where work was routinized and low-
skilled and workers had experienced no promotions but they
considered these the relics of a prior form of work process
(centralized data processing and computer use) and not a
formula to be replicated extensively in the future.
Needless to say, there may be variations across firms in the
future. For example, the cooperative sector insurance
company was least interested in "core periphery" strategies,
and most interested in retaining and retraining its existing
workforce.4 In contrast, the private insurance companies
that was the product of successive mergers and acquisition
was much more of a mystery in terms of future firm
practices. In early 1990, its personnel management seemed
most interested in keeping workforce costs as low as
possible (because of the burden of financing the corporate
4 Its use of CDDs in hiring in the mid 80s was little
different from that of other firms, however.
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restructuring process) and much more variable than it had
been in the firms that had been taken over.
Third, there was little explicit interest in core-
periphery strategies historically among these firms. As one
banking personnel official stated: "here we store up people
for future use."5 I discuss below to what extent this
attitude is associated with elements of the French
institutional context on employment relations.
Fourth, banks and insurance companies had very low
turnover which, in the absence of drastic layoffs, would
make it very difficult to implement a core-periphery
strategy. The latter entails a vast workforce change which
presumes either high turnover (replacing those who leave
with secondary workforces), or rapid employment growth (not
the case in these sectors), or massive layoffs.
Aspects of the French socio-institutional context which have
mediated the use of irregular employment by banks and
insurance companies.
Before discussing the ways in which the French socio-
institutional context mediated firm practices in the
restructuring polar case, I step back and define how to
think of this context in comparative perspective. Firstly,
if we look at the set of laws directly pertaining to
employment relationships, then countries such as France and
the United States are very wide apart and the expectation is
of very different employment outcomes (see Piore, 1986.)
5 "Ici, on engrange les gens."
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However, where the banking and insurance sectors are
concerned, these broad distinctions in legal systems do not
account for their use of irregular employment for
restructuring. If they could, then research could neatly
sort countries into those with core-periphery employment and
those without. So far, it has proved difficult to do so.
Secondly, if we look at the specific industrial
relations context defined narrowly (as it was in U.S.
industrial relations research prior to the reformulation by
Kochan, Katz and McKersie, 1986) in the two sectors, there
is not enough union power in the sectors and in the French
context at large to account for banks and insurance
companies having so far steered away from core-periphery
strategies.
Thirdly, if we consider, however, generalized socio-
institutional characteristics that affect economic activity
in a broad sense, that color the nature of social
protection, and finally that shape expectations of the
nature of employment relations, 6 then there are factors in
the French case which clearly mediated the use of irregular
employment by banks and insurance companies. These factors
acted by regulating firm behavior and/or by improving the
6 From a comparative perspective, some of the earlier
works to draw the implications of the socio-institutional
context defined in such a way include the study of French
and German plants by Maurice, Sellier and Silvestre (1982)
and Berger and Piore, (1980.)
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status of workers in irregular employment, thereby
indirectly affecting firm practices. I discuss them here.
The fact that the French state is a major shareholder
in all the large banks and insurance companies affects the
latter's responsiveness to concerns of national employment
policy. And concerns about layoffs were heightened by a
sluggish national employment growth through much of the
1980s. As already discussed, these firms avoid generating
unemployment through mass layoffs. As nationalized firms
and major employers, however, they have benefitted from
closer government policy attention. During the 1980s, they
received subsidies to facilitate early retirement and to
hire young workers so as to renew their workforce
progressively.
They are also committed to avoid layoffs through their
collective bargaining agreement. Smaller banks have had
layoffs, however, but these cases are sparse. Because
layoffs are not standard practice in these sectors, and have
not become so in the 1980s, establishing a substantial
periphery of workers subject to frequent layoffs is not part
of easily accessible options for workforce management.
Layoff avoidance, coupled with low workforce turnover, did
compel these banks and insurance companies to use irregular
arrangements but to use them for a progressive
transformation of employment systems.
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Both of these restraints on layoffs have affected the
banking and insurance sectors more directly than the
legislation on administrative oversight on layoffs
originally enacted by a conservative government in the early
1970s and in place until 1986. In the insurance collective
bargaining agreement for the Paris area, the clause pledging
to avoid layoffs was signed the same year as the national
legislation and reflects the meshing of the practices of
large employers and the objectives of the national
government.
The fact that the "social protection" function (Jacoby,
1987) is largely socialized, rather than tied to employers,
may have made core-periphery strategies less appealing to
French firms. It is harder for firms to shelter themselves
from benefits costs by externalizing workers. In fact,
sectors, such as insurance and banking, with developed
internal labor markets are among those for whose workforce
the socialization of employment benefits is most advanced.
In other sectors of the French economy, the social
protection function is less socialized, more in the control
of employers, and thus core-periphery strategies may be more
appealing. For example, in food service or construction, it
7 Another aspect of "uniformization" is the process of
"mensualization" of workforces which proceeded apace during
the 1980s. Full-time manual and clerical workers have for
the most part been brought onto a salaried pay system which
has stabilized earnings for numerous workers. Workers
receive full pay even if hours are cut but receive overtime
rates for hours over 39 per week.
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has been possible for firms to resort to contracting out to
individual workers in order to avoid regulations governing
employment relationships and the cost of socialized
benefits.
The government's ability to extend clauses of a major
collective bargaining agreement to all establishments and
workforces in a sector (another aspect of socialized "social
protection") has also contributed to steer these employers
away from externalizing clerical workforces. Banks and
insurance companies have in the past excluded workers in
non-banking, non- insurance related activities through
service sub-contracting. They cannot, however, elude
clauses of a collective bargaining agreement for their
clerical workers by opening a new establishment in a
different location.
The restrictive aspects of regulation on irregular
employment contracts per se has acted in two ways. It has
altered the terms of trade offs between CDDs and temp
contracts, making the latter costlier but has also made temp
contracts easier to use after 1989. The regulatory power of
the government was also instrumental in compelling
collective bargaining in the temporary help industry.
The national government's ability to regulate the
operations of the temporary help service industry first
"cleaned" the industry of marginal operators, and then
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contributed to the industry's specialization.' The threat
of further regulation, and the ability to carry out that
threat, compelled the temporary help industry to engage in
collective bargaining negotiations which yielded an
agreement giving temp workers a legal status with
significant protection. The government's ability to carry
out that threat was enhanced by the combined effect of the
unpopularity, in the public's eye, of irregular employment
of any form during a period of high unemployment, and that
of the high visibility of the temp industry as a major
"culprit" (publicized cases of bankruptcy and violation of
the labor code.)9
The government's action on the temp help service
industry both built worker protection and altered the
decision terms for user firms as well. It contributed to
turning temp employment into a form of employment they used
sparingly and in particular ways only.
The lesson from the French experience of collective
bargaining for temp workers is that bargaining took place,
and innovative solutions such as seniority portability were
8 Puel (1988) noted that from 1980 to 1988, the number
of temp services was cut in half. Unskilled workers in the
industry decreased from 55 to 30 percent of employment.
Skilled occupations (administrative secretaries, nurses,
solderers, machine tool and die workers) represented over 50
percent of employment in 1980.
9 Those publicized cases are similar to what has
happened in recent months with employee leasing in the
United States.
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found, only once the government threatened the industry with
further costly regulation and conveyed to major union
federations that temping was "there to stay." 10 In the
absence of the regulatory threat, collective bargaining, a
more flexible option to control terms of employment than
legislation, might not have taken place. Also, in the
absence of government monitoring, the temp help industry
might not have been compelled to compete on service
quality --in this case worker micro computer skills-- and
might not have jumped in to fill the training gap left by
the vocational education system where office technologies
skills are concerned.
Finally, government regulation favoring the conversion
of full-time workers to part-time schedules both provided a
job benefit wanted by numerous workers and enabled firms to
renew their workforce by selectively using it to reduce the
presence of some worker categories in the workplace. While
this was not an intended use of part-time, it allowed banks
and insurance companies to increase workforce turnover
(several workers on part-time amount to one worker leaving)
in a time when they needed it while satisfying the
preference of some workers for reduced hours. Needless to
say, it did not meet the needs of all the workers who
10 As a caveat, the novel benefits for temp workers
may be affordable only because of minority of them are
career temp workers.
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desired reduced hours since part-time was selectively
offered to some worker categories only.
ATTEMPTS AT CATEGORIZING NATIONAL ECONOMIES
From the start, this study has stayed away from a
perspective of cross-national comparisons according to which
national differences in legal systems drive all observed
differences in employment structures. These national
differences, however, do provide a context that mediates
firm practices without fully determining them. During the
1980s, the debate of labor market flexibility stimulated
research attempts to sort national economies according to
their degree of labor market regulation. Two polar
arguments were made. Given the new competitive conditions
and technological changes, a/ countries with little labor
market regulation had more wage flexibility and thus were
more competitive, or b/ countries with little regulation
would rely on external flexibility (and core-periphery
strategies) and those with extensive labor market regulation
would be compelled to rely on internal flexibility (job
change and redesign) and would use irregular employment
little (see for example, Brunhes for OECD, 1988.) The
drawback of this approach has been that researchers have
found numerous counter examples in each country to
contradict the predictions drawn from relying primarily on
national labor legislation.
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If I were to put the French case in a similar
framework, it would fall in a category different from the
U.S. but also far from the paragons of the "internal
flexibility" approach which researchers provide, such as the
former Federal Republic of Germany. Marchand (1989) put
France in a category with Italy as an intermediate case of a
"European" model examplified by Sweden and the RFA. On
aggregate, French firms spend too little time and funds on
workforce training to fit the "internal flexibility" model
provided by researchers.
This study provides an added perspective on this
debate; looking at national levels of irregular arrangements
makes it difficult to sort economies into camps because
these statistics hide the range of employer strategies in
which these arrangements fit. Additionally, one cannot
derive conclusions about the role of national regulation by
focusing on a few firm cases because, as several researchers
have pointed out (e.g. Bertrand and Noyelle, 1989), there
can always be found a counter case (for instance,
researchers find cases of internal flexibility in the U.S.
and extensive subcontracting in Sweden.)
With the possibility of the existence of a range of
strategies -from "core-periphery" to "restructuring"- then
national levels of irregular employment can be read in the
following way. Some of the irregular employment is
generated by restructuring polar strategies and most of it
302
is generated by core-periphery strategies. National
contexts of labor legislation may steer certain firms away
from core-periphery strategies, and thus alter projected
levels of irregular employment. That is more likely to
happen, however, if those firms have organizational
histories and attributes of the type displayed by the
banking and insurance cases.
GENERIC ASPECT OF THIS STUDY
As already mentioned in the introduction, this study
moved away from the U.S. debate on irregular arrangements
whose two sides were: a/ irregular employment is secondary
(and imposed on workers) versus b/ irregular employment is
not secondary because it is driven by the preferences of the
workforce. Instead, I took issue with the formulation of
the first side of the debate which is the nature of the
demand for irregular employment, thus assuming that
irregular employement use is demand driven but keeping in
mind that the degree of workforce availability for these
arrangements also affected firm practices.
To draw the distinction between two polar cases of firm
strategies for use of irregular arrangements, I considered
irregular arrangements as a pliable form of employment,
meaning "pliable" in two ways:
irregular arrangements are pliable in that firms put
them to different uses in order to meet varied strategies,
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and they cannot easily be equated with secondary employment,
the category of economic analysis. This first distinction
allowed for a more textured account of irregular employment
than one that would treat it as a residual category of core-
periphery strategies.
.irregular arrangements are pliable in the sense that
their institutional contents (terms and conditions of
employment) vary not only across countries (as is commonly
assumed) but across time in each country and that firm
strategies (which vary within countries) give a different
meaning to it for workers and for economic analysis.
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TABLE 1-1: RECOURSE TO LIMITED DURATION CONTRACTS: PERCENT OF ESTABLISHMENTS
USING THESE CONTRACTS AND PERCENT OF WAGE WORKERS HOLDING SUCH
CONTRACTS: 1977-1983
Establishments with:
10 to 49 50 to 199
workers workers
200 to 499
workers
over 500
workers TOTAL
%of %of %of %of %of %of %of
estab. wkers. estab. wkers. estab. wkers. estab.
%of %of
wkers. estab.
1.2 22.1
3.0 44.5
2.2 52.5
1.7 38.4
3.7 65.0
2.7 70.4
1.9 47.5
3.6 74.8
2.5 74.8
1.2 12.2
2.2 27.0
1.6 30.6
Source: Ministere du Travail, Tableaux Statistiques (Paris: Documentation
Francaise, 1986), p. 204. April 15 survey dates.
TABLE 1-2: RECOURSE TO TEMPORARY HELP CONTRACTS: PERCENT OF ESTABLISHMENTS
USING THESE CONTRACTS AND PERCENT OF WAGE WORKERS HOLDING SUCH
CONTRACTS: 1977-1983
Establishments with:
10 to 49 50 to 199
workers workers
200 to 499
workers
over 500
workers TOTAL
%of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of %of
estab. wkers. estab. wkers. estab. wkers. estab. wkers. estab. wkers.
0.7 13.9
1.2 22.6
0.5 19.5
1.2 26.7
1.6 39.8
0.9 38.6
1.1
1.9
1.2
44.7
59.3
63.0
1.4 7.9
1.8 12.3
1.2 8.7
1977
oA) 1980
2 1983
8.1
20.9
24.8
% of
wkers.
1.4
3.0
2.3
1977
1980
1983
5.0
8.1
5.1
1.1
1.6
0.9
TABLE I-3:SHARE OF CCD IN TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT
CDD - BOTH SEXES
....---- ..--------------------- 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Unspecified sector 4.13 2.05 4.25 2.79 2.39 5.07 2.05
AGRICULTURE 3.88 3.59 3.65 5.57 6.50 7.48 7.06
Food processing 3.26 2.94 2.34 2.46 3.67 5.13 4.34
Energy 0.70 1.29 0.33 0.83 0.81 1.08 1.21
Intermediate goods mfg. 1.57 0.93 1.09 1.83 2.24 2.62 3.52
Production goods mfg. 1.55 1.40 0.84 1.66 1.78 2.64 3.47
u Consumer goods mfg. 2.34 2.26 2.15 2.26 3.10 3.41 3.93
ILn
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 1.87 1.64 1.36 1.90 2.39 3.02 3.57
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORK! 2.57 1.65 1.67 2.27 2.40 3.57 3.76
Trade 2.55 2.27 2.19 2.64 3.35 3.82 4.10
Transportation and Communications 1.20 1.08 1.10 1.65 1.66 2.46 2.61
Market services 2.98 2.91 3.26 3.61 4.49 5.11 5.59
Financial institutions 0.99 1.38 1.42 1.83 1.65 2.27 2.05
Non-market services 2.22 1.76 2.47 2.50 3.97 4.24 5.50
TERTIARY SECTOR 2.35 2.20 2.41 2.78 3.49 4.05 4.48
ALL ACTIVITIES 2.24 1.96 1.97 2.44 3.03 3.71 4.14
Source: Table PA09, Enquete Emploi, 1982-88.
All surveys are for March except for April-May 1982 survey.
TABLE 1-4: SHARE OF TEMPS IN TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT
TEMPS -BOTH SEXES
.-.----..--.---.--------------- 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987
Unspecified sector 3.73 1.37 1.22 3.23 0.61 0.51 2.18
AGRICULTURE 0.00 0.36 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.36
Food processing 0.82 0.78 0.58 0.78 1.16 1.24 1.05
Energy 1.18 1.03 1.34 0.80 0.50 0.81 1.08
Intermediate goods mfg. 0.95 1.01 0.99 1.29 1.11 1.24 2.32
Production goods mfg. 1.64 1.35 1.00 0.99 1.43 1.34 1.86
Consumer goods mfg. 0.59 0.61 0.87 1.13 0.86 0.65 0.99
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 1.09 1.00 0.94 1.07 1.12 1.10 1.62ON
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORK% 1.07 0.72 0.88 1.02 1.42 1.16 1.77
Trade 0.57 0.39 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.38 0.57
Transportation and Communications 0.47 0.61 0.43 0.39 0.65 0.71 0.72
Market services 1.35 1.36 1.14 1.19 1.50 1.55 1.57
Financial institutions 0.34 0.43 0.60 0.48 0.55 0.36 0.86
Non-market services 0.38 0.37 0.14 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.30
TERTIARY SECTOR 0.79 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.87 0.84 0.96
1.00 0.95 1.260.93 0.84 0.79 0.87ALL ACTIVITIES
TABLE 1-4: SHARE OF TEMPS IN TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT
TEMPS -BOTH SEXES
--------------------------- 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1987
Unspecified sector 3.73 1.37 1.22 3.23 0.61 0.51 2.18
AGRICULTURE 0.00 0.36 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.25 0.36
Food processing 0.82 0.78 0.58 0.78 1.16 1.24 1.05
Energy 1.18 1.03 1.34 0.80 0.50 0.81 1.08
Intermediate goods mfg. 0.95 1.01 0.99 1.29 1.11 1.24 2.32
Production goods mfg. 1.64 1.35 1.00 0.99 1.43 1.34 1.86
Consumer goods mfg. 0.59 0.61 0.87 1.13 0.86 0.65 0.99
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 1.09 1.00 0.94 1.07 1.12 1.10 1.62
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORK! 1.07 0.72 0.88 1.02 1.42 1.16 1.77
Trade 0.57 0.39 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.38 0.57
Transportation and Communications 0.47 0.61 0.43 0.39 0.65 0.71 0.72
Market services 1.35 1.36 1.14 1.19 1.50 1.55 1.57
Financial institutions 0.34 0.43 0.60 0.48 0.55 0.36 0.86
Non-market services 0.38 0.37 0.14 0.27 0.28 0.21 0.30
TERTIARY SECTOR 0.79 0.76 0.69 0.71 0.87 0.84 0.96
1.00 0.95 1.260.84 0.79 0.870.93ALL ACTIVITIES
TABLE I-5:SHARE OF INTERNSHIPS (ALL TYPES) IN PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Unspecified sector 1.99 0.60 0.00 0.56 0.58 3.11 1.11
AGRICULTURE 0.51 0.35 0.55 0.26 0.99 1.41 1.44
Food processing 0.41 0.29 0.12 0.10 0.55 0.73 0.79
Energy 0.48 1.73 1.28 0.92 0.43 0.23 1.24
Intermediate goods mfg. 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.42 0.56 0.59
Production goods mfg. 0.17 0.20 0.15 0.33 0.47 0.64 0.68
Consumer goods mfg. 0.27 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.71 0.89
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 0.24 0.31 0.24 0.27 0.47 0.62 0.75
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORK! 0.25 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.23 0.99 1.19
Trade 0.41 0.46 0.30 0.28 0.39 1.42 1.68
Transportation and Communications 0.29 0.26 0.41 0.42 0.56 0.47 0.64
Market services 0.96 0.66 0.63 0.85 1.46 2.03 2.51
Financial institutions 0.36 0.38 0.63 0.54 0.84 0.76 0.54
Non-market services 0.50 0.80 0.56 1.12 2.70 2.75 3.09
TERTIARY SECTOR 0.60 0.54 0.49 0.64 1.14 1.64 1.95
ALL ACTIVITIES 0.43 0.42 0.37 0.44 0.80 1.22 1.45
NOTE: Internships ("stages") combine government sponsored and private ones.
TABLE 1-6: TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS IN EACH MAJOR SECTOR
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Unspecified sector 92,567 47,398 44,518 45,309 49,312 58,866 56,964
AGRICULTURE 309,930 268,288 280,463 247,683 251,606 242,021 260,250
Food processing 497,080 519,660 520,563 554,377 543,460 517,053 501,828
Energy 249,589 254,733 259,706 267,198 278,278 253,995 249,402
Intermediate goods mfg. 1,371,491 1,331,025 1,246,822 1,287,485 1,223,520 1,192,600 1,133,306
Production goods mfg. 1,733,574 1,708,436 1,662,061 1,607,946 1,554,946 1,504,531 1,472,632
Consumer goods mfg. 1,266,581 1,228,217 1,197,278 1,226,928 1,212,344 1,139,621 1,129,556
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 5,118,315 5,042,071 4,886,430 4,943,934 4,812,548 4,607,800 4,486,724
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORKS 1,378,058 1,345,163 1,225,561 1,223,262 1,202,489 1,234,029 1,251,574
Trade 1,920,449 1,956,640 1,969,899 1,921,706 1,894,258 1,948,174 1,981,576
Transportation and Communications 756,545 765,875 755,058 763,443 759,509 769,366 772,547
Market services 2,274,589 2,245,844 2,303,585 2,308,948 2,408,677 2,533,367 2,639,754
Financial institutions 614,728 604,331 622,441 603,382 638,568 648,478 674,309
Non-market services 870,569 850,863 882,374 826,218 838,648 853,440 879,085
TERTIARY SECTOR 6,436,880 6,423,553 6,533,357 6,423,697 6,539,660 6,752,825 6,947,273
ALL ACTIVITIES 13,335,750 13,126,473 12,970,509 12,883,885 12,855,615 12,895,541 13,000,785
Note: Included are "Salaries sauf de I'Etat et des Collectivites Locales"
TABLE I-7:SHARE OF PART-TIME IN TOTAL (PRIVATE AND PUBLIC) WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT
PART-TIME UP TO 30+ HRS (BUT < 40HRS)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Unspecified sector 11.59 8.08 15.34 13.06 13.02 12.32
AGRICULTURE 15.52 13.31 12.45 12.77 13.22 11.67
Food processing 4.66 4.99 5.47 6.00 7.36 6.62
Energy 1.93 3.54 2.93 4.10 2.99 3.41
Intermediate goods mfg. 2.03 2.01 1.84 2.05 2.31 2.04
Production goods mfg. 1.61 1.90 2.00 2.39 2.56 2.27
Consumer goods mfg. 4.83 5.57 4.96 5.40 6.02 5.59
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 2.82 3.21 3.10 3.54 3.92 3.57
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORKS 2.88 2.31 3.00 2.77 3.11 3.05
Trade 11.35 11.45 12.09 13.25 13.98 13.69
Transportation and Communications 4.38 5.17 5.66 6.42 7.52 7.87
Market services 11.53 12.15 13.06 13.92 15.59 15.15
Financial institutions 7.25 6.75 7.35 8.86 8.26 8.64
Non-market services 8.58 16.16 17.29 18.78 20.00 20.64
TERTIARY SECTOR 11.77 12.36 13.26 14.46 15.63 15.72
ALL ACTIVITIES 8.53 8.96 9.67 10.52 11.55 11.60
Source: INSEE, Enquete Emploi.
TABLE I-8:TOTAL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC WAGE AND SALARY WORKERS IN EACH MAJOR SECTOR
Unspecified sector
AGRICULTURE
Food processing
Energy
Intermediate goods mfg.
Production goods mfg,
Consumer goods mfg.
TOTAL MANUFACTURING
CONSTRUCTION AND PUBLIC WORKS
Trade
Transportation and Communications
Market services
Financial institutions
Non-market services
TERTIARY SECTOR
ALL ACTIVITIES
5,196,595 5,126,078 4,973,803 5,034,046 4,892,141 4,689,271
1,384,544 1,350,596 1,234,584 1,228,434 1,210,471 1,240,239
1,923,289
1,225,490
3,128,146
663,054
6,831,872
1,960,428
1,233,208
3,140,955
650,443
3,944,080
10,771,851 10,929,114
17,777,047 17,735,186
1,972,823
1,217,307
3,206,536
671,886
4,026,107
11,094,659
17,642,602
1,923,679
1,240,278
3,256,986
651,552
4,102,792
11,175,287
17,745,734
1,895,438
1,271,440
3,437,758
684,937
4,255,537
11,545,110
17,964,515
1,952,164
1,251,015
3,551,839
694,792
4,227,115
11,676,925
17,918,059
Note: Included are "Salaries sauf de I'Etat et des Collectivites Locales"
1982
106,673
317,384
500,356
264,251
1,375,632
1,782,659
1,273,697
1983
53,741
275,657
524,725
267,398
1,333,751
1,762,652
1,237,552
1984
52,232
287,324
527,668
274,449
1,251,285
1,716,663
1,203,738
1985
53,774
254,193
560,807
291,010
1,292,408
1,657,450
1,232,371
1986
60,354
256,439
548,317
297,476
1,227,697
1,601,601
1,217,050
1987
66,601
245,023
522,886
271,681
1,199,207
1,551,061
1,144,436
TABLE I-9:INCIDENCE OF CDDs IN TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SAL
BOTH SEXES 1982 1
EXECUTIVES AND INTELLECTUAL PROFESSION! 1.39 1
MIDDLE LEVEL OCCUPATIONS 1.63 1
EMPLOYEES 2.68
MANUAL WORKERS 2.35
TOTAL 2.24 1
Notes: 1/ No one from the public sector in included in this table.
2/ This table includes workers in nationalized companies
3/ Artisans and business owners not included because CDDs do not
apply to them.
TABLE l-10:INCIDENCE OF TEMPS IN TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND S
BOTH SEXES 1982 1
ARY EMPLOYMENT
983 1984
1.18
1.72
2.29
2.00
1.96
ALARY
983
EXECUTIVES AND INTELLECTUAL PROFESSION! 0.34 0.18
MIDDLE LEVEL OCCUPATIONS 0.56 0.54
EMPLOYEES 1.05 0.87
MANUAL WORKERS 1.11 1.06
TOTAL 0.93 0.84
Notes: 1/ No one from the public sector in included in this table.
2/ This table includes workers in nationalized companies
3/ Artisans and business owners not included because CDDs do not
1.70
1.59
2.49
1.88
1.97
1985
1.69
1.71
2.76
2.71
2.44
EMPLOYMENT
1984 1985
0.14
0.49
0.89
0.98
0.79
0.06
0.42
0.81
1.26
0.87
1986
1.43
2.15
3.73
3.30
3.03
1986
0.26
0.67
0.65
1.51
1.00
1987
1.97
2.60
4.36
4.15
3.71
1987
0.09
0.54
0.82
1.40
0.95
TABLE I-1l1:TOTAL PRIVATE WAGE AND SALARY EMPLOYMENT IN MAJOR OCCUPATIONS
BOTH SEXES 1982 1983 1984 1985
EXECUTIVES AND INTELLECTUAL PROFESSION( 1,034,285 1,067,535
MIDDLE LEVEL OCCUPATIONS 2,382,137 2,422,316
EMPLOYEES 3,607,433 3,539,606
MANUAL WORKERS 6,311,895 6,097,016
TOTAL 13,335,750 13,126,473
Notes: 1/ No one from the public sector in included in this table.
2/ This table includes workers in nationalized companies
3/ Artisans and business owners not included because CDDs
do not apply to them.
1,106,460
2,446,375
3,559,055
5,858,619
12,970,509
1,092,529
2,473,655
3,480,757
5,836,944
12,883,885
1,173,832
2,457,280
3,512,676
5,711,827
12,855,615
1,185,688
2,512,474
3,548,672
5,648,707
12,895,541
1986 1987
TABLE IV-1: SECTORAL STATISTICS-INSURANCE
Job Categories: Employes (Low)
AM(Agent de Maitrse, Middle)
Cadres (High)
December of
AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT: Administrative
and sales wkers
INDEX 100=1960
% FEMALE WKERS IN AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT
1960 1963 1965 1967 1976 1978 1980 1981
55,980 74,691
45.5
85,900
142 202.7 203.9 205.1 205.5 207.8
45.5 52.2
-ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE ONLY-
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
121,400 123,000 123,200 122,700 122,600 122,500 123,000
210.1 210.5 209.4 209.2 209 210.1
52.4 52.4 52.6 52.7 52.6 52.6
TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE 47,800
ADMINISTRATIVE AS % OF TOTAL WORKFORCE
% FEMALE IN ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE
EMPLOYES AS % OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE
AMs AS % OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE
CADRES AS % OF ADMINISTRATIVE WORKFORCE
CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPLOYES CATEGORY
55.30
66,500
77.70
56.50
AVERAGE AGE OF EMPLOYES
AVERAGE SENIORITY OF EMPLOYES
% FEMALE IN EMPLOYES
% FEMALE EMPLOYES IN TOTAL WORKFORCE
CHARACTERISTICS OF AM CATEGORY
AVERAGE AGE OF AMs
AVERAGE SENIORITY OF AMs
% FEMALE IN AMs
% FEMALE AMs IN TOTAL WORKFORCE
76.82
59.8
24.9
15.3
77.97
56.9
27.6
15.6
32 32
5 5
69.9 69.6
41.8 39.6
40 39
14 15
61.6 63.7
15.2 17.6
PROMOTION THROUGH SENIORITY
% OF EMPLOYES WHO ARE IN 'D' LEVEL
% OF AMI WHO ARE IN 'D' LEVEL
% OF AMII WHO ARE IN 'D' LEVEL
% OF AMIII WHO ARE IN 'D' LEVEL
Source: FFSA, 1989
9.6
27.2
37.6
55.3
78.94 79.07
52.4
30.4
17.2
97,000 97,700
79.02 78.86 79.33
62.14 61.96
49.4
32.2
18.4
32
6
71.6
37.5
40
15
64.5
19.6
12.0
31.8
42.1
58.2
32
7
72.1
35.6
39
14
64.9
20.9
14.8
36.8
45.1
61.1
97,400
79.38
62.15
97,500
79.53
62.01
96,600
78.50
62.24
97,200
79.35
62.05
42.5
36.4
21.0
34
9
71.8
30.5
39
15
65.8
24.0
16.9
36.6
45.5
61.7
TABLE IV-2: SECTORAL STATISTICS- BANKING
Job Categories: Employes (Low)
Grades (Middle)
Cadres (High)
1980 1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
AFB BANK EMPLOYMENT
AFB INDEX
TOTAL OF ALL BANKS
INDEX ALL BANKS
AFB EMP. AS % OF ALL BANKS
243,220 247,165
100.0 101.6
375,989 390,922
100 104
64.7 63.2
250,973
103.2
403,464
107.3
62.2
251,735
103.5
405,205
107.8
62.1
250,988
103.2
404,303
107.5
62.1
248,869
102.3
404,190
107.5
61.6
DATA ON BANKING AND OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS COMBINED
(Bertrand and Noyelle, 1986)
1975 1980
TOTAL EMPLOYMEN' 376,000 412,000
PERCENT CHANGE 2.3
(1975-80)
1985
450,000
1.34
(1980-85)
1980
AFB DATA (March survey of member banks)
1982 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
EMPLOYES AS % OF TOTAL
GRADES AS % OF TOTAL
CADRES AS % OF TOTAL
% FEMALE IN TOTAL
% FEMALE IN EMPLOYES
% FEMALE IN GRADES
% FEMALE IN CADRES
40.7
45.7
13.6
50.2
62.0
50.0
15.8
36.7
49.0
14.3
50.3
63.3
50.5
16.5
34.5
50.9
14.6
50.7
63.8
51.7
17.3
32.3
52.7
15.0
50.7
64.0
52.0
17.4
DISTRIBUTION OF FEMALE WORKERS ACROSS CATEGORIES
% EMPLOYES IN FEMALES
% GRADES IN FEMALES
% CADRES IN FEMALES
50.2 46.1 43.3 40.7
45.5 49.2 51.7 54.1
4.3 4.7 5.0 5.2
DISTRIBUTION OF MALE WORKERS ACROSS CATEGORIES
% EMPLOY ES IN MALES
% GRADES IN MALES
% CADRES IN MALES
31.1 27.1
45.8 48.9
23.1 24.0
AGE DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYED WORKFORCE
------------- (all financial institutions, a broader sector than banks)
PERCENT IN 15-24 GROUP 9.6
PERCENT IN 25-49 GROUP 74.2
PERCENT IN 50+ GROUP 16.2
Source: AFB, 1989 unless otherwise specified.
L,
28.3 26.0 23.4
55.5 57.0 58.8
16.2 17.0 17.8
51.5
65.9
53.6
19.3
52.1
67.3
55.4
21.6
30.5
53.9
15.6
51.3
65.3
52.9
18.4
38.8
55.6
5.6
21.8
52.1
26.1
36.2 33.5 30.2
57.7 59.8 62.4
6.1 6.7 7.4
19.9 18.1 16.0
53.1 53.9 54.8
27.0 28.0 29.2
5.3
81.9
12.8
---------- -
- --------
TABLE IV-3: TOTAL EMPLOYMENT IN FOREIGN BANKS
All
Foreign banking
banks*/ activities
Metropolitan France
1980 14,683 226,818
1987 18,441 229,901
% change +26.0 +1.4
Total activities
1980 16,238 243,220
1987 19,855 248,869
% change +22.3 +2.3
Notes: */ includes branches and subsidiaries
Source: AFB, 1989
Note to me: Effectifs reels , "real" total employment
TABLE IV-4: EMPLOYMENT IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED
(Number reported here is that of workers on payroll as of 12/31 of each year)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
INSURANCE
IN1 Admin
Sales
IN2 Total
Admin
Sales
Cleaning*/
COO Total **/
(Admin+sales)
7,852 7,750
5,472 5,384
10,716
6,549
375
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
7,788 7,722 7,765 7,830 7,665 7,543 7,438 7,336 7,401
5,322 5,169 5,222 4,859 4,730 4,834 4,787 4,556 4,916
17,403
10,502
6,534
367
17,212
10,192
6,660
360
17,557
10,176
7,021
360
17,907
10,154
7,400
353
17,590
10,157
7,440
353
17,558
10,250
6,979
329
17,792
10,303
7,175
314
18,126
10,273
7,543
310
18,342
10,099
7,944
299
2,857 3,026 3,249 3,506 3,698 3,909 4,036 4,109 4,250 4,264 4,203
- BANKS
BK1 43,197 43,478 43,439 43,180 42,691 42,373 41,979 41,649
BK2***/
-covered by contract
-not covered by contract
7,471
150
BK3
REG
7,474 7,515 7,568 7,822 7,993 7,807
150 147 145 109 105 94
48,380 48,433 47,912 47,262 46,400 45,376
1,108 1,077 1,254 1,249 1,225 1,112
BUS 1,370 1,39U 1,42u 1,37' 1,4381
*/ Includes security workforce
**/ This cooperative sector firm owns its sales network and does not separate its administrative and sales workforces.
***/ This bank draws a distinction between workers covered by bargaining unit
and those not included in the bargaining unit
NOTE: employment figure reported includes all workers on CDI, CDD
and in special assignments. It corresponds to line 111 of the Bilan Social
The last bank in the table reports only average employment (line 114)
All firms interviewed were renamed. "COO" indicates the cooperative sector insurance company.
REG" stands for a regional banks and "BUS" for a business customer bank.
1,355
TABLE IV-5: COMPOSITION OF FIRM TOTAL WORKFORCE BY BROAD JOB CATEGORIES
INSURANCE
IN1 Total
Employes
AMI
AMII
AMIII
Middle (AM Total)
High (Cadres)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
7,852 7,750 7,788 7,722 7,765 7,830 7,665 7,543 7,438 7,336 7,401
55.3 53.8 52.0 50.9 50.7 52.0 47.0 41.3 38.4 35.3 33.1
10.7 11.2 12.3 13.0 13.5 13.1 15.8 19.1 19.8 21.5 22.9
11.1 11.4 11.8 12.0 11.8 11.8 12.7 13.5 14.4 14.9 15.3
9.1 9.5 9.4 9.4 9.5 8.7 9.3 9.9 10.4 10.6 10.6
31.0 32.1 33.5 34.3 34.8 33.6 37.8 42.5 44.7 47.0 48.8
13.7 14.1 14.5 14.4 14.5 14.4 15.2 16.1 16.9 17.7 18.1
IN2 total
Employes
AMI
AMII
AMIII
Middle (AM Total)
High (Cadres)
10,250 10,303 10,273 10,099
56.5 55.4 53.4 51.1
7.0 7.5 8.0 8.6
11.4 11.3 11.5 11.9
6.7 7.0 7.0 7.2
25.2 25.8 26.4 27.6
18.4 19.3 20.1 21.2
oo COO
Employes
AMI
AMII
AMll
Middle (AM Total)
High (Cadres)
4,250 4,264 4,203
54.7 52.8 48.6
12.8 13.5 14.8
10.1 10.6 11.8
4.7 4.7 5.3
27.5 28.7 31.9
17.8 18.4 19.5
BANKS TABLE IV-5
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989p/
BK1 43,197 43,478 43,439 43,180 42,691 42,373 41,979 41,649
Employes 32.0 31.0 30.1 28.2 26.1 24.8 22.5 19.2
Grades 11 27.9 28.4 28.6 29.5 30.5 31.1 31.8 33.4
Grades 1I 16.9 17.1 17.6 18.1 18.6 18.6 19.3 20.2
Grades IV 10.4 10.5 10.7 10.8 11.0 11.3 11.6 11.7
Middle (Grades Total) 55.2 56.0 56.9 58.4 60.1 61.0 62.7 65.3
High (Cadres) 12.8 12.8 13.0 13.4 13.8 14.1 14.8 15.6
BK2 7,471 7,474 7,515 7,568 7,822 7,993 7,807
Employes
Grades Il
Grades III
Grades IV
Middle (Grades Total)
High (Cadres)
37.0 33.7 33.0 31.6 29.7 27.7 23.7
21.2 21.9 22.5 22.4 22.7 22.4 24.2
14.4 15.8 15.9 16.5 16.7 16.9 17.9
8.5 8.9 8.9 9.2 9.8 11.8 11.2
44.1 46.6 47.3 48.0 49.3 51.1 53.4
18.9 19.7 19.8 20.2 21.0 21.2 22.9
1989
w
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
BK3 a/ 48,380 48,433 47,912 47,262 46,400 45,376
Employes 50.8 48.1 47.0 46.0 43.2 40.9 38.7 38.8 36.6 34.7 32.7 30.3 27.7 25.3
Grades Il 25.5 25.9 26.7 28.0 29.3 30.5
Grades 111 15.0 15.5 16.0 16.2 16.6 16.8
Grades IV 11.4 11.9 12.2 12.6 12.9 13.4
Middle (Grades Total) 39.5 41.9 42.7 43.6 46.2 48.1 50.1 50.1 51.9 53.3 54.9 56.8 58.8 60.7
High (Cadres) 9.7 10.0 10.3 10.4 10.6 11.0 11.2 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.4 12.9 13.5 14.0
REG
Employes
Grades I1
Grades Ill
Grades IV
Middle (Grades Total)
High (Cadres)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
1,108
40.5
24.2
12.6
6.0
43.2
16.2
BUS 1,404 1,393 1,203
Employes 35.5 31.5 27.0
Grades 11
Grades Ill
Grades IV
Middle (Grades Total) 41.2 43.1 44.7
High (Cadres) 23.3 25.3 28.3
NOTE: p/ preliminary count
a/ For this bank, the proportional breakdown of the workforce pro rates
part-timers in full-time equivalents. As a result, the share of Employes
is underestimated. Also, proportional breakdown and total employment
are not available for 1975 to 192.
1984
1,077
36.8
24.7
14.5
6.1
46.2
17.0
1985
1,254
34.2
23.9
14.5
8.2
46.7
19.1
1986
1,249
30.4
25.0
15.5
9.5
49.6
20.0
1987
1,225
29.5
23.7
16.0
10.9
50.6
19.9
1988
1,112
26.4
23.9
17.2
10.4
51.5
22.0
TABLE IV-6A: SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WORKFORCE (p.1 of 2)
1978 1979 1980 1981
INSURANCE
IN1 Total
< 6 yrs
6 to <16 yrs
16 to 25 yrs
26 to <35 yrs
35+ yrs
7,852
32.5
41.5
16.0
10.0
7,750
29.6
42.6
17.6
10.2
7,788
27.2
43.2
19.3
10.3
7,722
25.2
43.6
20.5
10.8
NA NA NA NA
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
7,765
25.9
42.4
21.1
6.0
4.6
7,830
28.0
41.7
21.5
6.0
2.8
7,665
24.0
43.0
23.3
6.9
2.8
7,543
21.7
39.5
28.3
7.8
2.6
7,438
18.3
37.4
32.8
8.8
2.7
7,336
16.4
37.6
32.8
10.4
2.8
7,401
13.4
38.0
34.3
11.4
2.9
IN2 Total 10,250 10,303 10,273 10,099
< 5 yrs 16.4 17.2 15.1 10.4
5 to < 15 yrs 46.3 39.4 35.0 30.8
15 to < 25 yrs 26.2 31.5 37.3 44.9
25 to < 35 yrs 7.2 8.2 9.0 10.5
35+ yrs 4.0 3.7 3.7 3.4
COO Total 4,250 4,264 4,203
< 1 yr 5.2 4.2 2.6
1 to <6 yrs 29.6 25.8 20.1
6 to < 11 yrs 23.7 25.3 28.2
11 to < 15 yrs 14.5 15.5 15.8
15+ yrs 27.0 29.2 33.3
TABLE IV-6A (cont'd): SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL WORKFORCE (p.2 of 2)
BANKS
BK1 Total
< 5 yrs
5 to < 10 yrs
10 to < 20 yrs
20+ yrs
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
43,197
8.8
22.0
46.3
22.9
BK2 Total a/ 7,471 7,474 7,515 7,568 7,822 7,993 7,807
< 5 yrs 20.1 21.9 21.1 18.8 25.0 24.4 22.7
5 to < 15 yrs 39.1 32.6 28.1 27.4 41.0 38.5 36.1
15 to < 25 yrs 31.0 35.1 40.0 43.2 24.7 28.5 32.7
25 to <35 yrs 6.8 5.6 5.6 5.4 4.8 4.9 5.7
35+ yrs 6.0 6.0 5.1 5.2 4.4 3.6 2.8
BK3 total b/ 47,408 47,169 46,571 45,852 44,997 43,999
< 5 yrs 17.2 16.5 15.5 14.0 9.7 8.0
5 to< 10 yrs 19.2 15.3 13.5 13.6 16.4 15.9
10 to < 20 yrs 37.9 41.2 42.4 42.6 41.0 42.3
20 to < 30 yrs 18.2 19.8 21.4 22.5 25.1 25.4
30+ yrs 7.5 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.8 8.4
REG Total 1,108 1,077 1,254 1,249 1,225 1,112
< 11 yrs (<10 yrs for 1983-85) 56.5 47.2 42.8 52.7 50.7 42.7
11 to <26 yrs (10 to <25 for 1983-85) 42.1 48.7 52.8 44.7 45.6 52.8
26 to <35 yrs (25 to 35 yrs for 1983-85) 1.2 3.6 3.8 2.3 3.2 4.1
35+ yrs 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.4
BUS no data provided
Note: For 1978 to 1981 all workers with over 25 years of seniority
are included in the next to last category
a/ the distribution for 1982 and 1983 does not add to 100 because the figures given
by this bank were slightly inflated in some categories. No correction was possible.
b/ This bank provides a breakdown for the workforce with part-timers
pro-rated in full-time equivalents. Thus, total employment is lower than in previous tables.
1983
43,478
10.1
16.4
48.8
24.6
1984
43,439
10.9
9.5
53.0
26.7
1985
43,180
10.6
7.4
53.4
28.5
1986
42,691
10.2
6.9
52.7
30.2
1987
42,373
10.9
7.6
49.9
31.6
1988
41,979
10.1
8.6
46.7
34.7
TABLE IV-6B: SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYES JOB CATEGORY (p.1 of 2)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
INSURANCE
IN1 Total Employes
< 6 yrs
6 to <16 yrs
16 to <25 yrs
26 to <35 yrs
35+ yrs
4,344
53.7
45.4
0.9
0.0
4,169
49.7
49.4
0.8
0.0
4,052
46.7
52.5
0.8
0.0
3,929
44.2
55.0
0.8
0.0
3,935
45.4
53.7
0.8
0.1
4,071
47.0
52.4
0.5
0.1
3,601
43.4
56.0
0.6
0.0
3,118
42.5
55.8
1.7
0.0
2,854
36.4
61.2
2.4
0.0
2,591
32.8
65.1
2.0
0.0
2,453
24.9
73.2
1.9
0.0
IN2 Total Employes 5,789 5,682 5,486 5,163
< 5 yrs 23.3 24.3 20.9 14.3
5 to < 15 yrs 57.1 49.3 44.6 39.9
15 to < 25 yrs 18.4 24.9 32.9 43.9
25 to < 35 yrs 0.9 1.2 1.3 1.8
35+ yrs 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
COO Total Employes 2,325 2,253 2,044
< 1 yr 7.9 6.4 3.4
1 to <6 yrs 36.3 32.8 26.5
6 to< 11 yrs 23.1 25.5 30.1
11 to < 15 yrs 14.5 14.7 14.3
15+ yrs 18.2 20.5 25.7
TABLE IV-6B (cont'd): SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF EMPLOYES JOB CATEGORY (p.2 of 2)
BANKS
BK1 Total Employes
< 5 yrs
5 to< 10 yrs
10 to < 20 yrs
20+ yrs
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
13,836
24.3
43.1
31.7
1.0
1983
13,491
28.3
33.6
37.0
1.1
1984
13,063
30.3
21.4
46.9
1.4
1985
12,185
29.6
19.1
49.7
1.7
1986
11,137
28.5
18.5
50.8
2.2
1987
10,519
29.4
19.8
47.9
2.9
1988
9,461
26.8
22.7
46.8
3.7
1989
7,976
27.0
25.0
42.9
5.2
BK2 Employes a/ 2,761 2,522 2,481 2,395 2,327 2,216 1,854
< 5 yrs 37.5 42.8 41.2 37.8 47.8 44.3 36.4
5 to < 15 yrs 48.6 41.1 37.5 38.0 42.9 43.8 46.8
15 to < 25 yrs 13.3 15.1 20.4 23.3 8.8 11.1 15.5
25 to <35 yrs 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.1
35+ yrs 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.4
BK3 Employes b/ 17,359 16,384 15,225 13,880 12,490 11,120
< 5 yrs 40.7 40.3 38.8 35.6 24.6 19.8
5 to < 10 yrs 29.6 25.4 24.2 25.7 34.5 35.5
10 to < 20 yrs 26.9 31.2 33.5 34.5 35.5 38.6
20 to < 30 yrs 2.3 2.7 3.1 3.8 5.0 5.6
30+ yrs 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
REG Employes 449 396 429 380 361 294
< 11 yrs (<10 yrs for 1983-85) 79.7 71.0 66.9 71.8 71.7 57.5
11 to <26 yrs (10 to <25 for 1983-85) 20.3 28.8 32.9 27.9 28.0 41.8
26 to <35 yrs (25 to 35 yrs for 1983-85) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.7
35+ yrs 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
TABLE IV-6C: SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF MIDDLE CATEGORY (AMs and GRADES) (p.1 of 2)
1978
INSURANCE
IN1 Total Middle cat.
< 6 yrs
6 to <16 yrs
16 to <25 yrs
26 to <35 yrs
35+ yrs
2,433
2.9
42.0
36.4
18.7
NA
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
2,490
2.2
39.7
39.5
18.5
NA
2,610
2.6
37.0
42.6
17.8
NA
2,669
2.6
35.0
44.4
18.1
NA
2,703
2.6
34.3
45.6
9.8
7.7
2,629
3.5
33.8
48.2
10.2
4.3
2,897
3.7
34.7
47.0
10.7
3.9
3,209
4.0
30.0
52.2
10.6
3.2
3,324
3.9
23.0
58.6
11.5
3.1
3,448
3.7
23.4
56.2
13.6
3.0
3,611
3.6
20.9
57.5
14.8
3.2
IN2 Total Middle cat. 2,578 2,643 2,717 2,792
< 5 yrs 2.4 3.1 3.2 1.8
5 to < 15 yrs 35.1 29.4 25.4 20.9
15 to < 25 yrs 42.6 46.7 49.2 53.5
25 to < 35 yrs 13.4 14.9 16.3 18.5
35+ yrs 6.5 5.9 5.9 5.2
COO Total Middle cat. 1,169 1,225 1,341
< 1 yr 1.3 1.1 1.2
1 to <6 yrs 18.3 15.0 12.0
6 to < 11 yrs 26.9 27.6 28.7
11 to < 15 yrs 16.3 18.9 19.5
15+ yrs 37.3 37.3 38.6
TABLE IV-6C(cont'd): SENIORITY DISTRIBUTION OF MIDDLE CATEGORY (AMs and GRADES)
(p.2 of 2)
BANKS
BK1 Total Middle cat.
< 5 yrs
5 to< 10 yrs
10 to < 20 yrs
20+ yrs
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
23,849
1.3
13.7
59.4
25.6
1983
24,386
1.7
9.8
60.8
27.7
1984
24,712
2.1
4.8
62.8
30.3
1985
25,216
2.7
3.1
61.9
32.3
1986
25,665
3.1
3.0
60.1
33.8
1987
25,878
4.0
3.7
56.9
35.4
1988
26,303
4.1
4.7
52.8
38.5
1989
27,189
5.8
5.6
46.9
41.7
BK2 Middle cat. a/ 3,297 3,479 3,549 3,639 3,853 4,084 4,167
< 5 yrs 9.5 10.2 10.2 9.0 14.1 15.6 15.8
5 to < 15 yrs 35.2 32.1 26.3 24.6 45.3 40.8 36.8
15 to < 25 yrs 42.0 46.2 51.5 55.1 30.8 35.0 38.9
25 to <35 yrs 8.4 6.5 6.8 6.4 5.7 5.7 6.5
35+ yrs 7.0 5.1 5.2 4.9 4.0 2.9 2.1
260 nn. 1 1.41 5119 255203A 635r 26AA7 26972Q
BK t3 Middle cat. l/
< 5 yrs
5 to < 10 yrs
10 to < 20 yrs
20 to < 30 yrs
30+ yrs
3.1
14.9
49.5
24.6
7.9
3.4
11.3
52.0
26.2
7.1
3.7
9.3
52.3
28.0
6.7
4.1
9.2
57.1
28.7
6.5
3.3
10.5
48.0
31.6
6.6
3.0
10.0
48.6
31.3
7.1
REG Middle cat. 479 498 585 619 620 573
< 11 yrs (<10 yrs for 1983-85) 40.1 33.7 29.7 28.1 38.1 30.2
11 to <26 yrs (10 to <25 for 1983-85) 57.8 62.9 67.0 63.3 58.1 65.1
26 to <35 yrs (25 to 35 yrs for 1983-85) 1.7 3.0 2.7 2.6 3.5 4.5
35+ yrs 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.2
TABLE IV-7: AVERAGE SENIORITY IN FIRMS WHICH PROVIDED THE INFORMATION
1983
T M
INSURANCE
IN2 Total
Low
Middle
High
COO Total
Low
Middle
High
|| 1984
F |lIT M
IlI
||I
IlI
II
11I
||I
||I
||I
IlI
11I
||I
F ||I
||I
||I
||I
IlI
||I
II
|II
IlI
IlI
Il
1985 11 1986
T M F lI T
||
14 14 1411 14
10 10 1111 11
18 16 2011 19
19 18 2111 19
11
II 10.1
II 8.2
II 12.4
11 12.7
M
14
10
17
18
9.4
6
10
12
IlI
F II
15 11
111||
20 11
20 11
10.4
8.7
13.3
13.7
1987
T
15
12
19
19
11.2
9.3
13
13.7
11
M F 11
||
15 1511
11 1211
17 2011
18 2011
11
10.6 11.4 11
7.8 9.5 11
10.4 13.9 11
13 14.5 11
BANKS
BK3 Total a/
Low
II
13 11
711
Note: a/ This bank provides average seniority by gender only but not for
the total workforce. It also does not provide average seniority for the
aggregated Middle and High categories.
M F
1988
T
16
12
20
19
12.1
10.2
13.4
14.5
15
11
18
18
11.4
7.5
11.2
13.9
16
13
21
20
12.3
10.7
14.1
15.2
TABLE IV-8: AVERAGE AGE FOR FIRMS WHICH PROVIDED THE INFORMATION
1983
M F
INSURANCE
IN2 Total
Employes (Low)
AM (Middle)
Cadre (High)
COO Total
Employes (Low)
AM (Middle)
Cadre (High)
111984
T IlM F
Il
IlI
llI
II
IlI
II
11I
II
IlI
ll
111985
T IIM F
111986
T IIM
39
35
40
44
36.3
31.2
36.2
40.6
111987
IlMF T
34.3
32.5
36.2
39.6
38
35
41
44
34.8
32.3
36.3
40.1
111988
F T llM
11 40 38 3911 40
11 36 35 3511 36
Il 40 42 41 11 41
11 45 44 4411 45
F T
44 44
1|
36.8 35.1 35.5 11 37.9 36.2 36.6
31.7 33.3 33.1 11 32.8 34.6 34.3
36.2 37.1 36.9 11 36.7 37.3 37.2
41.2 39.9 40.6 11 34.9 35.6 35.4
BANKS Il 1I |1 11 11
BK3 Total a/ 36 34 II 36 35 I 37 35 11 37 36 11 38 37 11 39 37
Employes (Low) 29 29 I 29 29 11 30 31 11 30 31 11 31 32 11 32 33
Grades (Middle) I || Il II 11
Cadre (High) I1 Il Il I1 11
Noteo'This bank provides average age by gender only. It does
not provide it for aggregated Middle and High categories.
..
TABLEJV-9: SHARE OF MIDDLE CATEGORY PROMOTED THROUGH SENIORITY ONLY
IN ONE MAJOR INSURANCE COMPANY
Ratio of AMI (low rung of Middle cat.) who were promoted through
1978 1979 1980 1981
"AMI Seniority" 380 423 497 541
Total AMI 844 872 958 1,002
Total AM 2,433 2,490 2,610 2,669
Percent of "AMI seniority" in:
-Total AMI
-Total AM
45.0
15.6
48.5
17.0
51.9
19.0
54.0
20.3
seniority
1982
582
1,052
2,703
55.3
21.5
1983
556
1,022
2,629
54.4
21.1
*/This is the only company which provided this information.
1984
746
1,210
2,897
61.7
25.8
1985
976
1,442
3,209
67.7
30.4
1986
1,035
1,476
3,324
70.1
31.1
1987
1,132
1,578
3,448
71.7
32.8
1988
1,247
1,694
3,611
73.6
34.5
TABLE IV-10: TOTAL TRAINING BUDGET AS SHARE OF THE WAGE BILL IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED
(I
In %
INSURANCE
IN1a/
IN2
Admin
Sales
COO b/
ncludes wages
1978 1979
paid to workers during training and expenses)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
4.62 4.14 4.34 4.13 4.64 5.07 4.60 4.97
3.05
2.80
3.52
5.17
3.31
3.15
3.64
4.39
BANKS
BK1 3.30 3.60 3.90 3.98 4.28 4.32 4.76 5.77
BK2 2.79 3.26 4.02 3.48 3.59 3.94 4.22
BK3 4.61 4.54 4.74 5.17 5.13 5.04
REG 3.5 4.66 4.39 5.32 4.61 5.54
BUS 1.80 2.25 3.40 3.49 4.67 4.64
a/ This insurance company aggregated training expenses for the Administrative
and Sales network workforces.
b/The cooperative company does not have separate sales and administrative workforces.
4.97
4.51
3.51
5.94
4.35
6.03
5.41
4.36
6.75
5.77
TABLE V-1A: IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN INSURANCE */
Administrative workforce only
December of 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Employe and AMI in CDD total
Female in CDD total
of CDD in female workforce
of CDD in male workforce
of CDD in total workforce
of CDD expiration in exits
"Turnover" a/
Number of temp workers as % of
av. end of month employment
Hours wked per temp wker
Temps (FTEs) as % of employment
% Part-time in female workforce
% Part-time in male workforce
% Part-time in total workforce
99.8 99.5 99.2 99.0 99.4
55.8 56.9 57.0 59.8 62.3
2.1
1.3
1.8
48.7 40.7 37.8 38.5 62.6
99.4
61.3
1.6
1.3
1.5
61.1
1.9
1.5
1.8
2.5
1.7
2.2
16.4 14.2 14.9 17.4 13.1 11.4
12.2
249h
1.5
15.1
186h
1.5
12.9
143h
1.0
10.7
148h
0.8
12.7
142h
0.9
6.1
0.6
4.0
10.2
139h
0.8
7.8
0.7
5.1
8.2
1.3
5.5
10.2
1.1
6.7
Note: FFSA Tableau de bord(1988): coverage is 37-45 % of all insurance employment.
Covers part of the sector to which companies interviewed belong except
for the cooperative firm.
a/ "Taux de rotation"
TABLE V-1 B: IRREGULAR EMPLOYMENT IN BANKING
1987
% CDD in total hiring 28.06
% CDD in Employe hiring 43.75
% CDD in Middle hiring (Grades) 15.04
% CDD in High hiring (Cadres) 1.60
% CDD in male hiring 16.80
% CDD in female hiring 37.21
% of total hiring in:
Employes 53.76
Grades 28.25
Cadres 17.99
% CDD in hiring by type of bank
3 largest banks 13.26
Other Parisian banks 35.52
Regional and local banks 47.13
Foreign banks 20.94
% CDI hiring as share of employment stock (long term hiring)
by type of bank
3 largest banks 2.56
Other Parisian banks 7.75
Regional and local banks 2.80
Foreign banks 9.95
PART-TIME: Enquete Emploi INSEE on Financial institutions
1980 1988
% PT in female workforce 6.4 17.6
% PT in male workforce 0.4 0.9
% PT in total workforce 3.2 9.2
Source: AFB, 1989b
TABLE V-2: RETIREMENT AND QUITS IN ONE INSURANCE COMPANY (Administrative worklorce)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Total exits
Employe
AM
Cadre
Total
496
84
56
636
Retirement as share exits
Employe
AM
Cadre
Total
Quits as share of exits
Employe
AM
Cadre
Total
449
267
112
828
3.6 6.4
59.5 48.3
58.9 76.5
15.9 19.3
7.0 5.1
45.8 57.9
54.7 50.9
17.3 19.4
51.7 49.5 40.9
32.2 22.9 16.8
13.7 22.6 32.1
45.2 43.1 35.6
261
57
37
355
5.2 7.3 1.1 4.2
54.8 77.9 31.6 43.3
57.5 79.5 35.1 45.2
25.6 39.9 9.6 17.0
2.4 5.6
51.1 51.4
41.9 31.7
16.7 23.2
44.8 38.5 41.0 48.4 39.9 45.8
10.8 7.9 28.1 21.7 31.9 18.6
17.5 10.7 32.4 32.3 22.6 50.0
32.0 24.9 38.0 41.0 36.2 39.7
Solidarity contracts as share of retirement
J Employe
AM
Cadre
Total
Early retirement as share of retirement
Employe
AM
Cadre
Total
Distribution of retirement across job categories
Employe 17.8 2
AM 49.5 3
Cadre 32.7 3
Total 100.0 10
Distribution of quits across job categories
Employe
AM 1
Cadre
Total 10
Distribution of total workforce by job category
Employe 55.3 5
AM 31.0 3
Cadre 13.7 1
Total 7,852 7,
38.9 66.7
44.2 70.7
30.4 74.2
39.3 71.2
47.4 44.4 27.3
50.9 44.2 21.2
77.8 52.2 13.5
57.4 46.7 19.7
5.0 30.9 18.8 12.0 10.0 8.8 16.7 9.8 12.7 11.0
6.9 39.2 54.5 57.3 63.0 52.9 54.2 58.5 57.1 46.2
6.1 29.9 26.7 30.7 27.0 38.2 29.2 31.7 30.2 42.9
10.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
6.2 87.2 82.2 83.4 84.0 79.3 80.2 75.3 60.2 56.5
1.1 7.9 8.6 9.1 10.2 11.9 11.2 16.9 12.0 14.8
2.8 5.0 9.2 7.5 5.8 8.9 8.6 7.9 27.8 28.7
)0.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
3.8 52.0 50.9 50.7 52.0 47.0 41.3 38.4 35.3 33.1
2.1 33.5 34.3 34.8 33.6 37.8 42.5 44.7 47.0 48.8
4.1 14.5 14.4 14.5 14.4 15.2 16.1 16.9 17.7 18.1
750 7,788 7,722 7,765 7,830 7,665 7.543 7,438 7,336 7,401
134
89
85
308
7.5
47.2
45.9
29.5
45.5
18.0
36.5
35.1
TABLE V-3: PART-TIME BY JOB CATEGORY IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED
(Administrative workforces unless otherwise specified)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
EMPLOYES
PT (20-30hrs)
% PT in category
Share of total PT
AMs
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
HIGH
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
TOTAL
PT
% PT
% Female in PT
4,344 4,169 4,052 3,929 3,935 4,071 3,601 3,118 2,854 2,591 2,453
19 17 16 16 14 41 107 236 278 316 361
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 1.0 3.0 7.6 9.7 12.2 14.7
59.4 54.8 64.0 61.5 56.0 75.9 55.7 59.0 49.5 44.7 44.3
2,433 2,490 2,610 2,669 2,703 2,629 2,897 3,209 3,324 3,448 3,611
8 7 5 5 6 7 70 152 261 346 410
0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 2.4 4.7 7.9 10.0 11.4
25.0 22.6 20.0 19.2 24.0 13.0 36.5 38.0 46.4 48.9 50.3
1,075 1,090 1,126 1,124 1,127 1,130 1,167 1,216 1,260 1,297 1,337
5 7 4 5 5 6 15 12 23 45 44
0.5 0.6 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 1.3 1.0 1.8 3.5 3.3
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.6 0.6
7,852 7,750 7,788 7,722 7,765 7,830 7,665 7,543 7,438 7,336 7,401
32 31 25 26 25 54 192 400 562 707 815
0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.7 2.5 5.3 7.6 9.6 11.0
84.4 83.9 92.0 96.2 92.0 96.3 96.9 96.8 94.1 92.1 93.3
EMPLOYES
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
5,789 5,682 5,486 5,163
461 527 550 559
8.0 9.3 10.0 10.8
81.7 81.1 78.8 77.5
AMs 2,578 2,643 2,717 2,792
PT 91 107 127 139
% PT in category 3.5 4.0 4.7 5.0
Share of total PT 16.1 16.5 18.2 19.3
HIGH
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
TOTAL
PT
% PT
% Female in PT
1,883 1,978 2,070 2,144
12 16 21 23
0.6 0.8 1.0 1.1
2.1 2.5 3.0 3.2
10,250 10,303 10,273 10,099
564 650 698 721
5.5 6.3 6.8 7.1
99.0 98.6 99.0 99.0
TABLE V-3 (cont'd): PART-TIME BY JOB CATEGORY IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED
COO
EMPLOYES
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
2,325
257
11.1
1,169 1,225 1,341
56 72 81
4.8 5.9 6.0
AMs
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
HIGH
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
TOTAL
PT
% PT
% Female in PT
756
20
2.6
4250 4264
333 385
7.8 9.0
NA NA
BANKS
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 p/
BK1
EMPLOYES
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
MIDDLE (GRADES)
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
HIGH
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
13,836
100
0.7
45.7
13,491
110
0.8
48.2
13,063
952
7.3
50.1
12,185
1,015
8.3
39.8
23,849 24,386 24,712 25,216
106 108 1,067 1,052
0.4 0.4 4.3 4.2
48.4 47.4 56.2 41.2
5,512
13
0.2
5.9
43,197
219
0.5
NA
TOTAL
PT
% PT
% Female in PT
5,601
10
0.2
4.4
43,478
228
0.5
NA
5,664
31
0.5
1.6
43,439
1,899
4.4
NA
5,779
36
0.6
1.4
43,180
2,553
5.9
NA
2,253
291
12.9
2,044
282
13.8
786
22
2.8
818
27
3.3
4203
390
9.3
NA
11,137
1,098
9.9
37.5
25,665
1,789
7.0
61.0
5,889
44
0.7
1.5
42,691
2,931
6.8
NA
10,519
1,069
10.2
35.2
25,878
1,915
7.4
63.1
5,976
53
0.9
1.7
42,373
3,037
7.2
NA
9,461
977
10.3
312
26,303
2,092
8.0
66.9
6,215
59
0.9
1.9
41,979
3,128
7.5
NA
7,976
874
11.0 *
26.9
27,189
2,300
8.5
70.9
6,484
71
1.1
2.2
41,649
3,245
7.8
NA
TABLE V-3 (cont'd): PART-TIME BY JOB CATEGORY IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED (p.3 of 4)
BK2 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
EMPLOYES 2,522 2,481 2,395 2,327 2,216 1,854
PT 20 37 77 106 106 100
% PT in category 0.8 1.5 3.2 4.6 4.8 5.4
Share of total PT 36.4 38.5 43.3 41.7 40.0 35.8
MIDDLE (GRADES)
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
HIGH
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
TOTAL
PT
% PT
% Female in PT
3,479 3,549 2,639 3,853 4,084 4,167
33 54 95 136 145 162
0.9 1.5 3.6 3.5 3.6 3.9
60.0 56.3 53.4 53.5 54.7 58.1
1,473 1,485 1,534 1,642 1,693 1,786
2 5 6 12 14 17
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.8 1.0
3.6 5.2 3.4 4.7 5.3 6.1
7,474 7,515 7,568 7,822 7,993 7,807
55 96 178 254 265 279
0.7 1.3 2.4 3.2 3.3 3.6
96.4 95.8 94.9 94.9 95.5 98.6
BK3 a/
EMPLOYESUL PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
MIDDLE (GRADES)
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
GRADES CLASSE 1I b/
PT
% PT in category
Share of total PT
17,707 16,806 15,667 14,320 12,853 11,480
1,178 1,822 2,010 2,060 2,060 2,017
6.7 10.8 12.8 14.4 16.0 17.6
54.9 49.0 48.1 45.7 44.8 43.5
25,109 25,815 26,304 26,845 27,283 27,543
940 2,018 2,299 2,370 2,452 2,519
3.7 7.8 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.1
43.8 54.3 55.0 52.5 53.3 54.4
12,337 12,544 12,793 13,233 13,595 13,840
635 1,266 1,454 1,663 1,735 1,798
5.1 10.1 11.4 12.6 12.8 13.0
29.6 34.1 34.8 36.9 37.7 38.8
5,564 5,812 5,941 6,097 6,264 6,353
26 57 69 82 89 97
0.5 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
1.2 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.1
48,380 48,433 47,912 47,262 46,400 45,376
2,144 3,717 4,178 4,512 4,601 4,633
4.4 7.7 8.7 9.5 9.9 10.2
97.2 96.4 96.8 96.7 96.8 95.6
HIGH
% PT in category
Share of total PT
TOTAL
% PT
% Female in PT
TABLE V-3 (cont'd): PART-TIME BY JOB CATEGORY IN FIRMS INTERVIEWED (p.4 of 4)
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
REG
EMPLOYES 449 396 429 380 361 294
PT 0 9 14 14 16 15
% PT in category 0 2.3 3.3 3.7 4.4 5.1
Share of total PT 0.0 36.0 35.9 31.8 30.2 30.0
MIDDLE (GRADES) 479 498 585 619 620 573
PT 2 15 19 24 29 30
% PT in category 0.0 3.0 3.2 3.9 4.7 5.2
Share of total PT 100.0 60.0 48.7 54.5 54.7 60.0
HIGH 180 183 240 250 244 245
PT 0 1 3 6 8 5
% PT in category 0.0 0.5 1.3 2.4 3.3 2.0
Share of total PT 0.0 4.0 7.7 13.6 15.1 10.0
ON
TOTAL 1,108 1,077 1,254 1,249 1,225 1,112
PT 2 25 39 44 53 50
% PT 0.2 2.3 3.1 3.5 4.3 4.4
% Female in PT 64.8 65.3 64.2 64.5 64.6 64.9
Notes: BUS did not report part-time data
a/ This bank did not provide the number of workers in each category but only their share
of total employment. I applied to the total number of workers the percent share
of each category. Because this percent had already been pro rated for
part timers, the numbers of Employe and Middle workers are underestimated
and, as a result, their part time rate is inflated.
b/ Lowest grade of the Middle category. This is the only firm which provided
this information.
TABLE V-4: TEMPORARY HELP SERVICE CONTRACTS IN FIRMS (Estimates) (p.1 of 2)
1978 1979 1980 1981
INSURANCE
IN1
a. Avg. monthly # of temps
Avg. durat. in workdays
b.Avg. mont. tot. empl.
Rate (a/b)*100
201 197
NA NA
7,709 7,752
2.6 2.5
108
NA
7,779
1.4
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
53 41.5
NA 17.5
7,730 7,779
0.7 0.5
IN2
a. Avg. monthly # of temps 152 125 115 79
Avg. duration in workdays 15.6 14.7 18.9 13.0
b. Avg. monthly total employment 10,175 10,284 10,296 10,189
Rate (a/b)*100 1.5 1.2 1.1 0.8
COO
a. Avg. monthly # of temps 11.0 5.5 4.1
Avg. duration in workdays 6.7 20.3 20.3
b. Avg. monthly total employment 4,178 4,257 4,241
Rate (a/b)*100 0.3 0.1 0.1
29.8
11
7,780
0.4
22.8
NA
7,719
0.3
47.5
18
7,576
0.6
60.2
NA
7,491
0.8
39.7
NA
7,378
0.5
94.4
28
7,450
1.3
TABLE V-4 (cont'd): TEMPORARY HELP SERVICE CONTRACTS IN FIRMS (Estimates) (p.2 of 2)
BANKS
BK1
a. Avg. monthly # of temps
Avg. duration in workdays
b. Avg. monthly total employment
Rate (a/b)*100
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
124
12.8
43,258
0.3
95
12.2
43,420
0.2
113
13
43,278
0.3
121
19
42,910
0.3
218
21
41,620
0.5
203
21
41,497
0.5
219
16
41,661
0.5
132
15.7
43,118
0.3
BK2
a. Avg. monthly # of temps 52.8 41.1 47.8 72.0 90.8 99.5 89.0
Avg. duration in workdays: Paris*/ 10.3 9.9 27.4 32.2 53.6 31.0 26.8
Avg. duration in workdays: rest of country 18.2 24.3 22.6 11.0 43.1 30.5 47.2
b. Avg. monthly total employment 7,389 7,442 7,473 7,469 7,693 7,940 7,932
Rate (a/b)*100 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.1
BK3
$ a. Avg. monthly # of temps
Avg. duration in workdays
b. Avg. monthly total employment
Rate (a/b)*100
106 220
14 27
47,542 47,321
0.2 0.5
REG
a. Avg. monthly # of temps 6.9 8.25 1.5
Avg. duration in workdays 16 18 11
b. Avg. monthly total employment 1,265 1,220 1,159
Rate (a/b)*100 0.5 0.7 0.1
Note: */ This bank reported average duration for Paris separately
The average monthly number of temp workers is estimated by firms from billing.
245
29
46,776
0.5
256
30
46,069
0.6
245
21
45,294
0.5
131
23
44,383
0.3
TABLE V-5: RATIO OF CDD TO REGULAR CONTRACTS (CDI) IN HIRING FROM THE
(Ratio = 1 if # hired on CDD= # hired on CDI) (p.1 of 2)
INSURANCE 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
IN1
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring
Employe hiring
#CDI in Total
#CDI in Employe
1.16
1.33
325
279
1.40
1.68
205
171
1.14
1.33
287
244
1.32 0.84 0.49
1.39 0.93 0.57
205 329 603
192 296 514
1.54
2.43
76
46
OUTSIDE
1985 1986 1987 1988
1.10
2.83
79
29
1.01
2.48
73
29
1.42
0.84
122
58
0.72
2.21
105
34
IN2
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 0.12 0.44 0.73 0.54
Employe hiring 0.15 0.6 1.09 0.79
#CDI in Total 305 204 161 156
#CDI in Employe 246 148 108 102
COO
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 0.85 1.10 0.89
Employe hiring 1.44 1.81 2.23
#CDI in Total 172 124 141
#CDI in Employe 95 67 52
TABLE V-5 (cont'd): RATIO OF CDD TO REGULAR CONTRACTS (CDI) IN HIRING FROM THE OUTSIDE
BANKS (p.2 of 2)
BK1
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring
Employe hiring
#CDI in Total
#CDI in Employe
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
0.09
0.10
1,305
1,121
0.11
0.12
1,514
1,289
0.15
0.18
1,005
809
0.19
0.27
694
490
0.17
0.26
648
449
0.15
0.21
1,463
974
0.15
0.22
1,177
753
BK2
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 0.16 0.18 0.31 0.85 0.64 0.50 0.58
Employe hiring 0.21 0.25 0.54 1.79 1.23 1.05 4.59
#CDI in Total 562 462 275 206 426 436 264
#CDI in Employe 424 315 158 95 220 185 29
BK3
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 0.14 0.12 0.25 0.23 0.29 0.33
Employe hiring 0.14 0.12 0.27 0.25 0.3 0.35
#CDI in Total 2,339 1,625 901 990 1,070 1,049
#CDI in Employe 2,257 1,569 849 928 1,005 951
REG
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 0.32 0.68 0.15 0.56 1.12 0.68
Employe hiring 0.54 2.13 0.51 2.38 5.67 8.00
#CDI in Total 121 69 85 82 37 37
#CDI in Employe 68 22 14 16 9 3
BUS
Ratio CDD/CDI in:
Total hiring 1.07 0.28 0.16 1.41 0.76 0.27
Employe hiring
#CDI in Total 77 96 148 73 86 51
#CDI in Employe
Note: Statistics on the Middle category not included because hiring
in that category was very limited during the 1980s.
0.12
0.16
1,464
1,057
TABLE V-6: CDD EXPIRATIONS AS SHARE OF EXITS FOR EMPLOYES AND TOTAL WORKFORCE
(p.1 of 2)
INSURANCE
IN1
Employes
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
Total workforce
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
166
426
39.0
169
562
30.1
168
372
45.2
172
520
33.1
132
348
38.0
134
585
23.0
204
449
45.4
207
828
25.0
105
261
40.2
111
355
31.3
83
192
43.2
87
283
30.7
71
168
42.2
72
246
29.3
43 21
272 308
15.8 6.8
160
422
37.9
162
560
28.9
IN2
Employes
CDD expirations 2 13 44 76
Total exits 135 142 183 224
% CDD in exits 1.5 9.1 24.1 33.9
Total workforce
CDD expirations 2 13 45 76
Total exits 250 242 309 415
% CDD in exits 0.8 5.4 14.6 18.3
COO
Employes
CDD expirations 50 71 95
Total exits 104 137 222
% CDD in exits 48.0 51.8 42.8
Total workforce
CDD expirations 53 80 100
Total exits 174 244 341
% CDD in exits 30.5 32.8 29.3
42
142
29.6
21
134
15.7
TABLE V-6(cont'd): CDD EXPIRATIONS AS SHARE OF EXITS FOR EMPLOYES AND TOTAL WORKFORCE
BANKS (p.2 of 2) 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
BK1
Employes
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
Total workforce
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
101 111 144 149 125 152 180 155
1,127 1,055 864 742 738 884 960 944
9.0 10.5 16.7 20.1 16.9 17.2 18.8 16.4
109 118 153 157 129 167 190 180
2,341 2,224 1,972 1,842 1,979 2,695 2,295 2,508
4.6 5.3 7.8 8.5 6.5 6.2 8.3 7.2
BK2
Employes
CDD expirations 23 34 29 38 99 136 151
Total exits 200 208 131 125 100 279 261
% CDD in exits 11.5 16.3 22.1 30.4 99 48.7 57.8
Total workforce
CDD expirations 24 34 30 42 104 153 168
Total exits 434 509 286 263 435 596 686
% CDD in exits 5.5 6.6 10.5 16 23.9 25.7 24.5
BK3
Employes
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
Total workforce
CDD expirations
Total exits
% CDD in exits
107 70 78 66 105 123
979 701 465 420 554 645
10.9 10.0 16.8 15.7 19.0 19.1
107 70 79 66 107 127
1,734 1,435 1,276 1,298 1,498 1,699
6.2 4.9 6.2 5.1 7.1 7.5
REG
Employes
CDD expirations 4 45 22 24 27 41
Total exits 55 88 55 55 44 69
% CDD in exits 7.2 51.1 40.0 43.6 61.4 59.4
Total workforce
CDD expirations 4 45 22 30 34 42
Total exits 144 147 123 133 118 175
% CDD in exits 2.7 25.4 17.9 22.6 28.8 24.0
BUS has no data in its Bilan Social
TABLE VI-1:NCIDENCE OF PART-TIME BY GENDER IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
PART-TIME IN ALL SECTORS
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total
% Female in total
SHARE OF PART-TIME IN TOTAL
Share in male employment
Share in female employment
PART-TIME IN ALL SECTORS
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total
% Female in total
SHARE OF PART-TIME IN TOTAL
Share in male employment
Share in female employment
TOTAL PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMEI
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total
% Female in total
--DEFINED AS 30+ HRS BUT < 40 HRS--
1980 1981 1982
1,515,535
211,305
1,304,230
13.9
86.1
8.5
2.0
17.8
--DEFINED AS LESS THAN 30 HRS--
1,250,223 1,295,398 1,245,550
201,833 193,382 153,422
1,048,390 1,102,016 1,092,128
16.1 14.9 12.3
83.9 85.1 87.7
7.0
1.9
14.8
17,886,442
10,785,182
7,101,260
60.3
39.7
7.3
1.8
15.4
17,813,752
10,652,603
7,161,149
59.8
40.2
7.0
1.5
14.9
17,777,047
10,443,331
7,333,716
58.7
41.3
Note:Prior to 1982, part-time defined as less than 30 hrs per week.
Source: INSEE, Enquete Emploi, 1982-88. Part-time figures concern private and public
wage and salary employment.
1986 19871983
1,588,277
215,616
1,372,661
13.6
86.4
9.0
2.1
18.7
1,299,165
154,472
1,144,693
11.9
88.1
7.3
1.5
15.6
17,735,186
10,403,156
7,332,030
58.7
41.3
2,075,458
329,880
1,745,578
15.9
84.1
11.6
3.2
22.5
1,683,794
262,228
1,421,566
15.6
84.4
1984
1,706,452
239,790
1,466,662
14.1
85.9
9.7
2.3
19.8
1,397,694
173,185
1,224,509
12.4
87.6
7.9
1.7
16.5
17,642,602
10,223,809
7,418,793
57.9
42.1
2,078,132
334,465
1,743,667
16.1
83.9
11.6
3.3
22.5
1,669,756
266,880
1,402,876
16.0
84.0
1985
1,867,478
285,541
1,581,937
15.3
84.7
10.5
2.8
21.0
1,500,579
216,429
1,284,150
14.4
85.6
8.5
2.1
17.0
17,745,734
10,213,654
7,532,080
57.6
42.4
9.4
2.6
18.3
9.3
2.6
18.1
17,964,515
10,194,134
7,770,381
56.7
43.3
17,918,059
10,182,992
7,735,067
56.8
43.2
TABLE VI-2: INCIDENCE OF CDDs AND TEMPORARY HELP CONTRACTS BY GENDER IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
(CDDs are limited duration contracts)
1982
13,335,750
8,425,143
4,910,607
63.2
36.8
TOTAL PRIVATE EMPLOYMEN
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total employment
% Female in total employment
CDD IN ALL SECTORS
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total CDD
% Female in total CDD
TEMPS IN ALL SECTORS
MALE
FEMALE
% Male in total temps
% Female in total temps
SHARE OF CDD IN TOTAL
Share in male employment
Share in female employment
SHARE OF TEMPS IN TOTAL
Share in male employment
Share in female employment
298,391
165,115
133,276
55.34
44.66
124,651
76,267
48,384
61.18
38.82
2.24
1.96
2.71
0.93
0.91
0.99
1983
13,126,473
8,314,672
4,811,801
63.3
36.7
256,823
124,310
132,513
48.40
51.60
110,468
67,013
43,455
60.66
39.34
1.96
1.50
2.75
0.84
0.81
0.90
1984
12,970,509
8,123,692
4,846,817
62.6
37.4
256,163
126,284
129,879
49.30
50.70
102,541
60,814
41,727
59.31
40.69
1.97
1.55
2.68
0.79
0.75
0.86
Source: INSEE, Enquete Emploi, 1982-88. Temp and CDD employment affect
private wage and salary employment only.
1987 19881985
12,883,885
8,018,598
4,865,287
62.2
37.8
314,973
178,566
136,407
56.69
43.31
112,514
71,492
41,022
63.54
36.46
2.44
2.23
2.80
0.87
0.89
0.84
1986
12,855,615
7,918,517
4,937,098
61.6
38.4
389,345
197,195
192,150
50.65
49.35
128,451
89,819
38,632
69.92
30.08
3.03
2.49
3.89
1.00
1.13
0.78
12,895,541
7,940,160
4,955,381
61.6
38.4
478,041
259,182
218,859
54.22
45.78
122,481
85,396
37,085
69.72
30.28
3.71
3.26
4.42
0.95
1.08
0.75
13,000,785
7,955,233
5,047,552
61.2
38.8
537,888
286,876
251,012
53.33
46.67
164,005
113,992
50,013
69.51
30.49
4.14
3.61
4.97
1.26
1.43
0.99
